Family Ownership (family + ownership)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 7 2006
Suwina Cheng
In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non-executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2008
SHUPING CHEN
ABSTRACT We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family's presence in the firm leads to similar results. [source]


Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2008
Yves Bozec
Abstract:, Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders. [source]


RISK, PERSISTENCE and FOCUS: A LIFE CYCLE OF THE ENTREPRENEUR

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 3 2005
Ian Hunter
Business lifecycle; business failure; entrepreneurship; New Zealand; colonisation Adapting a life cycle model from managerial literature, conclusions are drawn about the nature of colonial entrepreneurship from a case analysis of 133 New Zealand entrepreneurs, active between 1880 and 1910. Five stages in the life cycle of the entrepreneur are investigated: preparation, embarkation, exploration, expansion and transformation. Characteristic behaviours observed include the prevalence of entrepreneurial partnerships; a propensity for commencing multiple business ventures; and persistence in the face of business failure. Strategically, the colonial entrepreneur leveraged personal skills and abilities as a modus operandi for business expansion, often relying on family ownership and family management structures. [source]