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False Memories (false + memory)
Selected AbstractsMetamemory Development: Understanding the Role of Similarity in False MemoriesCHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2009Vikram K. Jaswal Research on the development of metamemory has focused primarily on children's understanding of the variables that influence how likely a person is to remember something. But metamemory also involves an understanding of why people occasionally misremember things. In this study, 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 38) were asked to decide whether another child's mistakes in a memory game were due to false memories or guesses. Some of the fictitious child's mistakes were similar to material he had seen earlier and some were not. Six-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, consistently attributed more similar than dissimilar mistakes to false memories. Understanding the link between similarity and false memories improves significantly between 5 and 6 years of age. [source] False memories: What the hell are they for?APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 8 2009Eryn J. Newman Recollecting the past is often accompanied by a sense of veracity,a subjective feeling that we are reencountering fragments of an episode as it occurred. Yet years of research suggest that we can be surprisingly inaccurate in what we recall. People can make relatively minor memory errors such as misremembering attributes of past selves and misremembering details of shocking public events. But sometimes these errors are more extreme, such as experiencing illusory recollections of entire childhood events that did not really happen. Why would the memory system fail us, sometimes very dramatically? We examine various false memory phenomena by first considering them to be a by-product of a powerful and flexible memory system. We then explore the idea that a system that is capable of mentally revising the past serves a predictive function for the future. Finally, we consider the possibility that false memories meet self-image and social needs. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] False memories for a robbery in young and older adultsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2009Alaitz Aizpurua The aim of the present study was to analyse memory performance in young and older adults based on a robbery scenario. The study examined free recall and the recognition of actions, people and details, as well as the Remember/Know/Guess judgements that accompanied recognition. Recognition was evaluated both immediately and 1 week later, although performance was not affected by the retention interval. In the free recall task, the older adults remembered less information than the younger adults but we found no differences between the two with regard to errors. Participants accepted more false actions, thus achieving higher recognition accuracy for people and details. They also categorized false alarms for actions more often as remember than as know or guess judgements. This pattern of results was more pronounced in the older adults, suggesting that aging is an important factor in false memories for events. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Are Young Children Susceptible to the False,Memory Illusion?CHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2002C.J. Brainerd False memories have typically been found to be more common during early childhood than during later childhood or adulthood. However, fuzzy,trace theory makes the counterintuitive prediction that some powerful forms of adult false memory will be greatly attenuated in early childhood, an important example being the Deese/Roediger/McDermott (DRM) illusion. Three developmental studies of this illusion (N=282) found that (1) it was at near,floor levels in young children, (2) it was still below adult levels by early adolescence, and (3) the low levels of the illusion in young children may be due to failure to "get the gist" of DRM materials. [source] False memory and obsessive,compulsive symptomsDEPRESSION AND ANXIETY, Issue 5 2009Heide Klumpp Ph.D Abstract Background: The memory deficit hypothesis has been used to explain the maintenance of repetitive behavior in individuals with obsessive,compulsive disorder, yet the majority of studies focusing on verbal memory show mixed results. These studies primarily evaluated memory accuracy via the inclusion or omission of previously encountered material, as opposed to false recognition (i.e., the inclusion of erroneous material). We evaluated false memories and memory processes in individuals with obsessive,compulsive washing symptoms (OC), individuals matched on depression and anxiety without OC symptoms (D/A), and in nonanxious individuals (NAC). Methods: Twenty-eight OC, 28 D/A, and 29 NAC individuals read OC-threat relevant, positive, and neutral scenarios and then performed a recognition test. Erroneous recognition of words associated to encoded, but not previously viewed, scenarios were classified as false memories. To evaluate processes underlying memory, participants completed a modified remember/know task to examine whether the OC individuals differed from the other individuals in recollective clarity for false memories of OC-relevant (e.g., germs), positive (e.g., lottery), and neutral (e.g., bread) material. Results: The OC individuals used "know" more than the D/A and NAC individuals for false memories of threat. For veridical memories, the OC individuals used "know" more than the NAC, but not, D/A individuals. Conclusions: The greater reliance on "know" (i.e., feelings of familiarity) in general and false threat memories in particular in individuals with OC symptoms may add to feelings of uncertainty for threat-relevant material, which may contribute to compulsive behavior. Depression and Anxiety, 2009. ©2008 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Pathways to false allegations of sexual harassmentJOURNAL OF INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND OFFENDER PROFILING, Issue 1 2006William O'Donohue Abstract A sexual harassment allegation is either true or false. Whether specific allegations are true or false is important to questions of epidemiology, clinical diagnosis and treatment, administrative and legal proceedings, as well as the welfare of actual victims and innocent alleged perpetrators. It is naïve and harmful to operate with the heuristic: ,All claims are true'. However, the truth of many allegations is very difficult to determine, particularly as is often the case when there are no witnesses, no conclusive hard evidence, and the presence of a situation where both parties have divergent accounts of the alleged occurrence. There has been little theoretical or empirical work on what would cause a person to make a false allegation of sexual harassment. This paper gives an overview of the intricacies associated with sexual harassment investigations and enumerates 14 possible pathways to false allegations: lying; borderline personality disorder, histrionic personality disorder, psychosis, gender prejudice, substance abuse, dementia, false memories, false interpretations, biased interviews, sociopathy, personality disorders not otherwise specified, investigative mistakes, and mistakes in determination of the degree of harassment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] ORIGINAL RESEARCH,PAIN: Misremembering Pain: Memory Bias for Pain Words in Women Reporting Sexual PainTHE JOURNAL OF SEXUAL MEDICINE, Issue 5 2009Lea Thaler MA ABSTRACT Introduction., The debate over the classification of dyspareunia as a sexual dysfunction or as a pain disorder raises the question of the comparative cognitive salience of sex and/or pain in the experience of women who report pain with intercourse. Refinements in our understanding of cognitive factors in the experience of pain with intercourse may be important in the development of effective treatments. Aim., This study aimed to compare the cognitive salience of sex and pain word stimuli in women reporting pain with intercourse and in a control group of women without sexual dysfunction. Methods., Twenty women reporting pain during sexual intercourse and 20 women reporting no sexual dysfunction (controls) participated in a memory protocol designed to detect differences as a function of group membership and type of stimulus (sex, pain, and two other control stimuli). Main Outcome Measures., Dependent measures were recall, recognition, intrusions, and false positives for sex words, pain words, and two other control word types. Results., Regardless of group membership, women had best recall for sex-related words; however, women reporting sexual pain evidenced more false memories for pain words than did control women, and pain words elicited more false memories than any other type of word for women with sexual pain. Conclusion., Results are interpreted to suggest that repeated activation through experience with persistent sexual pain may have contributed to the: (i) development of stronger semantic networks related to pain in comparison to no sexual dysfunction controls and; (ii) activation of pain networks more easily triggered by pain-related stimuli in women with sexual pain than in no sexual dysfunction controls. Sex, however, had not attained the cognitive salience of pain. Thaler L, Meana M, and Lanti A. Misremembering pain: Memory bias for pain words in women reporting sexual pain. J Sex Med 2009;6:1369,1377. [source] What's behind crashing memories?APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 9 2009Plausibility, belief, memory in reports of having seen non-existent images The present study investigated the precise nature of crashing memory reports: Are they truly memories or are they based on beliefs? We asked 88 individuals whether they had seen non-existent footage of the Pim Fortuyn assassination and conducted thorough post-experimental interviews. Two-thirds of our participants falsely reported having seen the footage, while less than 10% also reported details that they could not have seen. Moreover, plausibility ratings of having seen the images were higher than false belief ratings, which in turn were higher than false memory ratings. After having been fully debriefed, 81% of the participants who reported crashing memories attributed their false report to their lack of a full understanding of the critical question. Another 10% of this subsample stated that they truly remembered the images (i.e. false memories). Thus, only a small subset of crashing memory reports seems to be induced by false beliefs and/or false memories. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Imagination equally influences false memories of high and low plausibility eventsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2009Stefanie J. Sharman To examine the effects of event plausibility on people's false beliefs and memories for imagined childhood events, subjects took part in a three-stage procedure. First, subjects rated how confident they were that they had experienced certain childhood events. They also rated their memories of the events. Second, 1,week later, subjects imagined one high, one moderate and one low plausibility event. Third, 1,week later (and 2,weeks after their initial ratings), subjects rated their confidence and memory a second time. Imagining the events made subjects more confident that they were genuine experiences and gave subjects clearer and more complete memories. Plausibility did not affect subjects' confidence but it did affect their memories. Subjects developed clearer and more complete memories for high, followed by moderate, followed by low plausibility events regardless of whether those events were imagined. We use a nested model of plausibility, belief and memory to discuss our findings. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Planting false memories for childhood sexual abuse only happens to emotionally disturbed people,,not me or my friendsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2009Kathy Pezdek Pezdek et al. (2006) reported that although imagining a plausible event increased people's belief in the event, imagining an implausible event did not. In response, Rubin and Berntsen (2007) conducted a survey and reported that only 17.8% considered it implausible that someone ,with longstanding emotional problems and a need for psychotherapy' could be a victim of childhood sexual abuse and forget the abuse. We replicated but qualified their findings; perceptions of the plausibility of this event for (a) respondents themselves and (b) other people in their cohort were substantially lower than the perceived general plausibility reported by Rubin and Berntsen. These findings limit the generalizability of Rubin and Berntsen's results to perceptions of personal plausibility and cohort plausibility, even for individuals indicating that they are likely to seek psychotherapy. Consequently, the risk of inducing false memories in psychotherapy may not be a ,substantial danger' as Rubin and Berntsen suggest. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Response: Most people who think that they are likely to enter psychotherapy also think it is plausible that they could have forgotten their own memories of childhood sexual abuseAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2009David C. Rubin Pezdek and Blandon-Gitlin (2008) found that 25% of their participants reported as plausible or very plausible that they themselves could have been a victim of childhood sexual abuse without being able to remember it. In addition, they found that the 25% figure increased to 61% for participants who reported that they were likely at some point in their life to seek psychotherapy. Given past work showing that it is easier to implant a false memory for plausible events, and counter to Pezdek and Blandon-Gitlin's conclusions, these data point to a substantial danger of implanting false memories of childhood sexual abuse during therapy in many people and in most people who are likely to go into therapy. Theoretical issues regarding plausibility are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] False memories for a robbery in young and older adultsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2009Alaitz Aizpurua The aim of the present study was to analyse memory performance in young and older adults based on a robbery scenario. The study examined free recall and the recognition of actions, people and details, as well as the Remember/Know/Guess judgements that accompanied recognition. Recognition was evaluated both immediately and 1 week later, although performance was not affected by the retention interval. In the free recall task, the older adults remembered less information than the younger adults but we found no differences between the two with regard to errors. Participants accepted more false actions, thus achieving higher recognition accuracy for people and details. They also categorized false alarms for actions more often as remember than as know or guess judgements. This pattern of results was more pronounced in the older adults, suggesting that aging is an important factor in false memories for events. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The role of emotional elaboration in the creation of false memoriesAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Sarah B. Drivdahl Two experiments employed an eyewitness suggestibility paradigm to examine the effects of emotional elaboration on the creation of false memories for suggested events. The results of both experiments converge in showing that reflectively elaborating on the emotional consequences of suggested events increases both false belief and false memory in having witnessed the suggested events. Moreover, the results also showed that emotional elaboration leads to higher false memory than other types of meaningful elaboration, thus providing evidence that the emotional content of the elaboration plays a role in promoting false memory development. The results have several real-world implications for forensic and therapeutic interviews. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Abducted by a UFO: prevalence information affects young children's false memories for an implausible eventAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Henry Otgaar This study examined whether prevalence information promotes children's false memories for an implausible event. Forty-four 7,8 and forty-seven 11,12 year old children heard a true narrative about their first school day and a false narrative about either an implausible event (abducted by a UFO) or a plausible event (almost choking on a candy). Moreover, half of the children in each condition received prevalence information in the form of a false newspaper article while listening to the narratives. Across two interviews, children were asked to report everything they remembered about the events. In both age groups, plausible and implausible events were equally likely to give rise to false memories. Prevalence information increased the number of false memories in 7,8 year olds, but not in 11,12 year olds at Interview 1. Our findings demonstrate that young children can easily develop false memories of a highly implausible event. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The tooth, the whole tooth and nothing but the tooth: how belief in the Tooth Fairy can engender false memories,APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2008Gabrielle F. Principe To examine how children's fantasy beliefs can affect memory for their experiences, 5- and 6-year-olds with differing levels of belief in the reality of the Tooth Fairy were prompted to recall their most recent primary tooth loss in either a truthful or fun manner. Many of the children who fully believed in the existence of the Tooth Fairy reported supernatural experiences consistent with the myth under both sets of recall instructions, whereas those who realized the fictionality of the myth recalled mainly realistic experiences. However, those children with equivocal beliefs evidenced a different pattern under each set of instructions, recalling mainly realistic experiences when asked to be truthful and reporting many fantastical experiences when prompted to relate the tooth loss in a fun manner. These findings suggest that children's beliefs in the reality of fantastic phenomena can give rise to genuine constructive memory errors in line with their fantasies. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Chronic and temporary aggression causes hostile false memories for ambiguous informationAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2008Melanie K. T. Takarangi Chronic and temporarily aggressive people show a phenomenon known as the hostile attribution bias (HAB), in which access to hostile schemas leads them to interpret ambiguously hostile information in a hostile way. Can these people also be induced to remember unambiguously hostile, yet completely false information? To address this question, we investigated the effect of both chronic and temporary aggression on recall for a list containing words that could be interpreted as exemplars of either an aggressive (violence-related) or non-aggressive (kitchen-related) category. Subjects were exposed to five consecutive lists of associated words including the ambiguous list, but half read a list of insult words immediately before presentation of the ambiguous list, while the other half read only emotionally neutral lists. When recalling the ambiguous list, aggressive subjects and subjects who were primed with insult words were more likely to report having seen unpresented aggressive words compared with their low aggressive and not primed counterparts. We discuss our findings in line with Anderson and Bushman's (2002) General Aggression Model (GAM). Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Interviewer feedback in repeated interviews involving forced confabulationAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2007Jessica M. Hanba The effects of confirmatory interviewer feedback on eyewitness testimony following forcibly confabulated and accurate responses to repeated interview questions were investigated in two experiments. The first experiment showed that, relative to neutral feedback, confirmatory feedback provided after a forcibly confabulated response greatly increased the likelihood that participants would provide the same confabulated response when re-interviewed 2 days later, led participants to report these repeated confabulations with greater speed and fewer expressions of doubt, and increased the prevalence of false memories. Confirmatory interviewer feedback provided following accurate responses appeared to have more modest consequences for consistency and confidence, but ceiling effects provided little opportunity for observing potential effects. A second experiment showed that these effects of confirmatory feedback are of considerable practical significance, in that, regardless of their accuracy, responses that had earlier been reinforced with confirmatory feedback were much more likely to be judged by others as credible. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The effects of prevalence and script information on plausibility, belief, and memory of autobiographical eventsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 8 2006Alan Scoboria Theoretical predictions of a recently proposed ,nested' model of factors involved in the creation of false memories for childhood events (general plausibility, personal plausibility, autobiographical belief and autobiographical memory) were tested. Prevalence and/or script-relevant information related to one of two unlikely childhood events was administered to a sample of 92 undergraduate participants. Predictions were (a) that script-knowledge would impact general, but not personal plausibility; and (b) that prevalence information would lead to changes in personal plausibility and to a lesser degree autobiographical belief. Memory ratings should not be affected by these manipulations. Predictions were upheld for plausibility, and were partially upheld for autobiographical belief in one of two target events. New post-manipulation support for the nested model was demonstrated. Implications for the nested model, and the creation of false autobiographical beliefs and memories for childhood events are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] ,Mind the gap': false memories for missing aspects of an eventAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2006Matthew P. Gerrie Numerous eyewitness testimony studies have shown that people can falsely remember parts of an event after being exposed to misleading suggestion about it (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978); however, few researchers have examined whether people falsely remember parts of an event when there is no such suggestion. Across two studies, we show that people systematically develop false memories for unseen aspects of an event. In Experiment 1, subjects saw a movie of a woman making a sandwich; some actions were missing. In a memory test, subjects confidently but falsely remembered 17% of unseen information from the event. In Experiment 2, subjects saw the same event, but the missing actions were either crucial or not crucial. Subjects were more likely to falsely remember the missing noncrucial than missing crucial information. Theoretically, our results fit with a source monitoring account of false memories. Practically, our results suggest a means by which we can predict what aspects of an event are likely to be falsely remembered. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The role of perceptual elaboration and individual differences in the creation of false memories for suggested eventsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2001Sarah B. Drivdahl Witnesses who are exposed to false or misleading information in the course of an investigation are often asked follow-up questions designed to elicit more detailed information about the alleged objects/events. The results of the present study showed that pressing witnesses to elaborate on the perceptual characteristics of suggested events increased false memory for these events. Specifically, participants who were asked about the perceptual details of suggested events (e.g. their location, physical appearance, etc.) were much more likely to later claim they ,definitely' remembered witnessing the fictions events than participants who were exposed to the same suggestions but were not probed about additional perceptual details. In addition, the present study examined the role of individual difference variables in susceptibility to suggestion. The results showed that scores on the Tellegen Absorption Scale (but not the Dissociative Experiences Scale and the Creative Imagination Scale) were correlated with susceptibility to false memory in this paradigm. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Metamemory Development: Understanding the Role of Similarity in False MemoriesCHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2009Vikram K. Jaswal Research on the development of metamemory has focused primarily on children's understanding of the variables that influence how likely a person is to remember something. But metamemory also involves an understanding of why people occasionally misremember things. In this study, 5- and 6-year-olds (N = 38) were asked to decide whether another child's mistakes in a memory game were due to false memories or guesses. Some of the fictitious child's mistakes were similar to material he had seen earlier and some were not. Six-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, consistently attributed more similar than dissimilar mistakes to false memories. Understanding the link between similarity and false memories improves significantly between 5 and 6 years of age. [source] False and Recovered Memories in the Laboratory and Clinic: A Review of Experimental and Clinical EvidenceCLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE, Issue 1 2004David H. Gleaves We review the clinical and laboratory evidence for recovered and false memories. Available data suggest that, at least under certain circumstances, both false and recovered memories may occur. We suggest that the critical questions are: (a) how common is each type of memory phenomenon, (b) what factors lead to the occurrence of each (including under what conditions are each possible and/or likely to occur), and perhaps most importantly, (c) can these two types of memories be distinguished from each other? We describe laboratory analogues for both types of experiences and describe an empirical research protocol that can not only demonstrate both phenomena but also compare the two. Such comparisons can help to determine the causes of these phenomena, discover factors that influence the two, and hopefully reveal signature variables that could provide telltale signs differentiating false and recovered memories. [source] Individual differences in the accuracy of autobiographical memoryCLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THEORY & PRACTICE), Issue 3 2004Robert Horselenberg In recent literature on ,false memories', autobiographical memory distortions are often linked to manipulations such as hypnosis or imagination. However, Barclay and Wellman (1986) demonstrated that such distortions might also occur more or less spontaneously. The current study sought to replicate this phenomenon. In addition, it examined whether certain personality traits, (i.e. fantasy proneness, dissociation, absorption, suggestibility and depression) might contribute to such spontaneous pseudo-memories. Volunteers (N = 38) kept a diary of self-selected, outstanding events for a 2-week period. Six months later, they were unexpectedly given a recognition test consisting of original memories and several types of foils. Participants performed relatively well on the recognition task, although they had some difficulties differentiating original items from foil items. Curiously enough, fantasy proneness was related to superior recognition performance.,Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Memories, fantasies, archetypes: an exploration of some connections between cognitive science and analytical psychologyTHE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2001Jean M. Knox The value of cognitive science as a means of investigating psychodynamic theory and practice is discussed and the limitations of this approach are described. Research findings from cognitive science are drawn on to clarify the nature of memory, which is seen to be a mixture of reproduction and reconstruction and the concepts of true and false memory are explored in this light. The part played by implicit memory and internal working models in producing transference is also examined. New ways of conceptualizing fantasy, which describes it as another facet of internal working models, and the role of transgenerational transmission of attachment patterns in creating internal working models are explored. The nature of archetypes is considered in the light of cognitive science research and a minimalist model is proposed, in which they can be likened to image schemas, that is, primitive conceptual structures that exist in a form which can never be experienced directly or indirectly. [source] Response: Most people who think that they are likely to enter psychotherapy also think it is plausible that they could have forgotten their own memories of childhood sexual abuseAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 2 2009David C. Rubin Pezdek and Blandon-Gitlin (2008) found that 25% of their participants reported as plausible or very plausible that they themselves could have been a victim of childhood sexual abuse without being able to remember it. In addition, they found that the 25% figure increased to 61% for participants who reported that they were likely at some point in their life to seek psychotherapy. Given past work showing that it is easier to implant a false memory for plausible events, and counter to Pezdek and Blandon-Gitlin's conclusions, these data point to a substantial danger of implanting false memories of childhood sexual abuse during therapy in many people and in most people who are likely to go into therapy. Theoretical issues regarding plausibility are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The role of emotional elaboration in the creation of false memoriesAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Sarah B. Drivdahl Two experiments employed an eyewitness suggestibility paradigm to examine the effects of emotional elaboration on the creation of false memories for suggested events. The results of both experiments converge in showing that reflectively elaborating on the emotional consequences of suggested events increases both false belief and false memory in having witnessed the suggested events. Moreover, the results also showed that emotional elaboration leads to higher false memory than other types of meaningful elaboration, thus providing evidence that the emotional content of the elaboration plays a role in promoting false memory development. The results have several real-world implications for forensic and therapeutic interviews. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The influence of schematic knowledge on contradictory versus additive misinformation: false memory for typical and atypical itemsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2006Robert J. Nemeth In the current study, we examined the influence of schema consistency on contradictory and additive misinformation. Sixty-four participants were shown a series of still photographs of common scenes (e.g., a kitchen), were later exposed to narratives containing misinformation, and were then tested on their memory of the photographic scenes. In addition, participants were asked to reflect on their phenomenological experience of remembering by giving remember/know responses. Participants reported greater false memory for schema-inconsistent items than schema-consistent items. The findings failed to replicate Roediger, Meade, and Bergman (2001). Explanations for the discrepant findings are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The role of perceptual elaboration and individual differences in the creation of false memories for suggested eventsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2001Sarah B. Drivdahl Witnesses who are exposed to false or misleading information in the course of an investigation are often asked follow-up questions designed to elicit more detailed information about the alleged objects/events. The results of the present study showed that pressing witnesses to elaborate on the perceptual characteristics of suggested events increased false memory for these events. Specifically, participants who were asked about the perceptual details of suggested events (e.g. their location, physical appearance, etc.) were much more likely to later claim they ,definitely' remembered witnessing the fictions events than participants who were exposed to the same suggestions but were not probed about additional perceptual details. In addition, the present study examined the role of individual difference variables in susceptibility to suggestion. The results showed that scores on the Tellegen Absorption Scale (but not the Dissociative Experiences Scale and the Creative Imagination Scale) were correlated with susceptibility to false memory in this paradigm. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Are Young Children Susceptible to the False,Memory Illusion?CHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 5 2002C.J. Brainerd False memories have typically been found to be more common during early childhood than during later childhood or adulthood. However, fuzzy,trace theory makes the counterintuitive prediction that some powerful forms of adult false memory will be greatly attenuated in early childhood, an important example being the Deese/Roediger/McDermott (DRM) illusion. Three developmental studies of this illusion (N=282) found that (1) it was at near,floor levels in young children, (2) it was still below adult levels by early adolescence, and (3) the low levels of the illusion in young children may be due to failure to "get the gist" of DRM materials. [source] |