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Face-to-face Communication (face-to-face + communication)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

An Eye Gaze Model for Dyadic Interaction in an Immersive Virtual Environment: Practice and Experience

COMPUTER GRAPHICS FORUM, Issue 1 2004
V. Vinayagamoorthy
Abstract This paper describes a behavioural model used to simulate realistic eye-gaze behaviour and body animations for avatars representing participants in a shared immersive virtual environment (IVE). The model was used in a study designed to explore the impact of avatar realism on the perceived quality of communication within a negotiation scenario. Our eye-gaze model was based on data and studies carried out on the behaviour of eye-gaze during face-to-face communication. The technical features of the model are reported here. Information about the motivation behind the study, experimental procedures and a full analysis of the results obtained are given in [17]. [source]

Dyadic processes of disclosure and reciprocity in bargaining with communication

JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING, Issue 1 2003
Kathleen L. McGinn
Abstract We offer a study revealing the mechanisms through which communication helps actual bargaining behavior outperform economic predictions. The possibility of individually strategic behavior in the presence of private information leads to game-theoretic predictions of less than full efficiency. We present a one-stage, simultaneous offers bargaining game in which buyers and sellers have independent, privately held valuations for the item being sold (i.e. a bilateral auction with two-sided private information). In three communication treatments, parties are: (a) allowed face-to-face communication prior to submitting offers; (b) allowed written communication prior to submitting offers; or (c) allowed no-communication prior to submitting offers. When parties are allowed pre-play communication, we find nearly full efficiency (98%). We examine two systematically predictable aspects of dyadic interaction,disclosure and reciprocity,to explain how negotiators achieve this efficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Community-based individual knowledge construction in the classroom: a process-oriented account

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER ASSISTED LEARNING, Issue 3 2010
C.-K. Looi
Abstract This paper explores the process of knowledge convergence and knowledge sharing in the context of classroom collaboration in which students do a group learning activity mediated by a generic representation tool. In analysing the transcript of the interactions of a group, we adapt the group cognition method of Stahl and the uptake analysis methodology of Suthers to understand how the members of the group did meaning making in their interactions, and how individual members did uptakes of their interactions and applied their new shared knowledge or understanding in new situations. The transcript is taken from our school-based research using the Group Scribbles software technology which provides representation spaces for individual, group or class work to support collaborative practices. Our work contributes toward a methodology for explaining a process-oriented account of a small group interaction through face-to-face communication over external shared representations. [source]

A Comparison of Exit and Voice Relationships Under Common Uncertainty

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2003
Herbert Dawid
We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized (1) by moral hazard, and (2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project, which is carried out by a subcontractor (the parties only have identical a priori beliefs). We consider a two-period model where the players can update their estimate of the base cost level according to incoming information. Exit relationships, where the firm signs one-period contracts with different subcontractors, are compared with voice relationships, where both partners commit to a two-period interaction and (due to information sharing and face-to-face communication between the partners) additional information about the base cost level is generated. It is shown that in such a dynamic framework with common uncertainty the quality of the additional information plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the optimal relationship: voice-based strategies governed by long-term contracts are preferable if the precision of the additional information about the base cost level is high. If the precision of the additional signal is low, exit strategies with frequent changes of the subcontractors are optimal for the manufacturer. [source]