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Expert Testimony (expert + testimony)
Kinds of Expert Testimony Selected AbstractsJuror Beliefs About Police Interrogations, False Confessions, and Expert TestimonyJOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2010Mark Costanzo Although there has been a rapid expansion in research on police interrogations and false confessions, little is known about the beliefs of potential jurors as to these issues. In collaboration with a trial research firm, we recruited 461 jury-eligible men and women who matched the demographic characteristics of jury pools in several states. Surrogate jurors responded to questions and statements in five areas: likely rates of false confessions for different crimes, the ability to discern true from false confessions, beliefs about false confessions, beliefs about permissible interrogation tactics, and beliefs about expert testimony on police interrogations. Results indicated that jurors believed that police interrogators are better than ordinary people at identifying lies and that this ability improves with experience. Jurors believed that they would be able to differentiate a true confession from a false confession by watching a videotape, but were less confident about making such a differentiation from an audio recording. A large majority of the sample reported that it would be helpful to hear expert testimony about interrogation techniques and reasons why a defendant might falsely confess to a crime. There were no significant gender differences. Compared to whites, nonwhite jurors had significantly less confidence in the abilities of the police and gave significantly higher estimates of false confession rates. Results are discussed in light of prior research and implications for jury decision making and expert testimony. [source] English Law's Epistemology of Expert TestimonyJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2006Tony Ward The decision whether to believe an expert witness raises difficult epistemological and ethical questions for a lay juror or judge. This article examines the English courts' approach to these questions in the light of a series of cases which endorse the test of admissibility formulated in the Australian case o/R v. Bonython. It argues that, if interpreted more rigorously than it generally has been to date, Bonython could provide the framework for an approach which avoids the pitfalls of either a ,scientistic' or a ,constructivist' epistemology of expert testimony. Such an approach needs to distinguish between different types of expertise and the differing degrees of deference that they call for on the part of a lay fact-finder. [source] Medical Evidence and Expert Testimony in Child Sexual AbuseJUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOURNAL, Issue 1 2006LORI D. FRASIER ABSTRACT Expert medical testimony in child sexual abuse cases can be critical to the outcome of a legal case. This article will review the development of the medical knowledge and clinical expertise in child sexual abuse. Since the passage of mandatory child abuse reporting laws, the forensic medical examination of a child for evidence of sexual abuse has become standard. Until recently, many myths regarding female genital anatomy existed but were based primarily on dogma and lack of empirical research. Over the past 25 years, many research studies and accumulating clinical evidence have expanded medical knowledge and debunked old myths. Physical evidence, even in cases of alleged genital or anal penetration is rare. Sexually transmitted infections are also uncommon and often require medical interpretation as to their significance in a prepubertal child. Specialized medical knowledge, training, and clinical expertise have developed in order to evaluate children presenting with allegations of sexual abuse. Such medical expertise provides invaluable service to courts. We review criteria for evaluating such expertise in light of current medical practice. [source] Jurors'Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the MessageLAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 2 2003Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi Jurors are laypersons with no specific expert knowledge, yet they are routinely placed in situations in which they need to critically evaluate complex expert testimony. This paper examines jurors'reactions to experts who testify in civil trials and the factors jurors identify as important to expert credibility. Based on in-depth qualitative analyses of interviews with 55 jurors in 7 civil trials, we develop a comprehensive model of the key factors jurors incorporate into the process of evaluating expert witnesses and their testimony. Contrary to the frequent criticism that jurors primarily evaluate expert evidence in terms of its subjective characteristics, the results of our study indicate that jurors consider both the messenger and the message in the course of evaluating the expert's credibility. [source] Ambiguous Responsibilities: Law and Conflicting Expert Testimony on the Abused Woman Who Shot Her Sleeping HusbandLAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 2 2000Renée Römkens First page of article [source] Expert Testimony by Ethicists: What Should be the Norm?THE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Issue 2 2005Edward J. Imwinkelried First page of article [source] Expert Testimony by Persons Trained in Ethical Reasoning: The Case of Andrew SawatzkyTHE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Issue 3 2000Françoise Baylis First page of article [source] Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: The effects of evidence, coherence and credentials on juror decision makingAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2010Bianca Klettke Psychological experts have been used increasingly to testify in child sexual abuse cases, yet little research has investigated what specific factors make experts effective. This study examined the potential effects that credentials, evidence strength and coherence may have on juror decision making. Sixty-four mock jurors read cases of child sexual abuse, followed by experts' testimony and rated guilt of the defendant, effectiveness of the expert testimony and credibility of the victim. Evidence strength and coherence of the testimony affected all dependent variables, and the interaction was significant. Guilt ratings of the defendant were lower and the victim was rated as less credible when both evidence strength and coherence were low. The credentials of the expert, however, had negligible impact. These findings indicate that experts can be effective and impact jurors when testimony is either high in coherence or high in evidence. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Expert testimony in recovered memory trials: Effects on mock jurors' opinions, deliberations and verdictsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2010Julie A. Buck The current study examined the impact of adversarial expert testimony on deliberations and verdicts in a mock trial involving recovered memories of child sexual abuse. Participants (N,=,238) were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions in a 2 (Defense Expert: absent or present),×,3 (Plaintiff Expert: absent, general or specific/therapist) factorial design. After reading the mock trial transcript, participants completed a questionnaire and deliberated to reach a jury verdict. The defense expert's statements effectively reduced the number of pro-plaintiff verdicts and the plaintiff's credibility. These effects were not mitigated by the plaintiff experts, suggesting that the plaintiff experts may only confirm jurors' prior pro-repression beliefs. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Effects of false-evidence ploys and expert testimony on jurors' verdicts, recommended sentences, and perceptions of confession evidence,BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 3 2009William Douglas Woody Ph.D. During interrogations, police may use false-evidence ploys or fabricated claims to convince suspects to confess. Mock jurors read trial materials containing interrogation transcripts with or without a false-evidence ploy and one of two expert witness conditions (present or absent). We examined jurors' verdicts, recommended sentences, and perceptions of the interrogation. Although factual evidence and the defendant's confession remained constant across conditions, false-evidence ploys led to fewer convictions and shorter sentences. Jurors also perceived interrogations with ploys as more deceptive and coercive. Expert testimony reduced convictions and increased interrogation deception and coercion ratings. Across ploy types, participants rated demeanor ploys as less deceptive and recommended longer sentences for confessors. Outcomes reveal important, previously unrecognized consequences of false-evidence ploys. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Psychology brings justice: the science of forensic psychology,CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR AND MENTAL HEALTH, Issue 3 2003Gisli H. Gudjonsson Professor of Forensic Psychology In this paper the focus is on one aspect of forensic psychology: the development of psychological instruments, a social psychological model and assessment procedures for evaluating the credibility of witnesses and police detainees during interviewing. Clinically grounded case work and research has impacted on police interviewing and practice, the admissibility of expert psychological testimony and the outcome of cases of miscarriage of justice. After describing the research that laid the foundations for advancement of scientific knowledge in this area, a brief review is presented of 22 high-profile murder cases where convictions based on confession evidence have been quashed on appeal between 1989 and 2001, often primarily on the basis of psychological evidence. The review of the cases demonstrates that psychological research and expert testimony in cases of disputed confessions have had a profound influence on the practice and ruling of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales and the British House of Lords. The cases presented in this paper show that it is wrong to assume that only persons with learning disability or those who are mentally ill make unreliable or false confessions. Personality factors, such as suggestibility, compliance, high trait anxiety and antisocial personality traits, are often important in rendering a confession unreliable. Future research needs to focus more on the role of personality factors in rendering the evidence of witnesses and suspects potentially unreliable. Copyright © 2003 Whurr Publishers Ltd. [source] A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SUITABILITY AND LIMITATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS IN FAMILY COURTFAMILY COURT REVIEW, Issue 2 2007Steven K. Erickson Psychologists are frequently consulted by the courts to provide forensic evaluations in a variety of family court proceedings. As part of their evaluations, psychologists often use psychological tests to assess parents, guardians, and children. These tests can have profound effects on how psychologists arrive at their opinions and are often cited in their reports to the court. However, psychological tests vary substantially in their suitability for these purposes. Most projective tests in particular appear to possess little scientific merit for evaluations within family court proceedings. Despite these serious limitations, expert testimony derived from evaluations using both projective and objective tests is often admitted uncontested. This article reviews the psychometric properties of psychological tests that are widely used in family court proceedings, cautions against their unfettered use, and calls upon attorneys to inform themselves of the limitations of evaluations that incorporate these tests. [source] Juror Beliefs About Police Interrogations, False Confessions, and Expert TestimonyJOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2010Mark Costanzo Although there has been a rapid expansion in research on police interrogations and false confessions, little is known about the beliefs of potential jurors as to these issues. In collaboration with a trial research firm, we recruited 461 jury-eligible men and women who matched the demographic characteristics of jury pools in several states. Surrogate jurors responded to questions and statements in five areas: likely rates of false confessions for different crimes, the ability to discern true from false confessions, beliefs about false confessions, beliefs about permissible interrogation tactics, and beliefs about expert testimony on police interrogations. Results indicated that jurors believed that police interrogators are better than ordinary people at identifying lies and that this ability improves with experience. Jurors believed that they would be able to differentiate a true confession from a false confession by watching a videotape, but were less confident about making such a differentiation from an audio recording. A large majority of the sample reported that it would be helpful to hear expert testimony about interrogation techniques and reasons why a defendant might falsely confess to a crime. There were no significant gender differences. Compared to whites, nonwhite jurors had significantly less confidence in the abilities of the police and gave significantly higher estimates of false confession rates. Results are discussed in light of prior research and implications for jury decision making and expert testimony. [source] Kumho, Daubert, and the Nature of Scientific Inquiry: Implications for Forensic Anthropology,JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES, Issue 4 2008Christopher R. Grivas M.S. Abstract:, In the last 15 years, the US Supreme Court has implemented major changes concerning the admittance of expert testimony. In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals superseded the Frye ruling in federal courts and established judges, not the scientific community, as the gatekeepers regarding the credibility of scientific evidence. In 1999, a lesser-known but equally important decision, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, ruled that technical expert testimony needed to employ the same rigor as outlined in Daubert, but experts can develop theories based on observations and apply such theories to the case before the court. Anthropology has never been defined as a hard science. Yet, many recent publications have modified existing techniques to meet the Daubert criteria, while none have discussed the significance of Kumho to anthropological testimony. This paper examines the impact of Daubert and Kumho on forensic anthropology and illustrates areas of anthropological testimony best admitted under Kumho's guidance. [source] The effects of labelling, expert testimony, and information processing mode on juror decisions in SVP civil commitment trialsJOURNAL OF INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND OFFENDER PROFILING, Issue 1 2009Joel D. Lieberman Abstract Expert witnesses offering testimony in sexually violent predator civil commitment trials may use diagnostic labels that are either familiar (e.g. ,psychopath') or unfamiliar (e.g. ,paraphilia') to jurors. Using predictions based on cognitive experiential self-theory, we explored the influence of testimony type (clinical versus actuarial) and diagnostic label (psychopath versus paraphilia) on jurors motivated to adopt either an experiential processing mode (PM; in which heuristic cues may be strongly relied upon) or an analytic rational PM. Consistent with previous research, our results indicated that when given a psychopathic diagnostic label, mock jurors motivated to process information experientially were more influenced by clinical testimony, whereas mock jurors induced into a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. However, experientially oriented jurors given a paraphilia diagnostic label did not show the expected influence of clinical expert testimony, and instead were more persuaded by actuarial testimony. These findings are discussed from a judgement and heuristics cues framework. The implications of several procedural suggestions are examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] English Law's Epistemology of Expert TestimonyJOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2006Tony Ward The decision whether to believe an expert witness raises difficult epistemological and ethical questions for a lay juror or judge. This article examines the English courts' approach to these questions in the light of a series of cases which endorse the test of admissibility formulated in the Australian case o/R v. Bonython. It argues that, if interpreted more rigorously than it generally has been to date, Bonython could provide the framework for an approach which avoids the pitfalls of either a ,scientistic' or a ,constructivist' epistemology of expert testimony. Such an approach needs to distinguish between different types of expertise and the differing degrees of deference that they call for on the part of a lay fact-finder. [source] Informing Theory from Practice and Applied ResearchJOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, Issue 3 2006Patricia Gurin Editors' introduction: Patricia Gurin grew up in southern Indiana where citizens split in support of the South and the North during the Civil War, and where the Ku Klux Klan was founded. After graduating from Northwestern University, she worked with the American Friends Service Committee (the social action voice of the Quakers). Later, after earning her PhD in social psychology at the University of Michigan, she (with Edgar Epps) conducted a study of students attending historically Black colleges, focusing on how the vast majority integrated collective and individual achievements, worked with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and stayed in college at the same time. That work initiated her life-long interest in personal and group identity. Most recently, Gurin presented expert testimony in the 2003 Supreme Court cases on affirmative action and the use of race in college admissions decisions. This social science evidence, providing strong support for the compelling interest for diversity in higher education, was widely cited in the majority opinion favoring race-conscious admission policies. Gurin brings this rich activist scholarship to her commentary and discusses the promise of practice and applied research for informing theory. She traces her own professional biography, one that evolved from being a researcher (using primarily national surveys) and teacher (primarily large lecture courses) to becoming intimately involved in teaching through interactive, small group learning communities. Gurin brings to light contributions from the articles that converge on theorizing about the social context such that the theorizing can take into account differences rather than be applied universally. [source] Jurors'Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the MessageLAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 2 2003Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi Jurors are laypersons with no specific expert knowledge, yet they are routinely placed in situations in which they need to critically evaluate complex expert testimony. This paper examines jurors'reactions to experts who testify in civil trials and the factors jurors identify as important to expert credibility. Based on in-depth qualitative analyses of interviews with 55 jurors in 7 civil trials, we develop a comprehensive model of the key factors jurors incorporate into the process of evaluating expert witnesses and their testimony. Contrary to the frequent criticism that jurors primarily evaluate expert evidence in terms of its subjective characteristics, the results of our study indicate that jurors consider both the messenger and the message in the course of evaluating the expert's credibility. [source] The Treating Physician as Expert Witness: Ethical and Pragmatic ConsiderationsPAIN MEDICINE, Issue 5 2006Ben A. Rich JD ABSTRACT Objective., The objective of this analysis is to apprise pain physicians of the ethical concerns and practical considerations that arise when a treating physician is called upon to testify as an expert witness in a legal proceeding involving his or her own patient. The provision of expert testimony in medico-legal proceedings has come under heightened scrutiny in recent years. When a physician testifies as an expert witness, such testimony is considered to be the practice of medicine, and hence subject to the same ethical and professional obligations as patient care. Increasingly, medical professional organizations have promulgated guidelines for such activities, and even implemented oversight mechanisms to review complaints concerning expert testimony by their members. Additional issues are raised when the expert witness is also the treating physician for the patient who is a party to the legal proceeding in which the expert testimony is offered. Conclusions., While it is not categorically unethical or inadvisable for a physician to testify as an expert witness in a medico-legal proceeding involving his or her own patient, such activity raises special issues and concerns. Prospective expert witnesses in such situations should be cognizant of these issues and insure that they have been adequately addressed before and during the testimony. [source] Ethical Implications of Physician Involvement in Lawsuits on Behalf of the Tobacco IndustryTHE JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS, Issue 4 2007Jess Alderman The statements of physicians who serve as expert witnesses for the tobacco industry reveal subtle but significant problems. Some expert testimony obfuscates the important issues, and some initially reasonable statements later evolve into extreme positions during cross-examination. Such statements fall into a "gray area" of professional ethics, potentially misleading juries and adversely affecting professional integrity. Medical associations can and should strongly enforce professional standards that do not tolerate tobacco industry influence on physician expert witnesses. [source] Does Trial presentation medium matter in jury simulation research?APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2010Evaluating the effectiveness of eyewitness expert testimony This study assesses whether mock jurors' perceptions of eyewitness expert testimony vary based on the level of ecological validity,video or transcript trial presentation medium. In Experiment 1, 496 jury-eligible mock jurors were presented a simulated trial. Each served in one condition in a 3 (no expert or eyewitness expert either with or without prosecution rebuttal witness),×,2 (trial presentation medium: Video or transcript) design. Participants were generally less certain of the defendant's guilt after the eyewitness expert testimony, and affective and cognitive ratings of the expert testimony were higher in the transcript than video condition. However, there were no significant interactions of modality with expert conditions, thus reducing concerns that jury simulation research must be conducted with live or video trials to be externally valid. Findings were replicated in Experiment 2 using the testimony of a different eyewitness expert rated to have a more dynamic communication style. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: The effects of evidence, coherence and credentials on juror decision makingAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2010Bianca Klettke Psychological experts have been used increasingly to testify in child sexual abuse cases, yet little research has investigated what specific factors make experts effective. This study examined the potential effects that credentials, evidence strength and coherence may have on juror decision making. Sixty-four mock jurors read cases of child sexual abuse, followed by experts' testimony and rated guilt of the defendant, effectiveness of the expert testimony and credibility of the victim. Evidence strength and coherence of the testimony affected all dependent variables, and the interaction was significant. Guilt ratings of the defendant were lower and the victim was rated as less credible when both evidence strength and coherence were low. The credentials of the expert, however, had negligible impact. These findings indicate that experts can be effective and impact jurors when testimony is either high in coherence or high in evidence. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Expert testimony in recovered memory trials: Effects on mock jurors' opinions, deliberations and verdictsAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2010Julie A. Buck The current study examined the impact of adversarial expert testimony on deliberations and verdicts in a mock trial involving recovered memories of child sexual abuse. Participants (N,=,238) were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions in a 2 (Defense Expert: absent or present),×,3 (Plaintiff Expert: absent, general or specific/therapist) factorial design. After reading the mock trial transcript, participants completed a questionnaire and deliberated to reach a jury verdict. The defense expert's statements effectively reduced the number of pro-plaintiff verdicts and the plaintiff's credibility. These effects were not mitigated by the plaintiff experts, suggesting that the plaintiff experts may only confirm jurors' prior pro-repression beliefs. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] What US prosecutors and defence attorneys know and believe about eyewitness testimonyAPPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 9 2009Richard A. Wise The present study compared what prosecutors and defence attorneys know about eyewitness testimony, what they believe jurors know about eyewitness testimony, and what legal safeguards they think are necessary to educate jurors about eyewitness factors. A total of 73 prosecutors and 1184 defence attorneys completed a survey about eyewitness testimony. Both groups of attorneys had extensive experience practicing law and trying criminal cases. Prosecutors were significantly less knowledgeable than the defence attorneys on almost every issue including the weak relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy at trial, jurors' inability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses and the benefits of sequential lineups. The prosecutors were less willing than the defence attorneys to permit eyewitness expert testimony and were less sceptical of jurors' knowledge of eyewitness testimony. We highlight issues from the survey that are relevant to the training of prosecutors and defence attorneys about eyewitness testimony. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Estimating the effects of misleading information on witness accuracy: can experts tell jurors something they don't already know?APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 7 2007Bradley D. McAuliff This study investigated potential differences between expert and lay knowledge of factors influencing witness suggestibility. Expert psychologists (N,=,58), jurors (N,=,157), and jury-eligible undergraduates (N,=,220) estimated the effects of misleading information on witness accuracy for three age groups in various conditions. Respondents possessed similar knowledge of age-related trends in suggestibility, the positive effects of a pre-misinformation warning, and the negative influence of longer delays between the event/misinformation and event/final memory test. Compared to experts, laypeople underestimated the size of suggestibility differences between age groups and lacked knowledge about how event detail centrality, witness participation, and source prestige can increase witness suggestibility. Laypeople rated themselves as being largely unfamiliar with witness suggestibility research and thought that expert testimony would be beneficial. These data shed light on the potential helpfulness of expert testimony in cases involving witness suggestibility. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Effects of false-evidence ploys and expert testimony on jurors' verdicts, recommended sentences, and perceptions of confession evidence,BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 3 2009William Douglas Woody Ph.D. During interrogations, police may use false-evidence ploys or fabricated claims to convince suspects to confess. Mock jurors read trial materials containing interrogation transcripts with or without a false-evidence ploy and one of two expert witness conditions (present or absent). We examined jurors' verdicts, recommended sentences, and perceptions of the interrogation. Although factual evidence and the defendant's confession remained constant across conditions, false-evidence ploys led to fewer convictions and shorter sentences. Jurors also perceived interrogations with ploys as more deceptive and coercive. Expert testimony reduced convictions and increased interrogation deception and coercion ratings. Across ploy types, participants rated demeanor ploys as less deceptive and recommended longer sentences for confessors. Outcomes reveal important, previously unrecognized consequences of false-evidence ploys. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Judicial gatekeeping and the social construction of the admissibility of expert testimony,,BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 2 2008Mara L. Merlino Ph.D. Content analysis of 192 U.S. District Court cases was conducted to investigate judges' evaluations of expert characteristics and evidence characteristics for toxicology, psychological/psychiatric, and damages testimony. Judges evaluated more expert characteristics, but not more evidence characteristics, as the number of months post- Daubert increased (Hypotheses 1 and 2). More evidence characteristics were evaluated when evidence was quantitatively rather than qualitatively based (Hypothesis 3). The greatest number of evidence characteristics examined was for toxicology evidence (Hypothesis 4). Fewer expert characteristics were evaluated for admissible evidence, but more evidence characteristics were evaluated for inadmissible evidence (Hypothesis 5). All analyses were significant at .05. Implications for judges, attorneys, and experts are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Determining dangerousness in sexually violent predator evaluations: cognitive,experiential self-theory and juror judgments of expert testimonyBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 4 2007Joel D. Lieberman Ph.D. Past research examining the effects of expert testimony on the future dangerousness of a defendant in death penalty sentencing found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific clinical expert testimony and tend to devalue scientific actuarial testimony. This study was designed to determine whether these findings extend to civil commitment trials for sexual offenders and to test a theoretical rationale for this effect. In addition, we investigated the influence of a recently developed innovation in risk assessment procedures, Guided Professional Judgment (GPJ) instruments. Consistent with a cognitive,experiential self-theory based explanation, mock jurors motivated to process information in an experiential condition were more influenced by clinical testimony, while mock jurors in a rational mode were more influenced by actuarial testimony. Participants responded to clinical and GPJ testimony in a similar manner. However, participants' gender exerted important interactive effects on dangerousness decisions, with male jurors showing the predicted effect while females did not. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Gender differences in attitudes toward psychopathic sexual offenders,,BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 1 2006Laura S. Guy M.A. Although a considerable amount of research has been conducted examining the validity of psychopathy as a psychological construct, relatively few studies have focused on the effects of using this disorder in "real-world" settings to influence the attitudes of laypersons who are making life-altering decisions about offenders. This study attempted to replicate and extend earlier findings (Guy & Edens, 2003) suggesting that there are gender differences in the impact of expert testimony regarding psychopathy. A sample of 599 undergraduates reviewed case facts regarding a hypothetical Sexually Violent Predator trial in which the type of risk assessment testimony provided (clinical opinion, actuarial scale, psychopathy evaluation) and the age of the victims (adult versus child) were manipulated. Consistent with prior research, despite overall high rates of support for commitment in the adult victim condition, men were less prone than women to support civil commitment when the defendant was described as "a psychopath" (62.5 versus 86.5%). No such gender differences were noted in the clinical opinion or actuarial conditions. When the victims were identified as children, type of testimony had no impact because support for commitment was almost unilateral. Finally, ratings of how psychopathic the defendant was perceived to be (regardless of the testimony provided) were significantly associated with support for commitment across most conditions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The effects of rational and experiential information processing of expert testimony in death penalty casesBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW, Issue 6 2004Daniel A. Krauss J.D., Ph.D. Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive,experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] | ||||||||||||||||