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Agency Relationship (agency + relationship)
Selected AbstractsAltruism and Agency in the Family Firm: Exploring the Role of Family, Kinship, and EthnicityENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 6 2006Neri Karra This article examines the relationship between altruism and agency costs in family business through an in-depth case study of a family firm. We found that altruism reduced agency costs in the early stages of the business, but that agency problems increased as the venture became larger and more established. Moreover, we suggest that altruistic behavior need not be confined to family and close kin, but may extend through networks of distant kin and ethnic ties. We thus present a more complex view of the agency relationship in family business than is often portrayed in the existing literature. [source] Mutual expectations: a study of the three-way relationship between employment agencies, their client organisations and white-collar agency ,temps'INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL, Issue 1 2004Janet Druker ABSTRACT This paper examines the mutual expectations of employment agencies, the temporary workers who are placed by them and the client or host companies with whom they are placed. It considers the ambiguities and complexities inherent in the psychological contracts of agency temps, pointing to positive dimensions of the agency relationship with temps coupled with a tough transactional regime. In periods of uncertainty agency temping provided individuals with an illusion of freedom and control. [source] An agency analysis of church,pastor relationsMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2001Charles Zech Incentives are critical to the study of economics. But do they work in non-traditional economic settings, such as religious organizations, in a manner consistent with economic theory? This study considers the agency relationship between churches and their clergy. This paper contends that pastor compensation is not typically tied directly to performance, but rather indirectly through promotion tournaments. Pastors whose performance is recognized as being exceptional are rewarded by being called to larger, more prestigious congregations. Given the difficulty of observing and measuring pastor performance this represents a sensible solution to the church,pastor principal,agent problem. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] King Canute and the ,Problem' of Structure and Agency: On Times, Tides and HerestheticsPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2009Colin Hay The story of King Canute (Cnut) is well known. Indeed, in perhaps its most familiar form it exists as an oral historical tradition passed from generation to generation. In this almost legendary account, King Canute is depicted as an arrogant ruler, so confident as to his own omnipotence that he takes on the forces of nature, pitting his own powers against those of the rising tide , his wet robes paying testament to his powerlessness in the face of potent material forces and to the triumph of (natural) structures over (human) agency. Or so it might seem. In this article I suggest that even in this, the simplest depiction of the story of Canute, the relationship between structure and agency is more complex and involved than it appears. This complexity is only accentuated if we turn from the legend to the historical evidence. Moreover, by reflecting on Canute's practical negotiation of the ,problem' of structure and agency we can not only gain an interesting political analytical purchase on a seemingly familiar tale, but we can also generate a series of valuable and more general insights into our understanding of the structure,agency relationship. In particular, the (various) stories of King Canute and the waves alert us to the need: (1) to maintain a clear distinction between the empirical and the ontological; (2) to resist the temptation to attempt an empirical adjudication of ontological issues (or, indeed, an ontological adjudication of empirical issues); (3) to differentiate clearly between the capacities of agents with respect to material/physical structures on the one hand, and social/political structures on the other; (4) to acknowledge the significance of unintended consequences; (5) to attend to the ,performative' dimensions of agency; and (6) to recognise the dangers inherent in an overly instrumental view of actors' motivations and intentions. [source] Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the SenateAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2009Sean Gailmard A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal-agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi-experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives,as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions. [source] Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in JapanTHE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2007Toshiaki Iizuka This article examines the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the markup. However, physicians are also sensitive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs. Overall, although the markup affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient's out-of-pocket costs than their own profits from markup. [source] A cross-national study of corporate governance and employment contractsBUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 3 2008Roberto García-Castro Corporate governance (CG) can be seen to operate through a ,double agency' relationship: one between the shareholders and corporate management, and another between the corporate management and the firm's employees. The CG and labour management of firms are closely related. A particularly productive way to study how CG affects and is affected by the employment relationship has been to compare CG across countries. The contributions of this paper to that literature are threefold. (1) An integration of aspects of the labour management literature in the CG debate. (2) Based on a sample of about 1000 firms from 31 countries, we find evidence of complementarities between the CG and the labour management of firms. Extreme cases, in general, outperform mixed cases. (3) Firm differences within countries are more important than scholars have assumed so far. We present the results of the study and implications for future research and for practice. [source] | |||||||||||||