Home  About us  Contact
 

Agency Model (agency + model)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting50%
Humanities and Social Sciences41%

Selected Abstracts

Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communication,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2000
PIERRE JINGHONG LIANG
Abstract Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source that partially but credibly conveys the agent's private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self-report). In a simple setting with no communication, alternative labor market frictions lead to alternative optimal recognition policies. When the agent is allowed to communicate his or her private information, accounting signals serve as a veracity check on the agent's self-report. Finally, such communication sometimes makes delaying the recognition optimal. We see contracting and confirmatory roles of accounting as its comparative advantage. As a source of information, accounting is valuable because accounting reports are credible, comprehensive, and subject to careful and professional judgement. While other information sources may be more timely in providing valuation information about an entity, audited accounting information, when used in explicit or implicit contracts, ensures the accuracy of the reports from nonaccounting sources. [source]

Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate Governance

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2006
Robert F. Radin
Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds. [source]

The Decision of the Supply Chain Executive to Support or Impede Supply Chain Integration: A Multidisciplinary Behavioral Agency Perspective,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 4 2009
Verónica H. Villena
ABSTRACT Applying the behavioral agency model developed by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998), this article analyzes human resource factors that induce supply chain executives (SCEs) to make decisions that foster or hinder supply chain integration. We examine two internal sources (compensation and employment risk) and one external source (environmental volatility) of risk bearing that can make SCEs more reluctant to make the decision to promote supply chain integration. We argue and empirically confirm the notion that an employment and compensation system that increases SCE risk bearing reduces the SCE's willingness to make risky decisions and thus discourages supply chain integration. We also reveal that this negative relationship becomes stronger under conditions of high environmental volatility. In addressing the "so what?" question, we found empirical support for the hypothesis that supply chain integration positively influences operational performance. Even though this decision has a positive value for the firm, we showed that SCEs discourage supply chain integration when they face higher risk bearing. Hypotheses are tested using a combination of primary survey data and archival measures in a sample of 133 Spanish firms. [source]

Business Models and the Transfer of Businesslike CentralGovernment Agencies

GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2001
Oliver James
At the same time as many researchers in public administration are suggesting the emergence of similar New Public Management (NPM) forms in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, a substantial number of those working in comparative political economy are rediscovering differences between countries. This paper explores a key component of NPM,business-like central government agencies,in four countries: the UK, the U.S., Germany, and Japan. So far, the private sector side of the NPM story has largely been neglected. However, the business-like agency model as developed in the UK was influenced by the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. In comparative political economy, the Anglo-American system is seen as different from that in Germany or Japan. These differences are important for understanding transfer through emulation of the UK agency model by policy-makers in other countries. An apparent inconsistency may be developing, with governments using an NPM form based on an Anglo-American model of business that is far from universal in business itself. [source]

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2000
Harry J. Paarsch
We develop and estimate an agency model of worker behavior under piece rates and fixed wages. The model implies optimal decision rules for the firm's choice of a compensation system as a function of working conditions. Our model also implies an upper and lower bound to the incentive effect (the productivity gain realized by paying workers piece rates rather than fixed wages) that can be estimated using regression methods. Using daily productivity data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia tree-planting firm, we estimate these bounds to be an 8.8 and a 60.4 percent increase in productivity. Structural estimation, which accounts for the firm's optimal choice of a compensation system, suggests that incentives caused a 22.6 percent increase in productivity. However, only part of this increase represents valuable output because workers respond to incentives, in part, by reducing quality. [source]

The Political Power of the Retirees in a Two-Dimensional Voting Model

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003
Georges Casamatta
We show that the retirees are able to obtain favorable pension policies whereas they belong to a minority in the population. The argument relies on the multidimensional nature of the political process. We consider a two-dimensional collective choice problem. The first of these choices is the level of the contribution rate to the Pay-As-You-Go pension system. The second is a noneconomic decision, unrelated to the pension system. Using a political agency model, we show that, as soon as the retirees are sufficiently numerous, the equilibrium tax rate may be higher than the tax rate preferred by the young, who yet constitute a majority over the pension issue. [source]

Policymaking in the Parallelogram of Forces: Common Agency and Human Service Provision

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 3 2004
Anthony M. Bertelli
The "congressional dominance" literature in political science provides valuable insights into the legislative control of administrative agencies. However, this literature tends to be conceptualized with respect to regulatory agencies, and it is not especially helpful in understanding the dynamics of policymaking in the provision of human services. After distinguishing the tasks of regulation and human services provision, we present an alternative: a common agency model of human service policy as the outcome of interest group bargaining. We illustrate its implications with an analytic narrative of service provision for the seriously mentally ill. [source]

Policymaking in the Parallelogram of Forces: Common Agency and Human Service Provision

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 2 2004
Anthony Bertelli
The "congressional dominance" literature in political science provides valuable insights into the legislative control of administrative agencies. However, this literature tends to be conceptualized with respect to regulatory agencies, and it is not especially helpful in understanding the dynamics of policymaking in the provision of human services. After distinguishing the tasks of regulation and human services provision, we present an alternative: a common agency model of human service policy as the outcome of interest group bargaining. We illustrate its implications with an analytic narrative of service provision for the seriously mentally ill. [source]

Executive Clemency or Bureaucratic Discretion?

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2007
Two Models of the Pardons Process
This article examines the use of the president's pardon power from 1953 to 2000. Two different models are used to describe the pardons process: a presidential model and an agency model. The presidential model takes a top-down approach to the pardons process by viewing the pardon power as a resource that the president can use to advance specific policy goals. In contrast, the agency model views the pardons process as a bottom-up process, with the preferences of officials within the Department of Justice as the key determinant of the number of pardons issued. This article empirically tests both of these models and finds that the president's control over the pardons process is limited by officials within the Justice Department and the actions of past presidents. This is illustrated by an in-depth case study of President Bill Clinton's controversial use of the pardon power. [source]

Revenue authorities: are they the right vehicle for improved tax administration?

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 3 2001
Nick Devas
It is now well recognised that reforms to tax administration are as important as tax policy changes for overall fiscal reform. One institutional model of tax administration, which has been quite widely adopted in Africa in recent years, is that of the semi-independent Revenue Authority. This approach is based on the executive agency model, widely adopted in the UK and elsewhere, as a way of improving performance of certain governmental functions. This article looks at the arguments for and against the Revenue Authority model, and examines a number of practical issues in the design of such an agency. It draws on the recent experience of Revenue Authorities in a number of countries. It concludes that the Revenue Authority model can offer an appropriate institutional framework for reforming tax administration, particular where low pay rates and rigid civil service systems inhibit effective management. However, Revenue Authorities do not solve all problems, and can only be expected to deliver results if they form part of a wider reform. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 1 2000
Rafael La Porta
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends. [source]

The evaluative face of a descriptive model: Communion and agency in Peabody's tetradic model of trait organization

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 7 2008
Guido Peeters
An important strand of research on cognitive trait organization is connected with Peabody's (1967) tetradic model stressing two non-evaluative dimensions: tight,loose and assertive,unassertive. The relationship of this model with the communion/agency model involving two evaluative dimensions is discussed and empirically investigated. It is shown that the models are orthogonally related suggesting four trait categories: agentic tight,loose, communal tight,loose, agentic assertive,unassertive and communal assertive,unassertive. Implications are discussed regarding the interpretation of stereotype contents, the validity of the tetradic and communion/agency models and the development of a functionalist approach of social perception and judgment. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]