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Executive Remuneration (executive + remuneration)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Overcoming Poor Value Executive Remuneration: resolving the manifest conflicts of interest

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2002
Allen Sykes
First page of article [source]

Executive Remuneration in Australia

AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 1 2010
Allan Fels
A fierce debate is raging about the legitimacy of executive pay rises. Australia's chief executive salaries are not as high as in the United States and the big European economies, but between 1993 and 2007 there was a sharp rise in remuneration. Most of the rise came in the form of incentive payments. In the Australian context, the size of the executive salary is closely linked with the size of the company. The evidence is mixed about how efficient executive remuneration has been, but what is clear is that the responsibility to ensure it is appropriate resides with boards, and that there is a need for greater shareholder participation. Accordingly, it is recommended that shareholders have a greater ,say on pay', and that two successive ,no' votes on remuneration by shareholders will have formal consequences for boards. The challenge is to improve agency between shareholders and management, and between shareholders and boards. An evolutionary approach is proposed. [source]

Balancing Self-interest and Altruism: corporate governance alone is not enough

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2004
Sandra Dawson
Governance has become a topic of unprecedented emotional significance and fundamental importance in the boardrooms of companies, partly as a result of a confluence of early 21st century corporate scandals, stock market falls and public rage about senior executive remuneration. A simple adherence to formal systems of corporate governance, in terms of structures, rules, procedures and codes of practice, whilst a starting point, will not alone win back confidence in markets and corporations. Consideration needs to be given to how to release entrepreneurial self interest within a moral context. This focuses attention on the role of other major social institutions which may more naturally be able to nurture a moral framework as well as the role of individual citizens and the responsibility of all of us to enact a moral framework for business activities. There is no escape from individual moral responsibility, and our part in creating and sustaining social institutions beyond corporations. [source]

Structure and Level of Remuneration Across the Top Executive Team

AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 3 2010
Michaela Rankin
This paper details the level and structure of executive remuneration across the executive team from 2006 to 2009. Results indicate that the level and structure of executive pay varies across the executive team. There is a clear delineation between the level and structure of all components of pay for the CEO and Executive 1, and for other executives. Employees of finance firms receive higher levels of pay and greater proportions of bonus than do employees in other sectors. Pay structure in 2009 is different from other years in the study, indicating that the economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 has led to differences in executive pay. [source]

Executive Remuneration in Australia

AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 1 2010
Allan Fels
A fierce debate is raging about the legitimacy of executive pay rises. Australia's chief executive salaries are not as high as in the United States and the big European economies, but between 1993 and 2007 there was a sharp rise in remuneration. Most of the rise came in the form of incentive payments. In the Australian context, the size of the executive salary is closely linked with the size of the company. The evidence is mixed about how efficient executive remuneration has been, but what is clear is that the responsibility to ensure it is appropriate resides with boards, and that there is a need for greater shareholder participation. Accordingly, it is recommended that shareholders have a greater ,say on pay', and that two successive ,no' votes on remuneration by shareholders will have formal consequences for boards. The challenge is to improve agency between shareholders and management, and between shareholders and boards. An evolutionary approach is proposed. [source]