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Executive Institutions (executive + institution)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	50%

Selected Abstracts

Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2001
David P. Baron
This paper presents theories of strategic nonmarket participation in majority-rule and executive institutions and develops from those theories a set of principles for nonmarket strategy. The theories are based on models of vote recruitment in client and interest-group politics and on models of common agency. The basic strategies developed are majority building, vote recruitment, agenda setting, rent-chain mobilization, majority protection, and competitive agenda setting and vote recruitment. [source]

Government-opposition dynamics in the European Union: The Santer Commission resignation crisis

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 5 2005
NILS RINGE
It considers the ideological left-right divide and the sovereignty-integration dimension as potential sources of a government-opposition cleavage in the EU, as well as a ,representation dimension'. The empirical evaluation of these propositions is based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the political crisis leading to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission. The article finds that government-opposition dynamics in the EU are related to the sovereignty-integration dimension of EU politics and to representation in EU executive institutions, rather than a left-right divide. Both political beliefs and opportunistic motivations determine government-support and opposition in the EU. [source]

Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions

Party Size, Ideology, and Executive-Level Representation in Advanced Parliamentary Democracies

POLITICS & POLICY, Issue 3 2009
CAROLYN FORESTIERE
How do party size and ideology matter for executive-level representation in parliamentary systems? This paper attempts to answer this question by providing and analyzing comparative data on 105 parties across 16 advanced parliamentary democracies. The electoral performance of each party is assessed, alongside the extent of each party's legislative and executive representation over time, from roughly 1945 to 1995. Two main conclusions are derived from the analysis. First, concerning party size, larger parties tend to be overrepresented in government-level institutions while for smaller parties the evidence is mixed, since almost half of the smaller parties in the data set have never achieved executive-level representation. Second, concerning party ideology, center parties have been largely overrepresented in executive institutions while left-wing parties have been the most systematically underrepresented in the 16 countries. ¿Qué tanto importan el tamaño del partido y su ideología para la representación a nivel ejecutivo en los sistemas parlamentarios? Este articulo trata de responder esta pregunta al proveer y analizar información comparativa de 105 partidos a través de 16 democracias parlamentarias avanzadas. La actuación de cada partido es evaluada junto al grado de la representación legislativa y ejecutiva a través del tiempo, aproximadamente desde 1945 hasta 1995. Dos conclusiones principales se derivan del análisis. Primero, en relación al tamaño del partido, los partidos grandes tienden a ser sobre-representados en las instituciones al nivel del gobierno mientras que para partidos más pequeños la evidencia es mixta, ya que casi la mitad de los pequeños partidos en el conjunto de datos nunca han logrado representación a nivel ejecutivo. Segundo, en relación a la ideología, los partidos de centro han sido mayormente sobre-representados en las instituciones del ejecutivo mientras que los partidos de izquierda han sido los más sistemáticamente sub-representados en los 16 países. [source]