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Executive Authority (executive + authority)
Selected AbstractsInstitutions, distributional concerns, and public sector reformEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2001JØRGEN GRØNNEGÅRD CHRISTENSEN As in otherWestern countries, a wave of reform has swept the Danish public sector. The record of these reforms is mixed and paradoxical; an ambiguous delegation of executive authority and radical privatization have been successfully implemented, while other measures, especially contracting out and user democracy or the introduction of greater choice, turn out to have failed. The paper argues that this experience offers two general lessons. First, shortterm costs and benefits are decisive to those who enact and implement public sector reform. Second, institutional factors specific to each type of reorganization have a major impact on the political distribution of costs and benefits. [source] Institutionalizing Neutrally Competent Policy Analysis: Resources for Promoting Objectivity and Balance in Consolidating DemocraciesPOLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 2 2005David L. Weimer Creating institutions that foster the production of objective and balanced policy analysis is a challenging task for all types of regimes. The value of neutral competence often suffers in tradeoffs with the value of responsiveness, especially in the exercise of executive authority. Institutional designers, however, are not without resources for structuring arrangements to promote the production of objective and balanced policy analysis: organizations can be created with an incentive to achieve "reputations" for neutral competence; organizations can be isolated from being too politically responsive through forms of "independence"; for promoting interaction based on "professional norms" can be created to resolve conflicts about prediction; "participation in international organizations" can be leveraged to counteract domestic biases; and "transparency" can be employed to facilitate balancing of views or to shame severe abuses. This essay sets out the logic underlying design with these sorts of institutional resources, illustrates their use primarily in the U.S. context, and speculates on their application in consolidating democracies. [source] Presidential Attribution as an Agency of Prime Ministerial Critique in a Parliamentary Democracy: The Case of Tony BlairBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2004Michael Foley The allusion to presidentialism in relation to the status, role and meaning of a prime minister's position is almost invariably skewed towards positive, purposive and expansive interpretations of strong executive authority. This study examines the negative and critical dimensions of the presidential attribution, and analyses the nature of its appeal as a device for organising and rationalising political dissent. The incidence and conditions of its usage in political argument during Tony Blair's premiership are reviewed. As a consequence, seven strands of usage are identified in the selection of presidentialism as a focus of opposition. In assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the presidential critique, the analysis not only shows its utility in drawing upon other sources of complaint, but also demonstrates its limitations in the delegitimation of executive authority. [source] |