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Evolutionary Game Theory (evolutionary + game_theory)
Selected AbstractsMATHEMATICS OF KIN- AND GROUP-SELECTION: FORMALLY EQUIVALENT?EVOLUTION, Issue 2 2010Arne Traulsen Evolutionary game theory is a general mathematical framework that describes the evolution of social traits. This framework forms the basis of many multilevel selection models and is also frequently used to model evolutionary dynamics on networks. Kin selection, which was initially restricted to describe social interactions between relatives, has also led to a broader mathematical approach, inclusive fitness, that can not only describe social evolution among relatives, but also in group structured populations or on social networks. It turns out that the underlying mathematics of game theory is fundamentally different from the approach of inclusive fitness. Thus, both approaches,evolutionary game theory and inclusive fitness,can be helpful to understand the evolution of social traits in group structured or spatially extended populations. [source] Expedient and Monotone Learning RulesECONOMETRICA, Issue 2 2004Tilman Börgers This paper considers learning rules for environments in which little prior and feedback information is available to the decision maker. Two properties of such learning rules are studied: absolute expediency and monotonicity. Both require that some aspect of the decision maker's performance improves from the current period to the next. The paper provides some necessary, and some sufficient conditions for these properties. It turns out that there is a large variety of learning rules that have the properties. However, all learning rules that have these properties are related to the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. For the case in which there are only two actions, it is shown that one of the absolutely expedient learning rules dominates all others. [source] MATHEMATICS OF KIN- AND GROUP-SELECTION: FORMALLY EQUIVALENT?EVOLUTION, Issue 2 2010Arne Traulsen Evolutionary game theory is a general mathematical framework that describes the evolution of social traits. This framework forms the basis of many multilevel selection models and is also frequently used to model evolutionary dynamics on networks. Kin selection, which was initially restricted to describe social interactions between relatives, has also led to a broader mathematical approach, inclusive fitness, that can not only describe social evolution among relatives, but also in group structured populations or on social networks. It turns out that the underlying mathematics of game theory is fundamentally different from the approach of inclusive fitness. Thus, both approaches,evolutionary game theory and inclusive fitness,can be helpful to understand the evolution of social traits in group structured or spatially extended populations. [source] REJOINDER TO FRACCHIA AND LEWONTINHISTORY AND THEORY, Issue 1 2005W. G. RUNCIMAN ABSTRACT In their response to my article, Fracchia and Lewontin have not refuted any of my three principal objections to theirs; they have ignored altogether my suggestion that evolutionary game theory illustrates particularly clearly the benefits that neo-Darwinian concepts and methods can bring to the human behavioral sciences; and they have attributed to me a version of "methodological individualism" to which I do not subscribe. It is, as is usual at this stage of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, too soon to say how much selectionist theory can contribute to the human behavioral sciences in general and comparative sociology in particular. But selectionism's critics achieve nothing by alleging that its proponents are committed to propositions to which they do not in fact assent and deny propositions with which they in fact agree. [source] "Spontaneous" Interethnic Order: The Emergence of Collective, Path-Dependent CooperationINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2000Badredine Arfi Can "spontaneous," decentralized interethnic cooperation emerge among ethnic groups whose members heavily discount future interethnic relations and do not fear punishment for interethnic noncooperation? Why is it that once the interaction between two ethnic groups evolves along a certain (cooperative or conflictual) path it sometimes becomes harder for the interacting groups to reverse course and seek alternative paths? The answer to these two questions lies in the fact that individual members not only are always calculative and could hence act opportunistically, but also are interdependent and can learn from one another. Because the members of interacting groups operate interdependently they thereby create collective nonlinear path dependence. Using a social game (within evolutionary game theory) the article shows counterintuitively that the emergence of collective, nonlinear path dependence within and across ethnic groups whose members heavily discount the future and face no punishment for interethnic noncooperation makes "spontaneous" decentralized interethnic cooperation a long-run equilibrium. Collective cooperation can thus develop path-dependently among ethnic groups without a Damocles' sword of any sort hanging over their members' heads, even when most individuals are shortsighted and opportunistic. [source] Applications of Game Theory in LinguisticsLINGUISTICS & LANGUAGE COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 3 2008Gerhard Jaeger The article gives a brief overview over the budding field of game theoretic linguistics, by focusing on game theoretic pragmatics on the one hand, and the usage of evolutionary game theory to model cultural language evolution on the other hand. Two specific applications are discussed in detail: the derivation of scalar implicatures via rational reasoning over communicative strategies, and the predictive potential of an evolutionary interpretation of exemplar dynamics in phonetics. [source] The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and EmpiricalPHILOSOPHY COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 6 2007Francesco Guala Ontological debates have always been prominent in the philosophy of social science. Philosophers have typically conceived of such debates as pre-scientific attempts to reform social scientific practice, rather than as post-scientific reflections on a firm body of scientific knowledge. Two celebrated contemporary research programs in social ontology , collective intentionality and evolutionary game theory , also follow this approach. In this paper I illustrate their central elements and criticize their weak empirical foundations. I finish by reviewing some work that combines empirical evidence with theoretical reflection, and suggest that it constitutes the way forward in the philosophy of social science. [source] Is There Life After Policy Streams, Advocacy Coalitions, and Punctuations: Using Evolutionary Theory to Explain Policy Change?POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 4 2003Peter John This article reviews the current state of public policy theory to find out if researchers are ready to readdress the research agenda set by the classic works of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), Kingdon (1984) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). After reviewing the influences of institutional, rational choice, network, socio-economic and ideational approaches, the article pays tribute to the policy streams, punctuated equilibrium and policy advocacy coalition frameworks whilst also suggesting that future theory and research could identify more precisely the causal mechanisms driving policy change. The article argues that evolutionary theory may usefully uncover the micro-level processes at work, particularly as some the three frameworks refer to dymamic models and methods. After reviewing some evolutionary game theory and the study of memes, the article suggests that the benefits of evolutionary theory in extending policy theories need to be balanced by its limitations. [source] | ||||||||||