Agricultural Subsidies (agricultural + subsidy)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2001
Rigoberto A. Lopez
This article examines the influence of campaign contributions on agricultural subsidies. Empirical results revealed that rent-seeking works, i.e. contributions, influence agricultural subsidies in the manner they best serve contributors' economic interests. Eliminating campaign contributions would significantly decrease agricultural subsidies, hurt farm groups, benefit consumers and taxpayers, and increase social welfare by approximately $5.5 billion. Although contributions are not the only determinants of agricultural subsidies, investment returns to farm PAC contributors are quite high ($1 in contributions brings about $2,000 in policy transfers). In fact, the results are in sharp contrast to the "truthful contributions" assumption of the Grossman,Helpman model. [source]


Presidential Address Agricultural Subsidies: Measurement and Use in Policy Evaluation

JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2003
Wilfrid Legg
"There is no art which one government sooner learns of another than that of draining money from the pockets of the people.' (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776) [source]


Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2001
Rigoberto A. Lopez
This article examines the influence of campaign contributions on agricultural subsidies. Empirical results revealed that rent-seeking works, i.e. contributions, influence agricultural subsidies in the manner they best serve contributors' economic interests. Eliminating campaign contributions would significantly decrease agricultural subsidies, hurt farm groups, benefit consumers and taxpayers, and increase social welfare by approximately $5.5 billion. Although contributions are not the only determinants of agricultural subsidies, investment returns to farm PAC contributors are quite high ($1 in contributions brings about $2,000 in policy transfers). In fact, the results are in sharp contrast to the "truthful contributions" assumption of the Grossman,Helpman model. [source]


After Cancún: what next for agricultural subsidies?

EUROCHOICES, Issue 3 2003
Tim Josling
Summary After Cancún: what next for agriculturalsubsidies? The collapse of the Ministerial in Cancún highlighted the enhanced role of the developing countries in the WTO and the reduced ability of the US and the EU to manage the trade system. One aspect of these changes has been that developing countries have taken much more interest in the level of domestic support in developed countries. Developed countries believe that the shift of support from production-linked to decoupled instruments has had a positive impact on trade. Developing countries maintain that this reform has not helped them, and has perpetuated inequities in the trade system. Research suggests that the output effect of decoupled support is limited, if not negligible. Such decoupling may be necessary to reform domestic polices. Additionally, domestic policies are being challenged by developing countries using the trade litigation of the WTO. But such challenges risk undermining support for the WTO. Until agreement is reached on these issues there will be little progress in further agricultural trade reform. A political solution must be found that continues the slow process of improvement of domestic farm policies and at the same time offers hope to developing countries that they will benefit from the improvement in the trade conditions for agricultural products. Après Cancún:quel avenir pour les subventions? L'échec de la conférence ministérielle de Cancun met en évidence !e rôle accru des pays en voie de développement à l'OMC, ainsi que la faible aptitude des Etats-Unis et de l'Europe à gérer le système des échanges internationaux. Ces changements impliquent que les pays en voie de développement s'intéressent de plus en plus aux niveaux de protection internes des pays développés. Les pays développés croient que le glissement des aides vers plus de découplage aura eu un effet positif sur les échanges. Mais les pays en voie de développement continuent à penser que ces réformes ne les ont pas aidés, et qu'elles ont perpétué les inégalités du commerce mondial. Le travail présenté ici semble montrer que l'effet du découplage sur l'offre est très faible, voire nul. Peut-être le decouplage est-il utile pour la réforme des politiques internes. Mais, au delà, ces politiques internes sont mises en cause par les pays en voie de développement, qui utilisent à leur encontre les ressources de procédure mises à leur disposition par l'OMC. De telles mises en cause sont de nature à détruire le soutien de l'opinion à l'OMC. II ne faut pas s'attendre à beaucoup de progrès dans les réformes du commerce international agricole tant qu'on n'aura pas trouve un accord sur ces questions. II est done necessaire d'élaborer des solutions qui confortent le lent progrès des politiques internes des pays developpes, tout en offrant aux pays en voie de développement 1, espoir de bénéficier de l'amélioration des conditions des échanges agricoles. Nach Cancún: Was geschieht als nächstes mitAgrarsubventionen? Das Scheitern des Ministerialtreffensin Cancún hob die verbesserte Position der Entwicklungsländer in der WTO und die verminderte Fähigkeit der USA und der EU hervor, das Handelssystem zu lenken. Finer der Aspekte dieser Veränderungen bestand darin, dass die Entwicklungsländer ein sehr viel größeres Interesse am Ausmaß der Inlandsstützung in Industrieländern gezeigt haben. Die Industrieländer glauben, dass sich der Schritt von einer produktionsgebundenen Inlandsstützung hin zu einer entkoppelten Inlandsstützung positiv auf den Handel ausgewirkt hat. Die Entwicklungsländer behaupten jedoch, dass ihnen diese Reform nicht geholfen habe und dass so Ungerechtigkeiten im Handelssystem aufrecht erhalten würden. Forschungsergebnisse legen es nahe, dass sich die entkoppelte Inlandsstützung sehr begrenzt, möglicherweise nur geringfügig, auf die Produktion auswirkt. Eine solche Entkopplung ist möglicherweise notwendig, urn inländische Politikmaßnahmen zu reformieren. Zusátzlich werden die inländischen Politikmaßnahmen von den Entwicklungsländern zur Zeit im Rahmen der WTO-Verfahren zur Beilegung von Handelsstreitigkeiten angefochten. Solche Anfechtungen bergen jedoch immer das Risiko einer abgeschwächten Unterstützung für die WTO. Bis in diesen Punkten Einigkeit herrscht, wird es nur geringe Fortschritte für die Agrarhandelsreformen geben. Es muss eine politische Lösung gefunden werden, welche den langsamen Verbesserungsprozess bei den inländischen Agrarpolitikmaßnahmen voran treibt und welche die Entwicklungsländer zugleich hoffen lässt, von der Verbesserung der Handelsbedingungen für landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse profitieren zu können. [source]


CAPITALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN AGRICULTURAL LAND PRICES: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 4 2009
Laure Latruffe
Abstract The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of existing literature, both theoretically and empirically, on the extent to which agricultural subsidies do translate into higher land values and rents and finally benefit landowners instead of agricultural producers. Our review shows that agricultural support policy instruments contribute to increasing the rental price of farmland, and that the extent of this increase closely depends on the level of the supply price elasticity of farmland relative to those of other factors/inputs on the one hand, and on the range of the possibilities of factor/input substitution in agricultural production on the other hand. The empirical literature shows that land prices and rents have in general a significant positive and inelastic response to government support. Such inelastic response is thought to reflect the uncertain future of the farm programmes. And in general, studies have indicated that land prices are more responsive to government-based returns than to market-based returns. [source]


EUROPEANIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES: A CASE STUDY OF THE AGRICULTURAL PAYING AGENCY IN SLOVAKIA

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 4 2009
MIROSLAV BEBLAVÝArticle first published online: 23 NOV 200
The paper explores the impact of Europeanization on bureaucratic autonomy in the new EU member states using as a case study the Agricultural Paying Agency in Slovakia. The paper shows that Europeanization had limited sustained impact on the personal autonomy of senior officials; however, it requires and sustains the personal autonomy of an extensive cadre of mid-level and junior civil servants. At the same time, it necessitates and continues to sustain significant change in the way agricultural subsidies are distributed, with a high level of autonomy in implementation and a lower, but still significant, measure of autonomy in policy-making. These conclusions can also generally be supported by evidence from Lithuania and Poland. In addition, the coercive elements of Europeanization interacted with the temporarily high bureaucratic autonomy in Slovakia to ,open' non-coercive channels of Europeanization of agricultural subsidies and beyond. [source]


After the Public Interest Prevails: The Political Sustainability of Policy Reform

GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2003
Eric Patashnik
The prevailing political science wisdom is that narrow interests regularly triumph over the general public. Yet the stunning passage of broad-based policy reforms in the face of intense clientele opposition suggests that the U.S. political system has a greater capacity to serve diffuse interests than has often been thought. Some of the most provocative policy-oriented political-science research during the 1980s and 1990s examined how these surprising reform victories occurred. Unfortunately, general-interest reforms do not always stick; reforms may be corrupted or reversed after their enactment. The long-term sustainability of any given policy reform hinges on the successful reworking of political institutions and on the generation of positive policy-feedback effects, especially the empowerment of social groups with a stake in the reform&s maintenance. This paper explores the postenactment dynamics of three canonical instances of general-interest reform legislation: tax reform, agricultural subsidy reform, and airline deregulation. Only in the airline-deregulation case has the self-reinforcing dynamic required for political sustainability been unmistakably evident. For analysts and advocates of general-interest reform measures alike, the clear lesson is to attend far more closely to what happens after reforms become law. [source]