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Equity Risk (equity + risk)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Terms modified by Equity Risk

equity risk premium

Selected Abstracts

Equity Risk, Conversion Risk, and the Demand for Insurance

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 3 2003
Rod Garratt
Existing insurance theory fails when applied to real property because it does not account for variations in the economic environment. The article studies optimal property insurance in the presence of two sources of variation: equity risk and conversion risk. Equity risk is randomness of the value of a property. It tends to raise demand for conventional insurance. In contrast, conversion risk is randomness in the value the property would have if, after severe damage, it were converted to the highest-valued use. It is distinct from equity risk because the highest-valued use is typically not the current one. Under independent conversion risk, the optimum upper limit is a compromise among underlying conversion thresholds. Absent independence, the optimum can be quite different. Conversion risk can raise or lower the demand for property insurance. Insurance contracts that fail to address conversion tend to undermine the orderly disposition of obligations and reduce the gains from reallocation of risks through insurance. [source]

A Parsimonious Macroeconomic Model for Asset Pricing

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 6 2009
Fatih Guvenen
I study asset prices in a two-agent macroeconomic model with two key features: limited stock market participation and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS). The model is consistent with some prominent features of asset prices, such as a high equity premium, relatively smooth interest rates, procyclical stock prices, and countercyclical variation in the equity premium, its volatility, and in the Sharpe ratio. In this model, the risk-free asset market plays a central role by allowing non-stockholders (with low EIS) to smooth the fluctuations in their labor income. This process concentrates non-stockholders' labor income risk among a small group of stockholders, who then demand a high premium for bearing the aggregate equity risk. Furthermore, this mechanism is consistent with the very small share of aggregate wealth held by non-stockholders in the U.S. data, which has proved problematic for previous models with limited participation. I show that this large wealth inequality is also important for the model's ability to generate a countercyclical equity premium. When it comes to business cycle performance, the model's progress has been more limited: consumption is still too volatile compared to the data, whereas investment is still too smooth. These are important areas for potential improvement in this framework. [source]

Risk-taking incentives of executive stock options and the asset substitution problem

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2005
Gerald T. Garvey
G32; D23; J33 Abstract Various theoretical models show that managerial compensation schemes can reduce the distortionary effects of financial leverage. There is mixed evidence as to whether highly levered firms offer less stock-based compensation, a common prediction of such models. Both the theoretical and empirical research, however, have overlooked the leverage provided by executive stock options. In principle, adjusting the exercise prices of executive stock options can mitigate the risk incentive effects of financial leverage. We show that the near-universal practice of setting option exercise prices near the prevailing stock price at the date of grant effectively undoes most of the effects of financial leverage. In a large cross-sectional sample of Canadian option-granting firms, we find evidence that executives' incentives to take equity risk are negatively rather than positively related to the leverage of their employers. [source]

Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2006
Brian W. Nocco
The Chief Risk Officer of Nationwide Insurance teams up with a distinguished academic to discuss the benefits and challenges associated with the design and implementation of an enterprise risk management program. The authors begin by arguing that a carefully designed ERM program,one in which all material corporate risks are viewed and managed within a single framework,can be a source of long-run competitive advantage and value through its effects at both a "macro" or company-wide level and a "micro" or business-unit level. At the macro level, ERM enables senior management to identify, measure, and limit to acceptable levels the net exposures faced by the firm. By managing such exposures mainly with the idea of cushioning downside outcomes and protecting the firm's credit rating, ERM helps maintain the firm's access to capital and other resources necessary to implement its strategy and business plan. At the micro level, ERM adds value by ensuring that all material risks are "owned," and risk-return tradeoffs carefully evaluated, by operating managers and employees throughout the firm. To this end, business unit managers at Nationwide are required to provide information about major risks associated with all new capital projects,information that can then used by senior management to evaluate the marginal impact of the projects on the firm's total risk. And to encourage operating managers to focus on the risk-return tradeoffs in their own businesses, Nationwide's periodic performance evaluations of its business units attempt to refl ect their contributions to total risk by assigning risk-adjusted levels of "imputed" capital on which project managers are expected to earn adequate returns. The second, and by far the larger, part of the article provides an extensive guide to the process and major challenges that arise when implementing ERM, along with an account of Nationwide's approach to dealing with them. Among other issues, the authors discuss how a company should assess its risk "appetite," measure how much risk it is bearing, and decide which risks to retain and which to transfer to others. Consistent with the principle of comparative advantage it uses to guide such decisions, Nationwide attempts to limit "non-core" exposures, such as interest rate and equity risk, thereby enlarging the firm's capacity to bear the "information-intensive, insurance- specific" risks at the core of its business and competencies. [source]

Recognition versus Disclosure: An Investigation of the Impact on Equity Risk Using UK Operating Lease Disclosures

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 9-10 2000
Vivien Beattie
This study examines the equivalency of accounting recognition versus disclosure. OLS regression analysis is used to determine whether there is an association between equity risk and an adjustment to financial risk for off-balance sheet operating leases. Two methods of adjustment are considered: constructive capitalisation and a simple factor method. The observation of a reliably positive association suggests that UK investors/analysts view operating leases from a property rights perspective rather than an ownership perspective. This supports the argument for recognition of all lease rights and obligations ,on-balance sheet', as proposed in the recent G4+1 discussion paper ASB (1999). [source]