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Equity Firms (equity + firm)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Kinds of Equity Firms

  • private equity firm
    		•

    Selected Abstracts

    Private equity and HRM in the British business system

    HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, Issue 3 2007
    Ian Clark
    Who owns the firm? Do changes in owner matter? Will change affect the operational and strategic role of the HR function? For some, the answer will be no precisely because mergers and acquisitions, takeovers, buyouts and privatisations are central activities for a British-based business where short-term value for shareholders and financial engineering are key management objectives that structure and inform the work of HR professionals. For other readers, the answer may well be yes; ownership and owner strategies do matter, particularly if a firm is acquired by a relatively new actor in the market for corporate control , the private equity firm. [source]

    The Role of Private Equity in Life Sciences

    JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 2 2010
    Jeff Greene
    In a roundtable published in this journal a year ago, there was a clear consensus that the R&D function in big pharma was inefficient and in need of major restructuring, possibly through increased investments by venture capital and private equity firms. In this discussion, an accomplished group of industry practitioners begins by looking at the prospects for both venture capital and private equity to play meaningful roles in financing early- and mid-stage drug development. In so doing, they explore questions like the following: , Are there ways for big pharma and biotech to reduce "science risk" and make R&D funding more profitable and attractive to venture capital and private equity,and perhaps even hedge funds? , What roles do you see for specialty PE firms like Symphony Capital and Paul Capital, which are now bundling mid-stage development assets and securitizing royalties? Then the panelists turn to the broader life sciences industry and consider the outlook for leveraged private equity transactions involving marketed products, late-stage development, and services. Here they consider issues like the following: , Will PE be attracted to less-R&D-intensive activities like medtech and generics? , Have the recent consolidation through mergers and reorganization of big pharma into decentralized business units created opportunities for carve-outs of certain businesses? For big pharma and life sciences companies in general, the answers to such questions point to greater specialization and focus achieved partly through strategic alliances with venture capital, private equity, and even hedge funds, and involving marketed products and services as well as early-stage drug development. [source]

    Operational Improvement: The Key to Value Creation in Private Equity

    JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2009
    Gary Matthews
    With credit tightening having reduced the availability of leverage and intensified the competition for new deals, the economic recession has caused many companies in private equity firm portfolios to under-perform. These changes are forcing the private equity firms to depend even more on their ability to improve operating performance to achieve their investment goals and generate attractive returns. But few PE firms have proved capable of achieving such improvements in portfolio companies consistently over time. In this paper, the authors discuss several ways that private equity firms use their operating expertise to drive value in their portfolio companies. They also examine the analytical framework used by some PE firms when assessing and prioritizing the many operational initiatives that could be undertaken within a newly acquired company. Part of that examination involves a detailed look at how private equity firms assemble an attractive mix of operational improvement projects in their initial 100-day plans. Finally, the authors explore one of the challenges faced by private equity firms when attempting to implement operational enhancements in newly acquired companies: bringing about change without alienating company management. The real-world application of this approach is demonstrated with a case study that shows how one private equity buyer put its operational skills into practice to help create value within a mid-sized portfolio company. [source]

    Private Equity, Corporate Governance, and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control

    JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2008
    Karen H. Wruck
    In the early 1980s, during the first U.S. wave of debt-financed hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, finance professors Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback introduced the concept of the "market for corporate control" and defined it as "the market in which alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources." Since then, the dramatic expansion of the private equity market, and the resulting competition between corporate (or "strategic") and "financial" buyers for deals, have both reinforced and revealed the limitations of this old definition. This article explains how, over the past 25 years, the private equity market has helped reinvent the market for corporate control, particularly in the U.S. What's more, the author argues that the effects of private equity on the behavior of companies both public and private have been important enough to warrant a new definition of the market for corporate control,one that, as presented in this article, emphasizes corporate governance and the benefits of the competition for deals between private equity firms and public acquirers. Along with their more effective governance systems, top private equity firms have developed a distinctive approach to reorganizing companies for efficiency and value. The author's research on private equity, comprising over 20 years of interviews and case studies as well as large-sample analysis, has led her to identify four principles of reorganization that help explain the success of these buyout firms. Besides providing a source of competitive advantage to private equity firms, the management practices that derive from these four principles are now being adopted by many public companies. And, in the author's words, "private equity's most important and lasting contribution to the global economy may well be its effect on the world's public corporations,those companies that will continue to carry out the lion's share of the world's growth opportunities." [source]

    Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Private Equity and Its Import for Public Companies

    JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2006
    Article first published online: 4 OCT 200
    The role of private equity in global capital markets appears to be expanding at an extraordinary rate. Morgan Stanley estimates that there are now some 2,700 private equity funds that either have raised, or are in the process of raising, a total of $500 billion. With this abundance of available equity capital, the willingness of private equity firms to participate in "club" deals, and the leverage that can be put on top of the equity, private equity buyers now appear able and willing to pay higher prices for assets than ever before. And thanks in part to this new purchasing power, private equity transactions reportedly account for a quarter of all global M&A activity as well as a third of the high yield and IPO markets. The stock of capital now devoted to private equity reflects the demonstrated ability of at least the most reputable buyout firms to produce consistently high rates of returns for their limited partners. Although a talent for identifying and purchasing undervalued assets may be part of the story, the ability to produce such returns on a consistent basis implies an ability to add value, to improve the performance of the operating companies they invest in and control. And in this round-table, a small group of academics and practitioners address two main questions: How does private equity add value? And are there lessons for public companies in the success of private companies? According to the panelists, the answer to the first question appears to have changed somewhat over time. The consensus was that most of the value added by the LBO firms of the,80s was created during the initial structuring of the deals, a process described by Steve Kaplan as "financial and governance engineering," which includes not only aggressive use of leverage and powerful equity incentives for operating managements, but active oversight by a small, intensely interested board of directors. In the past ten years, however, these standard LBO features have been complemented by increased attention to "operational engineering," to the point where today's buyout firms feel obligated, like classic venture capitalists, to acquire and tout their own operating expertise. In response to the second of the two questions, Michael Jensen argues that much of the approach and benefits of private equity-particularly the adjustments of financial policies and stronger managerial incentives-can be replicated by public companies. And although some of these benefits have already been realized, much more remains to be done. Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, is finding a way to transfer to public companies the board-level expertise, incentives, and degree of engagement that characterize companies run by private equity investors. [source]

    Private Equity Syndication: Agency Costs, Reputation and Collaboration

    JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 5-6 2009
    Miguel Meuleman
    Abstract:, Syndicates are a form of inter-firm alliance in which two or more private equity firms invest together in an investee firm and share a joint pay-off, and are an enduring feature of the leveraged buyout (LBO) and private equity industry. This study examines the relationship between syndication and agency costs at the investor-investee level, and the extent to which the reputation and the network position of the lead investor mediate this relationship. We examine this relationship using a sample of 1,122 buyout investments by 80 private equity companies in the UK between 1993 and 2006. Our findings show that where agency costs are highest, and hence ex-post monitoring by the lead investor is more important, syndication is less likely to occur. The negative relationship between agency costs and syndication, however, is alleviated by the reputation and network position of the lead investor firm. [source]