Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Equity Capital (equity + capital)
Selected AbstractsEVIDENCE THAT GREATER DISCLOSURE LOWERS THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITALJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2000Christine A. Botosan The effect of corporate disclosure on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to both corporations and the investment community. However, the relationship between disclosure level and cost of capital is not well established and has proved difficult for researchers to quantify. As described in this article, the author's 1997 study (published in The Accounting Review) was the first to measure and detect a direct relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. After examining the annual reports of 122 manufacturing companies, the author concluded that companies providing more extensive disclosure had a lower (forward-looking) cost of equity capital (measured using Value Line forecasts with an EBO valuation formula that derives from the dividend discount model). For companies with extensive analyst coverage, differences in disclosure do not appear to affect cost of capital. But for companies with small analyst followings, differences in disclosure do appear to matter. Among this group of companies, the firms judged to have the highest level of disclosure had a cost of equity capital that was nine-percentage points lower than otherwise similar firms with a minimal level of disclosure. Closer analysis of some of the specific disclosure practices also suggests that, for small firms with limited analyst coverage, there are benefits to providing more forward-looking information, such as forecasts of sales, profits, and capital expenditures, and enhanced disclosure of key non-financial statistics, such as order backlogs, market share, and growth in units sold. In closing, the article also discusses an interesting new study (by Lang and Lundholm) that suggests there is an important distinction between effective corporate disclosure and "hyping the stock." The findings of this study show that while higher levels of disclosures are associated with higher stock prices, sudden increases in the frequency of disclosure are viewed with skepticism. [source] Analyst Coverage and the Cost of Raising Equity Capital: Evidence from Underpricing of Seasoned Equity Offerings,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2008Robert M. Bowen First page of article [source] Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006DAN DHALIWAL ABSTRACT We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963], the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage-related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt. [source] International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006LUZI HAIL ABSTRACT This paper examines international differences in firms' cost of equity capital across 40 countries. We analyze whether the effectiveness of a country's legal institutions and securities regulation is systematically related to cross-country differences in the cost of equity capital. We employ several models to estimate firms' implied or ex ante cost of capital. Our results support the conclusion that firms from countries with more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation, and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital. We perform extensive sensitivity analyses to assess the potentially confounding influence of countries' long-run growth differences on our results. We also show that, consistent with theory, the cost of capital effects of strong legal institutions become substantially smaller and, in many cases, statistically insignificant as capital markets become globally more integrated. [source] Dividend Taxes and Implied Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2005DAN DHALIWAL ABSTRACT We estimate firm-level implied cost of equity capital based on recent advances in accounting and finance research and examine the effect of dividend taxes on the cost of equity capital. We investigate whether dividend taxes affect firms' cost of capital by testing the relation between the implied cost of equity capital and a measure of the tax-penalized portion of dividend yield, which we define as the product of dividend yield and the dividend tax penalty. The results generally support the dividend tax capitalization hypothesis. We find a positive relation between the implied cost of equity capital and the tax-penalized portion of dividend yield that is decreasing in aggregate institutional ownership, our proxy for tax-advantaged investors. The evidence in this study adds to the understanding of the effect of investor-level taxes on equity value. [source] A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2002Christine A. Botosan This paper examines the association between the cost of equity capital and levels of annual report and timely disclosure, and investor relations activities. We estimate the cost of equity capital using the classic dividend discount model. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures. The latter result is contrary to theory but is consistent with managers' claims that greater timely disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility. We find no association between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. We conclude that aggregating across different disclosure types results in a loss of information. Failing to include all disclosure types in regression analyses may lead to a correlated omitted variable bias and erroneous conclusions. [source] How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 4 2008Gene Amromin We test the hypothesis that the 2003 dividend tax cut boosted US stock prices and thereby lowered the cost of equity capital. Using an event-study methodology, we attempt to identify an aggregate stock market effect by comparing the behavior of US common stock prices with that of foreign equities and the equities of real estate investment trusts (REITs). We also examine the relative cross-sectional response of prices of high- and low-dividend-paying stocks. We do not find any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate US stock market. On the other hand, high-dividend stocks outperformed low-dividend stocks by a few percentage points over the event windows, suggesting that the tax cut may have induced asset reallocation within equity portfolios. Finally, the positive abnormal return on nondividend paying US stocks in 2003 does not appear to be tied to tax cut news. [source] Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006DAN DHALIWAL ABSTRACT We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963], the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage-related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt. [source] International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006LUZI HAIL ABSTRACT This paper examines international differences in firms' cost of equity capital across 40 countries. We analyze whether the effectiveness of a country's legal institutions and securities regulation is systematically related to cross-country differences in the cost of equity capital. We employ several models to estimate firms' implied or ex ante cost of capital. Our results support the conclusion that firms from countries with more extensive disclosure requirements, stronger securities regulation, and stricter enforcement mechanisms have a significantly lower cost of capital. We perform extensive sensitivity analyses to assess the potentially confounding influence of countries' long-run growth differences on our results. We also show that, consistent with theory, the cost of capital effects of strong legal institutions become substantially smaller and, in many cases, statistically insignificant as capital markets become globally more integrated. [source] Dividend Taxes and Implied Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 5 2005DAN DHALIWAL ABSTRACT We estimate firm-level implied cost of equity capital based on recent advances in accounting and finance research and examine the effect of dividend taxes on the cost of equity capital. We investigate whether dividend taxes affect firms' cost of capital by testing the relation between the implied cost of equity capital and a measure of the tax-penalized portion of dividend yield, which we define as the product of dividend yield and the dividend tax penalty. The results generally support the dividend tax capitalization hypothesis. We find a positive relation between the implied cost of equity capital and the tax-penalized portion of dividend yield that is decreasing in aggregate institutional ownership, our proxy for tax-advantaged investors. The evidence in this study adds to the understanding of the effect of investor-level taxes on equity value. [source] Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets?JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2005Evidence from East Asia ABSTRACT In emerging markets, the agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. We examine whether external independent auditors are employed as monitors or as bonding mechanisms, or both, to alleviate the agency problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structures are more likely to employ Big 5 auditors. This relation is evident among firms that raise equity capital frequently. Consistently, firms hiring Big 5 auditors receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency conflicts. Also, we find that Big 5 auditors take into consideration their clients' agency problems when making audit fee and audit report decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets. [source] A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 1 2002Christine A. Botosan This paper examines the association between the cost of equity capital and levels of annual report and timely disclosure, and investor relations activities. We estimate the cost of equity capital using the classic dividend discount model. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases in the annual report disclosure level but increases in the level of timely disclosures. The latter result is contrary to theory but is consistent with managers' claims that greater timely disclosures may increase the cost of equity capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility. We find no association between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. We conclude that aggregating across different disclosure types results in a loss of information. Failing to include all disclosure types in regression analyses may lead to a correlated omitted variable bias and erroneous conclusions. [source] Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Private Equity and Its Import for Public CompaniesJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2006Article first published online: 4 OCT 200 The role of private equity in global capital markets appears to be expanding at an extraordinary rate. Morgan Stanley estimates that there are now some 2,700 private equity funds that either have raised, or are in the process of raising, a total of $500 billion. With this abundance of available equity capital, the willingness of private equity firms to participate in "club" deals, and the leverage that can be put on top of the equity, private equity buyers now appear able and willing to pay higher prices for assets than ever before. And thanks in part to this new purchasing power, private equity transactions reportedly account for a quarter of all global M&A activity as well as a third of the high yield and IPO markets. The stock of capital now devoted to private equity reflects the demonstrated ability of at least the most reputable buyout firms to produce consistently high rates of returns for their limited partners. Although a talent for identifying and purchasing undervalued assets may be part of the story, the ability to produce such returns on a consistent basis implies an ability to add value, to improve the performance of the operating companies they invest in and control. And in this round-table, a small group of academics and practitioners address two main questions: How does private equity add value? And are there lessons for public companies in the success of private companies? According to the panelists, the answer to the first question appears to have changed somewhat over time. The consensus was that most of the value added by the LBO firms of the,80s was created during the initial structuring of the deals, a process described by Steve Kaplan as "financial and governance engineering," which includes not only aggressive use of leverage and powerful equity incentives for operating managements, but active oversight by a small, intensely interested board of directors. In the past ten years, however, these standard LBO features have been complemented by increased attention to "operational engineering," to the point where today's buyout firms feel obligated, like classic venture capitalists, to acquire and tout their own operating expertise. In response to the second of the two questions, Michael Jensen argues that much of the approach and benefits of private equity-particularly the adjustments of financial policies and stronger managerial incentives-can be replicated by public companies. And although some of these benefits have already been realized, much more remains to be done. Perhaps the biggest challenge, however, is finding a way to transfer to public companies the board-level expertise, incentives, and degree of engagement that characterize companies run by private equity investors. [source] EVIDENCE THAT GREATER DISCLOSURE LOWERS THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITALJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2000Christine A. Botosan The effect of corporate disclosure on the cost of equity capital is a matter of considerable interest and importance to both corporations and the investment community. However, the relationship between disclosure level and cost of capital is not well established and has proved difficult for researchers to quantify. As described in this article, the author's 1997 study (published in The Accounting Review) was the first to measure and detect a direct relationship between disclosure and cost of capital. After examining the annual reports of 122 manufacturing companies, the author concluded that companies providing more extensive disclosure had a lower (forward-looking) cost of equity capital (measured using Value Line forecasts with an EBO valuation formula that derives from the dividend discount model). For companies with extensive analyst coverage, differences in disclosure do not appear to affect cost of capital. But for companies with small analyst followings, differences in disclosure do appear to matter. Among this group of companies, the firms judged to have the highest level of disclosure had a cost of equity capital that was nine-percentage points lower than otherwise similar firms with a minimal level of disclosure. Closer analysis of some of the specific disclosure practices also suggests that, for small firms with limited analyst coverage, there are benefits to providing more forward-looking information, such as forecasts of sales, profits, and capital expenditures, and enhanced disclosure of key non-financial statistics, such as order backlogs, market share, and growth in units sold. In closing, the article also discusses an interesting new study (by Lang and Lundholm) that suggests there is an important distinction between effective corporate disclosure and "hyping the stock." The findings of this study show that while higher levels of disclosures are associated with higher stock prices, sudden increases in the frequency of disclosure are viewed with skepticism. [source] To Hedge or Not to Hedge: Managing Demographic Risk in Life Insurance CompaniesJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 1 2006Helmut Gründl Demographic risk, i.e., the risk that life tables change in a nondeterministic way, is a serious threat to the financial stability of an insurance company having underwritten life insurance and annuity business. The inverse influence of changes in mortality laws on the market value of life insurance and annuity liabilities creates natural hedging opportunities. Within a realistically calibrated shareholder value (SHV) maximization framework, we analyze the implications of demographic risk on the optimal risk management mix (equity capital, asset allocation, and product policy) for a limited liability insurance company operating in a market with insolvency-averse insurance buyers. Our results show that the utilization of natural hedging is optimal only if equity is scarce. Otherwise, hedging can even destroy SHV. A sensitivity analysis shows that a misspecification of demographic risk has severe consequences for both the insurer and the insured. This result highlights the importance of further research in the field of demographic risk. [source] Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial ApproachJOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 4 2002Helmut Gründl This article discusses various approaches to pricing double-trigger reinsurance contracts,a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ,,alternative risk transfer.'' The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double-trigger reinsurance contracts. [source] Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market Equity PricesTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2000Peter Blair Henry A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country's government to allow foreigners to purchase shares in that country's stock market. On average, a country's aggregate equity price index experiences abnormal returns of 3.3 percent per month in real dollar terms during an eight-month window leading up to the implementation of its initial stock market liberalization. This result is consistent with the prediction of standard international asset pricing models that stock market liberalization may reduce the liberalizing country's cost of equity capital by allowing for risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents. [source] An Analysis of Nonunderwritten Rights Offers: The Case of Closed-END FundsTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002James A. Miles Abstract We study nonunderwritten rights offerings without subscription pre-commitments from large shareholders. The results indicate firms incur substantial indirect costs in the form of price concessions for raising equity capital this way. The data therefore support the selling cost explanation of the rights-offering paradox. Additionally, we describe how market participants collectively respond to intermediate such offerings. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||