Equilibrium Behavior (equilibrium + behavior)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition*

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2002
C. Monica Capra
We consider a duopoly pricing game with a unique Bertrand,Nashequilibrium. The high-price firm has a nonvanishing market share, however, and intuition suggests that observed prices may be positively related to this market share. This relationship is implied by a model in which players make noisy (logit) best responses to expected payoff differences. The resulting logit equilibrium model was used to design an experiment in which the high-price firm's market share varies. The model accurately predicts the final-period price averages. A naive learning model predicts the observed differences in the time paths of average prices. [source]


Characterization of differential ebulliometers for measuring activity coefficients

AICHE JOURNAL, Issue 1 2000
J. David Raal
Differential ebulliometry is a powerful and rapid procedure for obtaining infinitely dilute activity coefficients with potentially very good accuracy. Tedious degassing procedures are not necessary, as in a static method, and from only a few measurements full system phase behavior can be evaluated. The principal problem, precise evaluation of the equilibrium liquid composition from the known composition of a prepared solution charged to the apparatus, is well known but has so far defied adequate resolution. A system of exact self-consistent equations was developed for the characterization of an ebulliometer through a dimensionless ebulliometer constant. Evaluation of this constant from typical data and its subsequent use are illustrated for a system of known phase equilibrium behavior. Remarkably, the equations permit evaluation of the effective "static" holdups in various parts of the equipment without any volume measurements. Since one equation is redundant to the main purpose, it can be used for a consistency check of measured and calculated data. The equations also furnish a guide for the operation of ebulliometers. [source]


Emergency transshipment in decentralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests

NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 6 2006
Hui Zhao
Abstract While there has been significant previous literature on inventory transshipment, most research has focused on the dealers' demand filling decision (when to fill transshipment requests from other dealers), ignoring the requesting decision (when to send transshipment requests to other dealers). In this paper we develop optimal inventory transshipment policies that incorporate both types of decisions. We consider a decentralized system in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer and of each other. We first study a network consisting of a very large number of dealers. We prove that the optimal inventory and transshipment decisions for an individual dealer are controlled by threshold rationing and requesting levels. Then, in order to study the impact of transshipment among independent dealers in a smaller dealer network, we consider a decentralized two-dealer network and use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium inventory strategies of the individual dealers. An extensive numerical study highlights the impact of the requesting decision on the dealers' equilibrium behavior in a decentralized setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 [source]


Properties of scoring auctions

THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2008
John Asker
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. [source]