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Equilibrium
Kinds of Equilibrium Terms modified by Equilibrium Selected AbstractsCOMPETITION FOR MARKET SHARE OR FOR MARKET SIZE: OLIGOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIA WITH VARYING COMPETITIVE TOUGHNESS,INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Claude D'Aspremont For an industry producing a composite commodity, we propose a comprehensive concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, allowing for a parameterized continuum of regimes varying in competitive toughness. Each firm sets simultaneously its price and its quantity under two constraints, relative to its market share and to market size. The price and the quantity equilibrium outcomes always belong to the set of oligopolistic equilibria. When firms are identical and we let their number increase, any sequence of symmetric oligopolistic equilibria converges to the monopolistic competition outcome. Further results are derived in the symmetric CES case, concerning in particular the collusive solution enforceability. [source] A SEARCH FOR MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA IN URBAN INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2008Donald R. Davis ABSTRACT Theories featuring multiple equilibria are widespread across economics. Yet little empirical work has asked if multiple equilibria are features of real economies. We examine this in the context of the Allied bombing of Japanese cities and industries in World War II. We develop a new empirical test for multiple equilibria and apply it to data for 114 Japanese cities in eight manufacturing industries. The data provide no support for the existence of multiple equilibria. In the aftermath even of immense shocks, a city typically recovers not only its population and its share of aggregate manufacturing, but even the industries it had before. [source] FURTHER ON CAPITAL AND INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIA: A REJOINDER TO MANDLERMETROECONOMICA, Issue 4 2005Pierangelo Garegnani First page of article [source] EFFICIENT MIXED CLUBS: NONLINEAR-PRICING EQUILIBRIA WITH ENTREPRENEURIAL MANAGERSTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2010HIDEO KONISHI Scotchmer and Wooders show that efficient clubs are homogeneous when consumers are divisible in Berglas's anonymous crowding model. However, if consumers are not divisible or if clubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, mixed clubs are efficient. In such a model, we consider clubs with multiple membership policies for different types of consumers, and show the existence and efficiency of equilibrium with nonlinear policies. We employ entrepreneurial equilibrium, all equilibrium concept with profit-seeking entrepreneurs. Our theorem can be regarded as showing the existence of a core allocation that satisfies envy-free property in the absence of non-anonymous crowding effects. [source] ON LABOUR DEMAND AND EQUILIBRIA OF THE FIRM,THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 5 2005ROBERT L. VIENNEAU This note considers a linear programming formulation of the problem of the firm. A neoclassical non-increasing labour demand function is derived from the solution of the linear program. Only a set of measure zero on this function, one or two points in the examples examined, provides equilibria of the representative firm. Equilibria of the representative firm are characterized by decisions of its managers that allow the same decisions to be made in successive periods. Hence, one can explain the quantity of labour that firms desire to hire either by a traditional neoclassical labour demand function or by equilibria of the firm, but generally not both. [source] HOTELLING'S BEACH WITH LINEAR AND QUADRATIC TRANSPORTATION COSTS: EXISTENCE OF PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2007ALAIN EGLI In Hotelling type models consumers have the same transportation cost function. We deviate from this assumption and introduce two consumer types. Some consumers have linear transportation costs, while the others have quadratic transportation costs. If at most half the consumers have linear transportation costs, a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists for all symmetric locations. Furthermore, no general principle of differentiation holds. With two consumer types, the equilibrium pattern ranges from maximum to intermediate differentiation. The degree of product differentiation depends on the fraction of consumer types. [source] ISOLATION BY DISTANCE IN EQUILIBRIUM AND NONEQUILIBRIUM POPULATIONS OF FOUR TALITRID SPECIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEAEVOLUTION, Issue 5 2000Elvira De Matthaeis Abstract Allozymic variation at 21,23 loci was studied in 28 populations of Talitrus saltator, 23 populations of Orchestia montagui, 13 populations of O. stephenseni, and five populations of Platorchestia platensis from the Mediterranean Basin. Different levels of gene flow (Nm,) were detected within each species at the scale of the whole Mediterranean: O. montagui and P. platensis had low population structure, with levels of Nm, 1, whereas the T. saltator and O. stephenseni populations have values of Nm, < 1. The relationship between Nm, and geographic distance was analyzed to test for the presence of an isolation by distance pattern in the spatial genetic variation within each species. A model of isolation by distance is useful to describe the pattern of genetic structuring of study species at the scale of the whole Mediterranean: geographic distance explained from 28% to 70% of the variation in gene flow. In the Aegean area all species showed an island model of genetic structuring regardless of the levels of gene flow. [source] COMMENT ON ,THE STABILITY OF GENERAL INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM: A NOTE ON SCHEFOLD' BY SERGIO PARRINELLOMETROECONOMICA, Issue 2 2008Duncan K. FoleyArticle first published online: 25 FEB 200 First page of article [source] RESWITCHING AS A CAUSE OF INSTABILITY OF INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUMMETROECONOMICA, Issue 4 2005Article first published online: 16 NOV 200, Bertram Schefold ABSTRACT It is generally recognized that the paradoxes of capital, of which reswitching is the most striking example, are a reason to question the existence of aggregate production functions. It is here shown that they affect intertemporal general equilibrium as well as causes of instabilities. [source] ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUMPACIFIC ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 5 2007Article first published online: 1 NOV 200, Atsumasa Kondo The limitation level of the government borrowing for which a dynamic equilibrium and the no Ponzi Game condition are compatible with each other is explicitly derived. The critical level depends on the long-run interest rate, primary balance, money supply etc. [source] STABILITY AND INSTABILITY OF THE COUCRNOT EQUILIBRIUM,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2008EIICHI CHUMAN Conditions for the Cournot equilibrium to be locally asymptotically stable or unstable are explored, which are still compatible with the second-order condition for the optimum. The Cournot equilibrium may not be stable even if the condition owing to Fisher (1961), Hahn (1962), and Okuguchi (1964, 1976, 1999) is satisfied, which was given as a sufficient condition for the Cournot equilibrium to be stable. However, as long as a game by symmetric players is concerned, the Cournot equilibrium is unstable whenever F-H-O condition is not satisfied. In this sense, that F-H-O condition is not satisfied is sufficient for the Cournot equilibrium to be unstable. [source] WELFARE IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN EXPORT TAXES UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLYBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2008Roger Clarke F12; F13; L13 ABSTRACT In the Eaton and GrossmanQuarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383,406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries. [source] Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated GamesECONOMETRICA, Issue 2 2005Jeffrey C. Ely We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes. [source] Strategic Experimentation with Exponential BanditsECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2005Godfrey Keller We analyze a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield payoffs after exponentially distributed random times. Free-riding causes an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with beliefs as the state variable. We construct the unique symmetric Markovian equilibrium of the game, followed by various asymmetric ones. There is no equilibrium where all players use simple cut-off strategies. Equilibria where players switch finitely often between experimenting and free-riding all yield a similar pattern of information acquisition, greater efficiency being achieved when the players share the burden of experimentation more equitably. When players switch roles infinitely often, they can acquire an approximately efficient amount of information, but still at an inefficient rate. In terms of aggregate payoffs, all these asymmetric equilibria dominate the symmetric one wherever the latter prescribes simultaneous use of both arms. [source] On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price AuctionsECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2004Philip J. Reny We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-price auctions. [source] Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are IncompleteECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2002Egbert Dierker First page of article [source] Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete InformationECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2001Susan Athey This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The main result establishes existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) under a condition we call the single crossing condition (SCC), roughly described as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (in the sense that higher types choose higher actions), a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing. When the SCC holds, a PSNE exists in every finite-action game. Further, for games with continuous payoffs and a continuum of actions, there exists a sequence of PSNE to finite-action games that converges to a PSNE of the continuum-action game. These convergence and existence results also extend to some classes of games with discontinuous payoffs, such as first-price auctions, where bidders may be heterogeneous and reserve prices are permitted. Finally, the paper characterizes the SCC based on properties of utility functions and probability distributions over types. Applications include first-price, multi-unit, and all-pay auctions; pricing games with incomplete information about costs; and noisy signaling games. [source] The Experimental and Theoretical Study of Phase Equilibria in the Pd,Zn (-Sn) System,ADVANCED ENGINEERING MATERIALS, Issue 3 2006J. Vizdal The binary Pd-Zn system was assessed in the scope of this paper. The experimental data from the literature were used for the assessment, together with our own data obtained by SEM-EDS analysis and by the DTA. The paper is focused particularly on the Pd-Zn system, but the Pd-Sn and Sn-Zn systems are also analysed in this paper. Finally, first prediction of the isothermal sections of the ternary Pd-Sn-Zn system was made. [source] Locational Equilibria in Weberian AgglomerationGEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2008Dean M. Hanink A simple Weberian agglomeration is developed and then extended as an innovative fixed-charged, colocation model over a large set of locational possibilities. The model is applied to cases in which external economies (EE) arise due to colocation alone and also cases in which EE arise due to city size. Solutions to the model are interpreted in the context of contemporary equilibrium analysis, which allows Weberian agglomeration to be interpreted in a more general way than in previous analyses. Within that context, the Nash points and Pareto efficient points in the location patterns derived in the model are shown to rarely coincide. The applications consider agglomeration from two perspectives: one is the colocation behavior of producers as the agents of agglomeration and the other is the interaction between government and those agents in the interest of agglomeration policy. Extending the analysis to games, potential Pareto efficiency and Hicks optimality are considered with respect to side payments between producers and with respect to appropriate government incentives toward agglomeration. [source] One-Pot Multienzymatic Synthesis of 12-Ketoursodeoxycholic Acid: Subtle Cofactor Specificities Rule the Reaction Equilibria of Five Biocatalysts Working in a RowADVANCED SYNTHESIS & CATALYSIS (PREVIOUSLY: JOURNAL FUER PRAKTISCHE CHEMIE), Issue 9 2009Daniela Monti Abstract The hydroxysteroid dehydrogenases (HSDHs)-catalyzed one-pot enzymatic synthesis of 12-ketoursodeoxycholic acid (3,,7,-dihydroxy-12-oxo-5,-cholanoic acid), a key intermediate for the synthesis of ursodeoxycholic acid, from cholic acid has been investigated. This goal has been achieved by alternating oxidative and reductive steps in a one-pot system employing HSDHs with different cofactor specificity, namely NADH-dependent HSDHs in the oxidative step and an NADPH-dependent 7,-HSDH in the reductive one. Coupled in situ regeneration systems have been exploited not only to allow the use of catalytic amounts of the cofactors, but also to provide the necessary driving force to opposite reactions (i.e., oxidation and reduction) acting on different sites of the substrate molecule. Biocatalysts suitable for the set-up of this process have been selected and their kinetic behaviour in respect of the reactions of interest has been evaluated. Finally, the process has been studied employing the enzymes both in free and compartmentalized form. [source] Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription GameJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2008STEFANO BARBIERI We reconsider Laussel and Palfrey's analysis of private provision of discrete public goods via the subscription game. We show their semi-regular equilibria do not exist, casting doubt on their efficiency analysis. Taking players' values for the public good as uniformly distributed on , we exhibit previously unrecognized continuous equilibria,those with contribution strategies strictly increasing up to their maximum values, not necessarily equal to the provision cost, c, at which point they become flat. We show piecewise-linear equilibria are not incentive efficient; and if and , then all symmetric equilibria are interim incentive inefficient. [source] Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly VotingJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2007FRANCESCO DE SINOPOLI Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria. [source] Comprehensive Linkage of Defect and Phase Equilibria through Ferroelectric Transition Behavior in BaTiO3 -Based Dielectrics: Part 1.JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN CERAMIC SOCIETY, Issue 6 2008Defect Energies Under Ambient Air Conditions Defect and phase equilibria have been investigated via the ferroelectric phase transition behavior of pure and equilibrated nonstoichiometric BaTiO3 powder samples. Through fabricating the BaTiO3 materials under highly controlled conditions to preserve the equilibrium conditions with respect to Ba/Ti ratio, annealing temperature (T), and oxygen partial pressure (PO2), systematic variations in the phase transition temperature can be noted with respect to Ba/Ti ratio and T. From the data extracted, we can then determine solubility limits. Equilibrating the defect reactions at the solubility limits provides a direct approach to identify and calculate the defect energetics. The phase transition temperature decreased with increasing concentration of the TiO2 partial-Schottky defects (BaTi1,,O3,2,) and the BaO partial-Schottky defects (Ba1,,TiO3,,), and showed discontinuous changes in the two-phase region. The formation enthalpy and entropy for the partial-Schottky defect reactions was evaluated to be 2.32±0.1 eV and 10.15±0.7 kB for the BaO partial-Schottky defect, and 2.89±0.1 eV and 8.0±1.5 kB for the TiO2 partial-Schottky defects equilibrated under air annealing conditions. [source] Pareto Equilibria with coherent measures of riskMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 2 2004David Heath In this paper, we provide a definition of Pareto equilibrium in terms of risk measures, and present necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium in a market with finitely many traders (whom we call "banks") who trade with each other in a financial market. Each bank has a preference relation on random payoffs which is monotonic, complete, transitive, convex, and continuous; we show that this, together with the current position of the bank, leads to a family of valuation measures for the bank. We show that a market is in Pareto equilibrium if and only if there exists a (possibly signed) measure that, for each bank, agrees with a positive convex combination of all valuation measures used by that bank on securities traded by that bank. [source] Uncertainty and Endogenous Selection of Economic EquilibriaMETROECONOMICA, Issue 1 2004Pasquale Scaramozzino ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of coordination failures based on market power and local oligopoly. The economy exhibits a multiplicity of Pareto-ranked equilibria. The introduction of uncertainty generates an endogenous equilibrium selection process, due to a strategic use of information by firms. The economy is more likely to settle on some equilibria than on others. We argue that a full understanding of these robustness criteria is needed before any policy which is intended to help coordinate the level of activity to a Pareto-dominant outcome can be successfully implemented. [source] Classical and Neoclassical Indeterminacy in One-shot Versus Ongoing EquilibriaMETROECONOMICA, Issue 3 2002Michael Mandler I analyze two connections between neoclassical and classical economics. First, I consider the indeterminacy that arises for both schools: in the neoclassical theories of overlapping generations and of factor pricing and in Sraffa's price theory. Neoclassical indeterminacy occurs only in environments where relative prices can change through time; otherwise, determinacy obtains. Although these results challenge the Sraffian position on indeterminacy, the classical principle that current economic activity is embedded in the past proves to be a powerful insight: it establishes the robustness of factor-price indeterminacy and casts doubt on the importance of overlapping-generations indeterminacy. Second, I argue that recent claims that capital-theoretic paradoxes arise in intertemporal general equilibrium modes, not just in aggregative theory, cannot be validated. [source] Equilibria of a self-gravitating, rotating disc around a magnetized compact objectMONTHLY NOTICES OF THE ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY, Issue 4 2004J. Ghanbari ABSTRACT We examine the effect of self-gravity in a rotating thick-disc equilibrium in the presence of a dipolar magnetic field. First, we find a self-similar solution for non-self-gravitating discs. The solution that we have found shows that the pressure and density equilibrium profiles are strongly modified by a self-consistent toroidal magnetic field. We introduce three dimensionless variables, CB, Cc and Ct, which indicate the relative importance of toroidal component of the magnetic field (CB), and centrifugal (Cc) and thermal (Ct) energy with respect to the gravitational potential energy of the central object. We study the effect of each of these on the structure of the disc. Secondly, we investigate the effect of self-gravity on the discs; thus, we introduce another dimensionless variable (Cg) which shows the importance of self-gravity. We find a self-similar solution for the equations of the system. Our solution shows that the structure of the disc is modified by the self-gravitation of the disc, the magnetic field of the central object and the azimuthal velocity of the gas disc. We find that self-gravity and magnetism from the central object can change the thickness and the shape of the disc. We show that as the effect of self-gravity increases the disc becomes thinner. We also show that, for different values of the star's magnetic field and of the disc's azimuthal velocity, the disc's shape and its density and pressure profiles are strongly modified. [source] Iron, Manganese and Copper Equilibria with Wood Fibres in Single Salt Aqueous SuspensionsTHE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Issue 3 2005Robin Susilo Abstract Ions of Fe, Mn and Cu were introduced into suspensions of protonated or metal-free fibres and the equilibrium concentration of each metal in the fibre and surrounding solution was measured. The results were compared with the Donnan equilibrium model. Mn and Cu concentrations on the fibres were found to be pH dependent and in agreement with the model. An increased amount of Fe on the Kraft pulp fibres was found and attributed to iron containing precipitates trapped within the fibres. Precipitates in mechanical pulps had a very small amount (1-2 wt%) of iron. Des ions de Fe, Mn et Cu ont été introduits dans des suspensions de fibres protonatées ou « sans métaux » et la concentration d'équilibre de chaque métal dans la fibre et la solution environnante a été mesurée. Les résultats ont été comparés avec le modèle d'équilibre de Donnan. On a trouvé que les concentrations de Mn et Cu sur les fibres étaient dépendantes du pH et en accord avec le modèle. Une quantité accrue de Fe a été trouvée sur les fibres de pâte kraft et attribuée aux précipitats contenant du fer retenus dans les fibres. Les précipitats dans les pâtes mécaniques ont une très petite quantité (1-2% en poids) de fer. [source] Prediction of High-Pressure Phase Equilibria using Cubic EOS: What Can Be Learned?THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Issue 5 2002Ilya Polishuk Abstract Modern semi-empirical cubic EOSs are usually attached by complex functionalities, such as Huron-Vidal (HV)-type mixing rules. Although this practice improves the flexibility of the models, it also complicates consideration of an overall picture of phase behavior. As a result, GE -based equations are usually adjusted to the experimental data by way of a local fit. The latter approach tends to ignore that different regions of the thermodynamic phase space are closely inter-related. The present study demonstrates that the contribution of (HV)-type mixing rules to predicting high-pressure phase equilibria can be quite modest and that in addition they may generate non-realistic phase diagrams. Les équations d'état (EOS) cubiques semi-empiriques modernes s'accompagnent habituellement de fonctionnalités complexes, telles que les règles de mélange de type Huron-Vidal (HV). Bien que cette pratique améliore la flexibilité des modèles, elle complique aussi la prise en compte globale du comportement des phases. En conséquence, les équations basées sur GE sont généralement ajustées aux données expérimentales au moyen d'un calage local. Cette dernière approche tend à ignorer que les différentes régions de l'espace de phase thermodynamique sont étroitement intereliées. La présente étude montre que la contribution des règles de mélange de type HV pour prédire les équilibres de phases à haute pression peut être assez modeste et qu'en outre elles peuvent produire des diagrammes de phases non réalistes. [source] Altruism and Determinacy of Equilibria in Overlapping Generations Models with ExternalitiesTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2003Alain Venditti This paper deals with an OLG model with production and a single commodity, in which agents are assumed altruistic and the aggregate production function contains external effects. I prove that, if the technology satisfies a minor assumption, which encompasses positive and negative externalities, some curvature conditions on the utility function ensure local determinacy of stationary and period 2 equilibria. I prove that non-separable, strictly concave preferences are a fundamental ingredient for the occurrence of indeterminate equilibria. Finally, considering the case of unbounded growth, I establish that for any utility and production functions a unique balanced growth path is globally determinate. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, E32 [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||