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Epistemological Assumptions (epistemological + assumption)
Selected AbstractsThe self, the psyche and the world: a phenomenological interpretationTHE JOURNAL OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2009Roger Brooke Abstract:, This paper takes as its starting point Jung's definition of the self as the totality of the psyche. However, because the term psyche remains conceptually unclear the concept of the self as totality, origin and goal, even centre, remains vague. With reference to Heidegger's analysis of human being as,Dasein, as well as Jung's writings, it is argued that Jung's concept of psyche is not a synonym for mind but is the world in which we live psychologically. An understanding of the psyche as existentially situated requires us to rethink some features of the self. For instance, the self as origin is thus not a pre-existential integrate of pure potentiality but the original gathering of existence in which, and out of which, personal identity is constituted. The ego emerges out of the self as the development and ownership of aspects of an existence that is already situated and gathered. Relations between the ego and the self are about what is known, or admitted, and its relation with what is already being lived within the gathering that is existence. The self as psyche, origin, and centre are discussed, as well as the meaning of interiority. Epistemological assumptions of object relations theory are critically discussed. The paper also includes critical discussions of recent papers on the self. Translations of Abstract Cet article prend pour point de départ la définition par Jung du soi comme totalité de la psyché. Cependant, du fait du manque de clarté conceptuelle du terme « psyché», le concept de soi comme totalité, origine et but, voire comme centre, demeure vague. En référence à l'analyse de Heidegger de l'être humain comme,Dasein,ainsi qu'aux écrits de Jung, j'émets l'hypothèse que le concept de psyché n'est pas synonyme d'esprit pour Jung, mais du monde dans lequel nous vivons psychologiquement. Une compréhension existentielle de la psyché suppose que nous repensions certaines des caractéristiques du soi. Ainsi par exemple, le soi comme origine n'est pas un amalgame pré-existentiel de potentialités pures mais il est formé par l'existence dans laquelle et à partir de laquelle se constitue l'identité personnelle. Le moi émerge du soi comme le développement et l'appropriation d'aspects d'une existence déjà posée et assimilée. Les relations moi-soi portent sur du connu ou de l'admis, en lien avec ce qui se vit au sein de cet agrégat qu'est l'existence. Les notions de transformation, d'intégration et d'intériorité sont examinées. L'article comporte des discussions critiques d'articles récents sur le soi. Dieser Aufsatz geht von Jungs Definition des Selbst als Totalität des Seelischen aus. Da jedoch der Terminus Seele konzeptuell unklar bleibt, bleibt auch das Konzept des Selbst als Totalität, Ursprung und Ziel, ausgleichendes Zentrum vage. Mit Bezug auf Heideggers Analyse des Menschlichen als,Dasein,wie auch auf Jungs Schriften wird argumentiert, daß Jungs Entwurf des Seelischen kein Synonym für Geist darstellt, sondern die Welt, in der wir psychologisch leben, meint. Ein Verständnis der Seele als existentielle Situation verlangt von uns ein Neubedenken einiger Eigenschaften des Selbst. Zum Beispiel bedeutet das Selbst als Ursprung nicht ein vorexistentielles Vorhandensein reiner Potentialität, sondern die originäre Erfassung des Existierenden in dem und aus dem heraus sich persönliche Identität bildet. Das Ego entspringt aus dem Selbst als Entwicklungsprodukt und Träger von Aspekten einer Existenz, die schon vorfindlich und erfaßt ist. Beziehungen zwischen dem Ego und dem Selbst beinhalten Gewußtes oder Zugelassenes und dessen Relation zu demjenigen, was schon gelebt wird in dem Angehäuften was die Existenz darstellt. Transformation, Integration und Innerlichkeit werden diskutiert. Der Text beinhaltet kritische Würdigungen neuerer Veröffentlichungen über das Selbst. Questo scritto inizia con la definizione junghiana del sé come totalità della psiche. Tuttavia, poiché il termine psiche è concettualmente non chiaro, il concetto del sé come totalità, origine e meta, persino centro, resta vago. Riferendomi all'analisi di Heidegger dell'essere umano come ,Dasein' e anche agli scritti junghiani, sostengo che il concetto junghiano di psiche non è un sinonimo do mente, ma è il mondo in cui noi viviamo psicologicamente. Intendere la psiche come situata esistenzialmente richiede di ripensare alcuni aspetti del sé. Ad esempio, il sé come origine non è una integrazione pre-esistente di pure potenzialità, ma è l'insieme originario dell'esistenza nel quale, e fuori dal quale si costruisce l'identità personale. L'Io emerge dal sé come sviluppo e possesso di aspetti di una esistenza che è già situata e raccolta. Le relazioni tra l'io e il sè. Riguardano ciò che è conosciuto, o possibile, e la sua relazione con ciò che è già vivente all'interno dell'insieme di ciò che è esistente. Vengono discusse le trasformazioni, le integrazioni e l'interiorità. Questo scritto include anche discussioni critiche di recenti lavori sul sé. Este trabajo toma como punto de partida la definición de Jung del Ser (Self) como la totalidad de la psique. Sin embargo, porque el término psique queda conceptualmente poco claro el concepto del Self como totalidad, el origen y objetivo, aún central, queda vago. Con referencia al análisis del Ser Humano de Heidegger como Dasein, se discute el concepto de Jung de psique como no sinónimo de mente en los escritos de Jung sino como el mundo en el cual vivimos psicológicamente. Una comprensión de la psique como existencialmente ubicada nos requiere de volver a pensar algunas características del Self. Por ejemplo el Self como origen no es un pre-existente constituido de pura potencialidad sino la conjunción original de la existencia en la cual, y fuera de la cual, está constituida la identidad personal. El ego surge fuera del Self como el desarrollo y propiedad de aspectos de una existencia situada y conjugada. Las relaciones entre el ego y el Self están acerca de lo que es conocido, o es admitido, y su relación con lo que ya se ha vivido dentro de la conjugación que es la existencia. Se reflexiona sobre la transformación, la integración, y interioridad. El trabajo incluye discusiones críticas de escritos recientes sobre el Self. [source] Disciplinary Agendas and Analytic Strategies of Research on Immigrant Transnationalism: Challenges of Interdisciplinary KnowledgeINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW, Issue 3 2003Ewa Morawska To be successful, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of immigration and transnationalism should begin by making different disciplinary languages about this phenomenon informed by mutual understanding of the conceptual frameworks, epistemological assumptions, and explanatory strategies used in research in particular academic fields. Drawing on studies in anthropology, sociology, history, and political science, I review here these taken-for-granted assumptions about "what is knowable and how" that underlie research on immigration and transnationalism in these disciplines. In conclusion, I suggest some avenues for mutual education in different disciplinary approaches and the epistemic gains derived therefrom. [source] A critical appraisal of evidence-based medicine: some ethical considerationsJOURNAL OF EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE, Issue 2 2003M. Gupta MD CM FRCPC MA Abstract Evidence-based medicine (EBM) is a concept that has grown to dominate the medical literature over the last decade. EBM has provoked a variety of criticisms, scientific, philosophical and sociological. However, while its basic conclusion , that we should practise EBM , is ethical, there has been limited ethical analysis of EBM. This paper aims to provide an analysis of EBM from an ethical perspective and identify some of EBM's potential ethical implications. Following a description of what constitutes EBM, this paper will identify and assess some of the basic values and epistemological assumptions of EBM that provide support for the moral duty to practise EBM. It will then examine potential ethical implications that could arise from practising EBM, given the challenges that have been made of EBM's assumptions and claims to authority. This paper will conclude by arguing that practitioners could strengthen the ethics of EBM by embracing a broader definition of evidence and including ethical criteria in the critical appraisal of research studies. [source] Indigenous Ecological Knowledge as Situated Practices: Understanding Fishers' Knowledge in the Western Solomon IslandsAMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, Issue 3 2009Matthew Lauer ABSTRACT In this article, we draw on research among fisherfolk of Roviana Lagoon, Solomon Islands, to examine certain epistemological assumptions of the "indigenous knowledge" concept. We describe how approaches to knowledge in Roviana differ from prevailing models of knowledge that distinguish between cognitive aspects and other modalities of knowing. For many Roviana fishers, ecological knowledge is not analytically separated from the changing contexts of everyday activities such as navigating and fishing. Inspired by Roviana epistemologies, we argue that a practice-oriented approach provides a more sympathetic and informative theoretical framework for understanding knowledge and its role in contemporary marine-resource conservation efforts. The theoretical and methodological implications of the perspective are illustrated with examples from an ongoing marine conservation project in the western Solomon Islands that integrates indigenous knowledge, remote-sensing techniques, and Geographic Information System (GIS) technologies. [source] Professional knowledge and the epistemology of reflective practiceNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 1 2010Elizabeth Anne Kinsella PhD Abstract Reflective practice is one of the most popular theories of professional knowledge in the last 20 years and has been widely adopted by nursing, health, and social care professions. The term was coined by Donald Schön in his influential books The Reflective Practitioner, and Educating the Reflective Practitioner, and has garnered the unprecedented attention of theorists and practitioners of professional education and practice. Reflective practice has been integrated into professional preparatory programmes, continuing education programmes, and by the regulatory bodies of a wide range of health and social care professions. Yet, despite its popularity and widespread adoption, a problem frequently raised in the literature concerns the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding the term reflective practice. This paper seeks to respond to this problem by offering an analysis of the epistemology of reflective practice as revealed through a critical examination of philosophical influences within the theory. The aim is to discern philosophical underpinnings of reflective practice in order to advance increasingly coherent interpretations, and to consider the implications for conceptions of professional knowledge in professional life. The paper briefly examines major philosophical underpinnings in reflective practice to explicate central themes that inform the epistemological assumptions of the theory. The study draws on the work of Donald Schön, and on texts from four philosophers: John Dewey, Nelson Goodman, Michael Polanyi, and Gilbert Ryle. Five central epistemological themes in reflective practice are illuminated: (1) a broad critique of technical rationality; (2) professional practice knowledge as artistry; (3) constructivist assumptions in the theory; (4) the significance of tacit knowledge for professional practice knowledge; and (5) overcoming mind body dualism to recognize the knowledge revealed in intelligent action. The paper reveals that the theory of reflective practice is concerned with deep epistemological questions of significance to conceptions of knowledge in health and social care professions. [source] What Does ,Efficiency' Mean in the Context of the Global Refugee Regime?BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2006Alexander Betts The language of ,efficiency' has increasingly been used as a rhetorical device to legitimate new approaches to refugee policy; in particular, extraterritorial processing and ,protection-in-regions-of-origin'. This article aims to explore what ,efficiency' might mean from the perspective of the global refugee regime in order to, firstly, expose the hidden assumptions implicit in the use of the ,efficiency' discourse in the current debate and, secondly, to explore what the concept might offer in defining the normative contours of a future regime structure. Although the concept is acknowledged to be inevitably political and to carry epistemological assumptions, reconstructing the concept by drawing on economic theory is argued to offer a means to improve the quality of debate on the allocation of resources within the refugee regime. Indeed, a critical application of the concepts of productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency is shown to offer far more nuanced insights for sustainable refugee protection than is implied by the contemporary debate's political manipulation of the term. The article assesses both the theoretical and policy implications that derive from a more rigorous conceptualisation of the meaning of efficiency. [source] | |||||||||||||