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Epistemic Status (epistemic + status)
Selected AbstractsBetween Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of TestimonyPHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010JOSEPH SHIEBER First page of article [source] Negotiating Historical Narratives: An Epistemology of History for History EducationJOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, Issue 1 2010JON A. LEVISOHN Historians typically tell stories about the past, but how are we to understand the epistemic status of those narratives? This problem is particularly pressing for history education, which seeks guidance not only on the question of which narrative to teach but also more fundamentally on the question of the goals of instruction in history. This article explores the nature of historical narrative, first, by engaging with the seminal work of Hayden White, and second, by developing the critique of White by David Carr. The picture of historical inquiry that emerges is one in which the fundamental cognitive activity is one of negotiating among narratives. Students, like historians, like any of us, come to the work of historical inquiry in possession of prior narratives, which are then thrown into an encounter with other narratives of varying size and scope. Good historians enact the negotiation among narratives responsibly and well, demonstrating the virtues of historical interpretation. History education, therefore, ought to help students improve their historical interpretations at the same time as it fosters those qualities that make them good interpreters. [source] INDEFENSIBLE MIDDLE GROUND FOR LOCAL REDUCTIONISM ABOUT TESTIMONYRATIO, Issue 2 2009Axel Gelfert Local reductionism purports to defend a middle ground in the debate about the epistemic status of testimony-based beliefs. It does so by acknowledging the practical ineliminability of testimony as a source of knowledge, while insisting that such an acknowledgment need not entail a default-acceptance view, according to which there exists an irreducible warrant for accepting testimony. The present paper argues that local reductionism is unsuccessful in its attempt to steer a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. In particular, it challenges local reductionism ,from within', without appealing to anti-reductionist intuitions. By offering novel arguments to the effect that local reductionism fails by its own standards, the present paper considerably strengthens the case against this version of reductionism. Local reductionism, it is argued, fails for three main reasons. First, it cannot account for the rationality of testimonial rejection in paradigmatic cases, even though the possibility of rational rejection is thought to be of central justificatory importance. Second, it does not provide a sufficiently distinct non-testimonial basis to which testimonial justification can be successfully reduced. Finally, local reductionism is shown to be an intrinsically unstable position, in danger of collapsing into full-fledged ,credulism' of the kind historically associated with Thomas Reid. [source] Which should you use, intuition or logic?ASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2008Cultural differences in injunctive norms about reasoning Past research has shown that tendencies to engage in holistic and analytical reasoning are differentially encouraged by East Asian and Western cultures. But little is known about cultural differences in the perceived value of analytic versus intuitive reasoning. In Study 1, Koreans and Americans ranked the importance of traits including ,intuitive' and ,logical' in work and family contexts. In Study 2, Euro-Canadians and East-Asian-Canadians read scenarios of intuitive versus rule-following business decisions. Relative to Western participants, East Asians rated intuitive reasoning as more important and reasonable than analytic reasoning. Implications for the epistemic status of reasoning modes, culture's effect on values about reasoning, and multiculturalism are discussed. [source] |