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Environmental Tax (environmental + tax)
Selected AbstractsGROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX-BASED PUBLIC PENSION REFORM,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2007TETSUO ONO This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which: (i) firms create emissions as by-products of production; and (ii) tax revenue from the working young is transferred to the retired elderly as pay-as-you-go pension benefits. The paper focuses on a replacement ratio, which measures the proportion of after tax work earnings replaced by the public pension, and considers a replacement ratio neutral reform in which the newly introduced environmental tax is devoted to cutting the social security tax, keeping the replacement ratio unchanged. It is shown that the reform may improve growth, environmental quality and the nonenvironmental utility of every generation. [source] Greenhouse gas emission policies in the UK and Germany: influences and responsesENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2002Bettina Schrader Climate change is considered to be one of the greatest environmental threats. In response to this threat, developed countries agreed in Kyoto to legally binding targets, which will reduce their atmospheric emissions. In April 1999 Germany introduced an environmental tax. At the same time the UK announced the introduction of a levy on energy consumption, from April 2001. This paper investigates the proposals from both governments and the influences upon them of a variety of institutions (NGOs, industry and business organizations). The similarities and differences between the consultation experiences, and the resulting policies, will be discussed for the two countries. Lessons are drawn applicable to the wider context of EU environmental legislation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment [source] On Environmental Policy and PermittingJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 5 2007PHILIPPE BONTEMS The literature on environmental policy under adverse selection usually assumes that firms' profit vary monotonically with a private information parameter. However, it is easy to demonstrate using standard production setups that regularity is not the rule. We show that policy requirements are very sensitive to this assumption. In particular, the optimal instrument resembles more an "adaptable" pollution standard than the economic instrument of an environmental tax. We also show that permitting, which results in some firms overinvesting in pollution-control equipment, does not serve the objective of improving the environment but rather allows the agency to increase the proceeds of the policy. [source] Die Ökologische Steuerreform in Deutschland , ein umweltpolitisches FeigenblattPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2003Christoph Böhringer Based on fundamental welfare economics we argue that extensive tax reductions and rebates in favour of energy-intensive industries, as provided by the tax reform, substantially water down its cost-effectiveness. The environmental tax reform essentially boils down to a fiscally motivated fuel tax. From a political economy perspective the exemptions can be explained by voters' low willingness-to-pay for the environment and the sectoral concentration of adjustment costs. With respect to green voters, however, the government does not admit that the environmental objective has effectively been abandoned. We conclude that an honest policy should either give up the environmental tax reform frankly or implement it without exemptions. [source] GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX-BASED PUBLIC PENSION REFORM,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2007TETSUO ONO This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which: (i) firms create emissions as by-products of production; and (ii) tax revenue from the working young is transferred to the retired elderly as pay-as-you-go pension benefits. The paper focuses on a replacement ratio, which measures the proportion of after tax work earnings replaced by the public pension, and considers a replacement ratio neutral reform in which the newly introduced environmental tax is devoted to cutting the social security tax, keeping the replacement ratio unchanged. It is shown that the reform may improve growth, environmental quality and the nonenvironmental utility of every generation. [source] ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION, MONITORING AND EFFICIENCYNATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 1 2001CARLOS MARIO GÓMEZ GÓMEZ ABSTRACT. The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the narrowing of the distance between formal theory and practical environmental policy design. We formulate a general and comprehensive theoretical model in order to take into account the different informational and technological problems which characterize the definition and implementation of environmental taxes in a second best world where there also are distortionary taxes. Having formalized these problems, we present a general model which allows us to discuss the existence of efficient and implementable environmental quality objectives and policy instruments, and to analyze many particular cases. [source] |