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Environmental Policy Instruments (environmental + policy_instruments)
Selected AbstractsNew alternative and complementary environmental policy instruments and the implementation of the Water Framework DirectiveENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2008Andy Gouldson Abstract Based on a study conducted for the Environment Agency for England and Wales, we discuss the contribution that new alternative and complementary environmental policy instruments might make to the realization of the objectives of the EU's Water Framework Directive. Following a survey that identified nearly 100 examples where alternative and complementary instruments are currently being applied in the UK, we categorize such instruments as information-based approaches, private and voluntary regulation or support and capacity building measures. Examples are given of each category of instrument before further findings on the preconditions for the successful application of such measures are presented. These preconditions relate to levels of commitment from key groups, levels of stakeholder understanding, the role of the lead actor, the importance of timing, the need to deliver a clear message, the importance of enforcement, the role of the media and the importance of social capital in key networks. We conclude that alternative and complementary measures have significant potential to contribute to the realization of the Water Framework Directive's objectives, but only where these preconditions are met. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Politics, industry and the regulation of industrial greenhouse-gas emissions in the UK and GermanyENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2004Ian Bailey This paper assesses the impact of ,new' environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), such as eco-taxes, tradable permits and environmental agreements, on the politics of regulating industrial greenhouse-gas emissions. Intense academic debate surrounds the extent to which environmental policy is driven by the public interest, public choices between actor and stakeholder interests, or embedded institutional traditions. However, the effects on environmental politics of the recent shift from direct regulation to NEPIs remain seriously under-researched. Surveys and interviews with industry and policy-makers on the implementation of United Kingdom and German climate policy indicate that, although economic pressures do influence the design of policy instruments, public choice is far from dominant; nor are industry reactions to particular NEPIs uniform between countries. This suggests that national institutional traditions are far more influential in informing policy choices and industry reactions to policy innovations than is often acknowledged. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &,Sons, Ltd and ERP,Environment. [source] Voluntary environmental policy instruments: two Irish success stories?ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2002Brendan Flynn Voluntary environmental policy instruments have attracted much interest in recent years, yet they remain firmly established only in the industrial setting of the typical environmental policy ,leader' states such as the Netherlands or Germany. This paper examines two Irish examples of innovative voluntary agreements, a farm plastic recycling scheme and a bird conservation project. These both suggest that the voluntary approach can be applied successfully outside the typical industrial sector. Noteworthy in explaining the emergence of the two case studies here was a policy transfer effect from the UK, involving organized Irish farming interests and Irish bird conservationists. A fear of impending state legislation, which is often cited as a vital precondition for successful voluntary approaches, was actually less important than the autonomous initiative of the interest groups themselves. It is suggested that a more important role for the state lies in ensuring good policy co-ordination. A concluding discussion examines the general problems and potential of relying on interest groups to transfer and implement innovative voluntary environmental policy instruments. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment [source] Intrinsische Motivation und umweltpolitische InstrumentePERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2001Erik Gawel In the discussion on the rational choice model of individual behavior, a growing emphasis has recently been placed on the importance of intrinsic motivation. Contrary to assumptions made in the standard economic literature, it is suggested that an individual's motivation to act may not be exclusively determined by external influences (incentives, restrictions) and (given) personal preferences, but, in addition, depends on intrinsically anchored ethical preferences. Intrinsic motivation may diminish if parallel external incentives, such as rewards or orders, come into play: Insofar as external intervention weakens the corresponding intrinsic motivation to act, the (normal) effect of relative prices is opposed by a (countervailing) crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation. The effect of (over-) crowding-out has been thematized especially in the context of environmental policy. It was suggested that subsidies may support intrinsic incentives whereas taxes and licences (especially though command-and-control measures) tend to undermine them. This paper critically analyzes the impact of intrinsic behavior considerations on the evaluation of environmental policy instruments. It is argued that, if at all, economists' standard recommendations for policy design with respect to subsidies need not be revised even if intrinsic motivation plays any role for the agents' environmental bevavior. Furthermore, command-and-control policy might rather support than weaken intrinsic motivation. [source] The Rise of ,New' Policy Instruments in Comparative Perspective: Has Governance Eclipsed Government?POLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2005Andrew Jordan Governance is a term in good currency, but there are still too few detailed empirical analyses of the precise extent to which it has or has not eclipsed government. This article explores the temporal and spatial characteristics of the governance transition by charting the deployment of new policy instruments in eight industrialised states and the European Union. The adoption and implementation of (,old' and ,new') policy instruments offer a useful analytical touchstone because governance theory argues that regulation is the quintessence of government. Although there are many ,new' environmental policy instruments in these nine jurisdictions, this article finds that the change from government to governance is highly differentiated across political jurisdictions, policy sectors and even the main instrument types. Crucially, many of the new policy instruments used require some state involvement (that is, ,government'), and very few are entirely devoid of state involvement (that is, pure ,governance'). Far from eclipsing government, governance therefore often complements and, on some occasions, even competes with it, although there are some cases of fusion. Future research should thus explore the many complex and varied ways in which government and governance interact in public policy-making. [source] Coerciveness and the selection of environmental policy instrumentsCANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 2 2001Douglas Macdonald This article analyses the relative coerciveness associated with the instruments used by municipal, provincial and federal governments in Canada to address three major successive pollution threats - sewage, industrial toxic waste, and greenhouse-gas emissions - that have appeared on the policy agenda over the course of the past century. During that time, there has been an overall trend of declining coerciveness, with one exception. In the case of toxic waste, established regulatory regimes were made more coercive some years after they were first put in place. These findings can best be explained by theories of instrument choice that look to interactions among relevant state and societal actors in the policy network. It is suggested that one aspect of that process in particular - the balance of power between regulator and "regulatee" -is of importance in explaining relative coerciveness. We must first understand theability of the regulator to coerce before we can explain the selection of more or less coercive instruments. Sommaire: Le degré de coercition est un attribut souvent utilisé pour classer les politiques publiques. L'auteur de cet article analyse la coercition associée aux instruments politiques utilisés par les gouvemements fédéral, municipaux et provinciaux au Canada au cours du siècle demier. Les gouvernements en question tentent de s'attaquer à trois importantes menaces successives de pollution qui ont figuré au programme d'élaboration des politiques, à savoir les égouts, les déchets toxiques industriels et les émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Pendant cette période, les politiques coercitives connaissaient un déclin, exception faite des déchets toxiques où des règlements établis sont devenus plus coercitifs quelques années après leur mise en place. Les théories du choix des instruments politiques qui étudient les interactions entre les acteurs gouvernementaux et sociaux en matiére d'élaboration des politiques expliquent mieux les résultats relevés. On pense qu'un aspect particulier de ce processus, à savoir l'équilibre du pouvoir entre l'autorité de réglementation et les réglementés, est important pour expliquer la coercition relative. Nous devons dans un premier temps comprendre lacnpacité de l'autorité de réglementation à contraindre avant de pouvoir expliquer le choix d'instruments plus ou moins coercitifs. [source] |