Environmental Agreements (environmental + agreement)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Kinds of Environmental Agreements

  • international environmental agreement


  • Selected Abstracts


    PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION

    NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 2 2006
    MICHAEL FINUS
    ABSTRACT. We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties. [source]


    Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Taking Up Positions And Meeting Pressure

    ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2003
    Sverre Grepperud
    This paper portrays voluntary agreements as a Nash-bargaining game between the authorities and the polluting industry. Before bargaining starts, the authorities threaten to introduce emission licences if the negotiations come to nothing, while industry, by the use of lobbying campaigns, can make it politically costly to regulate by law. The most likely game of the ones considered is characterized by the authorities first announcing a level of licensing, whereupon industry will adjust its lobbying activity. This game results in a relatively defensive industry and authorities than other games under consideration. [source]


    Negotiation versus manipulation: The impact of alternate forms of LDC government behavior on the design of international environmental agreements,

    PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2001
    Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
    International environmental agreement; LDC government; perfect correlation Abstract. This article addresses the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) with limited funds that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (IEA) for less developed countries (LDCs). The SNGA can only deal with polluting firms in the LDCs through their national governments. This tripartite hierarchical interaction is studied for two LDCs. The private information of the firms and the governments across the two countries is perfectly correlated. In this setting, we study the effects of two kinds of behavior by the governments of the LDCs. We show that despite the perfect correlation in the private information of governments and firms across the two countries, the SNGA cannot design a first-best IEA. Our analysis suggests that problems arising from the SNGA's inability to monitor the actions of the polluting firms and the national governments are less salient than is commonly believed. However, there is no denying the fact that the success of lEAs is dependent not only on the funds available for environmental protection, but also on the manner in which LDC governments represent polluting firms in their countries. [source]


    Local Participation in Natural Resource Monitoring: a Characterization of Approaches

    CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Issue 1 2009
    FINN DANIELSEN
    conservación; evaluación de la biodiversidad; esquemas de monitoreo; intereses locales; manejo de recursos naturales Abstract:,The monitoring of trends in the status of species or habitats is routine in developed countries, where it is funded by the state or large nongovernmental organizations and often involves large numbers of skilled amateur volunteers. Far less monitoring of natural resources takes place in developing countries, where state agencies have small budgets, there are fewer skilled professionals or amateurs, and socioeconomic conditions prevent development of a culture of volunteerism. The resulting lack of knowledge about trends in species and habitats presents a serious challenge for detecting, understanding, and reversing declines in natural resource values. International environmental agreements require signatories undertake systematic monitoring of their natural resources, but no system exists to guide the development and expansion of monitoring schemes. To help develop such a protocol, we suggest a typology of monitoring categories, defined by their degree of local participation, ranging from no local involvement with monitoring undertaken by professional researchers to an entirely local effort with monitoring undertaken by local people. We assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each monitoring category and the potential of each to be sustainable in developed or developing countries. Locally based monitoring is particularly relevant in developing countries, where it can lead to rapid decisions to solve the key threats affecting natural resources, can empower local communities to better manage their resources, and can refine sustainable-use strategies to improve local livelihoods. Nevertheless, we recognize that the accuracy and precision of the monitoring undertaken by local communities in different situations needs further study and field protocols need to be further developed to get the best from the unrealized potential of this approach. A challenge to conservation biologists is to identify and establish the monitoring system most relevant to a particular situation and to develop methods to integrate outputs from across the spectrum of monitoring schemes to produce wider indices of natural resources that capture the strengths of each. Resumen:,El monitoreo de tendencias en el estatus de especies o hábitats es rutinario en los países desarrollados, donde es financiado por el estado o por grandes organizaciones no gubernamentales y a menudo involucra a grandes números de voluntarios amateurs competentes. El monitoreo de recursos naturales es menos intenso en los países en desarrollo, donde las agencias estatales tienen presupuestos pequeños, hay menos profesionales o amateurs competentes y las condiciones socioeconómicas limitan el desarrollo de una cultura de voluntariado. La consecuente falta de conocimientos sobre las tendencias de las especies y los hábitats presenta un serio reto para la detección, entendimiento y reversión de las declinaciones de los recursos naturales. Los tratados ambientales internacionales requieren que los signatarios realicen monitoreos sistemáticos de sus recursos naturales, pero no existe un sistema para guiar el desarrollo y la expansión de los esquemas de monitoreo. Para ayudar al desarrollo de tal protocolo, sugerimos una tipología de categorías de monitoreo, definidas por el nivel de participación local, desde ningún involucramiento local con el monitoreo realizado por investigadores profesionales hasta un esfuerzo completamente local con el monitoreo llevado a cabo por habitantes locales. Evaluamos las fortalezas y debilidades de cada categoría de monitoreo, así como su sustentabilidad potencial en países desarrollados o en desarrollo. El monitoreo basado localmente es particularmente relevante en los países en desarrollo, donde puede llevar a decisiones rápidas para resolver amenazas clave sobre sus recursos naturales, puede facultar a las comunidades locales para un mejor manejo de sus recursos naturales y puede refinar las estrategias de uso sustentable para mejorar la forma de vida local. Sin embargo, reconocemos que la precisión y exactitud del monitoreo llevado a cabo por comunidades locales en situaciones diferentes requiere de mayor estudio y los protocolos de campo requieren de mayor desarrollo para obtener lo mejor del potencial de este método. Un reto para los biólogos de la conservación es la identificación y establecimiento del sistema de monitoreo más relevante para la situación particular, así como el desarrollo de métodos para integrar los resultados de una gama de esquemas de monitoreo para producir índices de recursos naturales más amplios que capturen las fortalezas de cada uno. [source]


    Politics, industry and the regulation of industrial greenhouse-gas emissions in the UK and Germany

    ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2004
    Ian Bailey
    This paper assesses the impact of ,new' environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), such as eco-taxes, tradable permits and environmental agreements, on the politics of regulating industrial greenhouse-gas emissions. Intense academic debate surrounds the extent to which environmental policy is driven by the public interest, public choices between actor and stakeholder interests, or embedded institutional traditions. However, the effects on environmental politics of the recent shift from direct regulation to NEPIs remain seriously under-researched. Surveys and interviews with industry and policy-makers on the implementation of United Kingdom and German climate policy indicate that, although economic pressures do influence the design of policy instruments, public choice is far from dominant; nor are industry reactions to particular NEPIs uniform between countries. This suggests that national institutional traditions are far more influential in informing policy choices and industry reactions to policy innovations than is often acknowledged. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &,Sons, Ltd and ERP,Environment. [source]


    Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries

    INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2009
    Olivier Bahn
    Abstract In this paper we use a dynamic model to analyze the composition and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in an asymmetrical framework. Signatory countries are assumed to optimize the total welfare of the international agreement's members, while non-signatory countries optimize their own individual welfare, taking into account the dynamics of the pollution stock. Our model is calibrated using data from the MERGE climate policy assessment model. We briefly review two contrasting approaches to define stability of IEAs, and provide a numerical illustration in each case. [source]


    COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING

    NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2006
    JOHAN EYCKMANS
    ABSTRACT. We combine new concepts of noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model on climate change to analyze the impact of different protocol designs on the success of coalition formation. We analyze the role of "single versus multiple coalitions,""open versus exclusive membership,""no, weak and strong consensus about membership" and "no transfers versus transfers." First, we want to find out whether and how modifications of the standard assumptions affect results that are associated with the widely applied cartel formation game in the noncooperative game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements. Second, we discuss normative policy conclusions that emerge from the various modifications. Third, we confront our results with evidence on past international environmental treaties and derive an agenda for future research. [source]


    PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION

    NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 2 2006
    MICHAEL FINUS
    ABSTRACT. We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties. [source]


    Negotiation versus manipulation: The impact of alternate forms of LDC government behavior on the design of international environmental agreements,

    PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2001
    Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
    International environmental agreement; LDC government; perfect correlation Abstract. This article addresses the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supra-national governmental authority (SNGA) with limited funds that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (IEA) for less developed countries (LDCs). The SNGA can only deal with polluting firms in the LDCs through their national governments. This tripartite hierarchical interaction is studied for two LDCs. The private information of the firms and the governments across the two countries is perfectly correlated. In this setting, we study the effects of two kinds of behavior by the governments of the LDCs. We show that despite the perfect correlation in the private information of governments and firms across the two countries, the SNGA cannot design a first-best IEA. Our analysis suggests that problems arising from the SNGA's inability to monitor the actions of the polluting firms and the national governments are less salient than is commonly believed. However, there is no denying the fact that the success of lEAs is dependent not only on the funds available for environmental protection, but also on the manner in which LDC governments represent polluting firms in their countries. [source]


    The evolving role of trade associations in negotiated environmental agreements: the case of United Kingdom Climate Change Agreements

    BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, Issue 1 2006
    Ian Bailey
    Abstract Voluntary and negotiated agreements are becoming increasingly popular instruments for regulating industry's environmental performance. Although their main purpose is to modify the behaviour of individual firms, the coordinating role of trade (or industry) associations is often critical to their environmental effectiveness. Thus, a clear and mutually agreed understanding of associations' role in the agreement process is essential. This paper examines the nature of trade associations' input into the negotiation and implementation of environmental agreements, using the case study of United Kingdom Climate Change Agreements. Results show associations serving a range of coordinating roles, including the aggregation of members' viewpoints, negotiation of agreements, provision of regulatory and technical knowledge and collation of performance data. We conclude that further involvement of trade associations in negotiated and voluntary agreements can bring appreciable, though not uncontested, benefits in terms of environmental effectiveness. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source]