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Endogenous Timing (endogenous + timing)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PAYOFF MOTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY,

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2009
KANGSIK CHOI
A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non-negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative-payoff-maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non-negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute-payoff-maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. [source]

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY AND PRIVATE DUOPOLY ,,CAPACITY-THEN-QUANTITY' GAME: THE LINEAR DEMAND CASE,

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 2 2009
YUANZHU LU
We consider a game of endogenous timing of sequential choice of capacity and quantity with observable delay in a mixed duopoly and a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly, we find that a simultaneous play at the capacity stage or at the quantity stage can never be supported as subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE); whereas a simultaneous play at each stage turns out to be the unique SPNE in a private duopoly. In mixed duopoly there is multiplicity of equilibria and all SPNEs require sequentiality at the capacity as well as quantity stage. [source]

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2009
Yasuhiko Nakamura
We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous-timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

MIXED DUOPOLY, PRIVATIZATION AND SUBSIDIZATION IN AN ENDOGENOUS TIMING FRAMEWORK,

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 1 2010
YOSHIHIRO TOMARU
This is the first paper to consider the endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with subsidization. Pal (Economics Letters, Vol. 61 (1998), pp. 181,185) shows that private leadership is always an equilibrium outcome in a mixed duopoly without any subsidy. By including the production subsidy, we observe that private leadership may disappear from equilibrium and that Cournot and public leadership become the likely equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, we find that when firms have identical technologies the first-best allocation can be attained by the same subsidy before and after privatization even though firms' production timings are endogenized. Finally, we examine privatization with lobbying activities and show that such privatization leads to the deterioration of social welfare. [source]

PRIVATISATION AND TIMING IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH BOTH FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC FIRMS,

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 4 2009
JOHN S. HEYWOOD
This paper models a mixed oligopoly with both a domestic and a foreign private firm and examines the resulting timing in the quantity setting game. We demonstrate that with a single simultaneous pre-game delay stage, the resulting endogenous timing has either the public firm leading or the two private firms leading. An alternative characterisation of the pre-game stage results in the single timing in which the two private firms lead and the public firm follows. For all timings that emerge endogenously, we show that privatisation will always lower domestic welfare but its influence on global welfare is ambiguous. [source]