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Enforcement Problem (enforcement + problem)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

Enforcement of environmental charges: some economic aspects and evidence from the German Waste Water Charge

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2001
Professor Dr Erik Gawel
Enforcement problems are usually analysed with respect to command-and-control measures of environmental regulation. The recognition that any environmental policy instrument entails an enforcement problem in principle is basic to a comparative analysis of enforcement effects. This paper deals with the comparative enforcement effects of charges: How does enforcement of a charge function? Which problems occur particularly in the enforcement of charges? Could enforcement be facilitated by a specific construction of charge laws? Are economic concepts of charge enforceable at all, and if so, under what conditions? Are charges more readily enforceable than other instruments? Therefore, some economic theory assessments of enforcement processes are presented first. In a third part, the paper sheds light on the practical experience made with the enforcement of the German Waste Water Charge. It is argued that the well worn thesis of an enforcement-friendly ,self-control' of market instruments is based on unrealistic assumptions. Whether against this background enforcement of environmental policy can be facilitated by an increased application use of charges must be viewed sceptically in an overall assessment of the problematic. Moreover, the transition from allocative control tasks to fiscal environmental charges may well be a symptom of rather than a contribution to the solution of the political and administrative crisis of enforcement. Especially for charges, the crucial question seems to be the political implementation rather than concrete enforcement by local authorities. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment [source]

Key Factors of Joint-Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis

KYKLOS INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, Issue 2 2005
Alexander S. Kritikos
Summary This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint-liability micro-lending contracts. Using our data set, we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint-liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. After the loan disbursement, the incentive system leads to peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100% if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long-term problems of the joint-liability approach, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino effect, are to be tackled notably. [source]

DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 4 2000
D FLATH
When retailers must commit to shipment quantities prior to resolution of demand uncertainty, manufacturer stipulation of a minimum retail price is likely to be profitable for the manufacturer and not damaging to the retailers. The reason is simple: if demand turns out to be low, the unfettered market-clearing price can lie below the price that maximizes total sales revenue. A minimum retail price that is binding in the low-demand state can thus increase total revenue even though it saddles retailers with unsold merchandise. The ubiquity of full reimbursement for returns in Japan, even though it is in theory merely a second-best way of achieving minimum retail price stipulations, reveals important aspects of manufacturer maintenance of retail prices having to do with enforcement problems, the allocation of risk-bearing, and economic incentives. These aspects of resale price maintenance (RPM) are relevant to the normative evaluation of the special exemptions for RPM that Japan's Fair Trade Commission has long maintained but is now phasing out. [source]