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Emissions Taxes (emission + tax)
Selected AbstractsTradeable Emissions Permits, Emissions Taxes and GrowthTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2004Bertrand Crettez This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition,, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez-faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from ,productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed. [source] Pigouvian Taxes in General Equilibrium with a Fixed Tax Redistribution RuleJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2000Andreas Lange This paper establishes existence of a first-best emission tax in a general equilibrium model with pollution, when the redistribution rule of the tax income is chosen fixed and independently of the Pigouvian tax rate. It is known that under standard convexity assumptions each Pareto efficient allocation can be implemented by simultaneously choosing a Pigouvian tax rate and an appropriate lump sum redistribution of income. In real politics, however, tax redistribution schemes are often restricted to a small feasible set. Nonetheless we show that for any given lump sum redistribution rule, being continuous in overall tax income, an emission tax rate exists that leads to a Pareto efficient equilibrium. [source] Combining policy instruments to curb greenhouse gas emissionsENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Olivier Bahn The Kyoto Protocol has set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for selected countries. To comply with these reduction requirements, decision-makers may use market-based instruments on a national or international basis. This paper advocates the combining of national emission taxes with international trade of emission permits. As a numerical application, this paper analyses macro-economic impacts of such a strategy for Switzerland. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [source] R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and PollutionAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2002Emmanuel Petrakis We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative, i.e. there should be a tax on R&D, depending on the extent of the appropriability problem and the degree of environmental damage. In a wide class of cases, depending on the parameter values, welfare in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the case of R&D subsidisation. [source] Tradeable Emissions Permits, Emissions Taxes and GrowthTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2004Bertrand Crettez This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition,, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez-faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from ,productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed. [source] | ||||||||||