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Emissions Permits (emission + permit)
Selected AbstractsTradeable Emissions Permits, Emissions Taxes and GrowthTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2004Bertrand Crettez This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition,, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez-faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from ,productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed. [source] Grandfathering and Greenhouse: The Role of Compensation and Adjustment Assistance in the Introduction of a Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme for AustraliaECONOMIC PAPERS: A JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Issue 2 2009Flavio Menezes Q52; Q58 The terms "grandfather clause" and "grandfathering" describe elements of a policy programme in which existing participants in an activity are protected from the impact of regulations, restrictions or charges applied to new entrants. In this paper, the role of grandfathering in the design of a carbon emissions trading scheme in Australia is assessed. It is argued that adjustment assistance policies such as those adopted in conjunction with previous microeconomic reform programmes are preferable to policies based on the free issue of emission permits. The suggestion that owners of capital assets should be compensated for changes in government policy that reduce the expected flow of income from those assets represents a radical, and undesirable, policy innovation. [source] Combining policy instruments to curb greenhouse gas emissionsENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 3 2001Olivier Bahn The Kyoto Protocol has set greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for selected countries. To comply with these reduction requirements, decision-makers may use market-based instruments on a national or international basis. This paper advocates the combining of national emission taxes with international trade of emission permits. As a numerical application, this paper analyses macro-economic impacts of such a strategy for Switzerland. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment [source] The role of policy instruments for promoting combined heat and power production with low CO2 emissions in district heating systemsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENERGY RESEARCH, Issue 6 2005Å. Marbe Abstract Policy instruments clearly influence the choice of production technologies and fuels in large energy systems, including district heating networks. Current Swedish policy instruments aim at promoting the use of biofuel in district heating systems, and at promoting electric power generation from renewable energy sources. However, there is increasing pressure to harmonize energy policy instruments within the EU. In addition, natural gas based combined cycle technology has emerged as the technology of choice in the power generation sector in the EU. This study aims at exploring the role of policy instruments for promoting the use of low CO2 emissions fuels in high performance combined heat and power systems in the district heating sector. The paper presents the results of a case study for a Swedish district heating network where new large size natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) combined heat and power (CHP) is being built. Given the aim of current Swedish energy policy, it is assumed that it could be of interest in the future to integrate a biofuel gasifier to the CHP plant and co-fire the gasified biofuel in the gas turbine unit, thereby reducing usage of fossil fuel. The goals of the study are to evaluate which policy instruments promote construction of the planned NGCC CHP unit, the technical performance of an integrated biofuelled pressurized gasifier with or without dryer on plant site, and which combination of policy instruments promote integration of a biofuel gasifier to the planned CHP unit. The power plant simulation program GateCycle was used for plant performance evaluation. The results show that current Swedish energy policy instruments favour investing in the NGCC CHP unit. The corresponding cost of electricity (COE) from the NGCC CHP unit is estimated at 253 SEK MWh,1, which is lower than the reference power price of 284 SEK MWh,1. Investing in the NGCC CHP unit is also shown to be attractive if a CO2 trading system is implemented. If the value of tradable emission permits (TEP) in such as system is 250 SEK tonne,1, COE is 353 SEK MWh,1 compared to the reference power price of 384 SEK MWh,1. It is possible to integrate a pressurized biofuel gasifier to the NGCC CHP plant without any major re-design of the combined cycle provided that the maximum degree of co-firing is limited to 27,38% (energy basis) product gas, depending on the design of the gasifier system. There are many parameters that affect the economic performance of an integrated biofuel gasifier for product gas co-firing of a NGCC CHP plant. The premium value of the co-generated renewable electricity and the value of TEPs are very important parameters. Assuming a future CO2 trading system with a TEP value of 250 SEK tonne,1 and a premium value of renewable electricity of 200 SEK MWh,1 COE from a CHP plant with an integrated biofuelled gasifier could be 336 SEK MWh,1, which is lower than both the reference market electric power price and COE for the plant operating on natural gas alone. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions TradingJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 3 2001Paul Elkins This paper surveys the literature on, and examples of current implementation of, carbon taxes and carbon emission permits. It sets out the theoretical basis for these instruments, with special reference to the revenue-recycling and tax interaction effects. This theoretical work concludes that instruments which raise revenue which can be recycled so as to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes are significantly less costly than those which do not. The paper then reviews the sizable literature on the distributional effects of these instruments, especially with regard to industrial competitiveness and regressive effects on low-income groups, evaluating attempts to mitigate these where they are perceived as unacceptable. The paper concludes that such efforts at mitigation, while possible, can substantially reduce the efficiency benefits of the instruments. The projected costs of carbon taxes depend on a wide range of assumptions. This is still a contested area, but the paper concludes that, on a range of plausible assumptions, these costs need not be high. Finally the paper notes that early evaluations of the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes have been generally positive. This suggests that, if concern about anthropogenic climate change continues to increase, more countries will introduce carbon taxes and emission permits, with the latter increasingly auctioned. [source] Der steinige Weg von der Theorie in die Praxis des Emissionshandels: Die EU-Richtlinie zum CO2 -Emissionshandel und ihre nationale UmsetzungPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 1 2005Patrick Graichen In this article we firstly critically discuss the institutional rules set by the EU-directive. Secondly, we analyse consequences for the national allocation plans. Furthermore, we discuss the allocation rules for emission permits, which are currently under consideration for Germany. In particular we focus on output-based versus emission-based allocation rules and on treatments of new entrants and firm exits. We argue that free permits should only be allocated due to either historic output or historic emissions. We further argue that new entrants should not get any free permits and that firms which leave the market should not lose their permits assigned for future periods. Finally we discuss interaction of emission trading and related instruments such as eco-taxes, and subsidies for renewable energy. [source] The tragedy of the commons: property rights and markets as solutions to resource and environmental problemsAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2009Gary D. Libecap In one way or another, all environmental and natural resource problems associated with overexploitation or under provision of public goods, arise from incompletely defined and enforced property rights. As a result private decision makers do not consider or internalize social benefits and costs in their production or investment actions. The gap between private and social net returns results in externalities , harmful effects on third parties: overfishing, excessive air pollution, unwarranted extraction or diversion of ground or surface water, extreme depletion of oil and gas reservoirs. These situations are all examples of the ,The Tragedy of the Commons'. In this paper, I consider options for mitigating the losses of open access: common or group property regimes, government tax and regulation policy, more formal private property rights. I briefly summarize the problems and advantages of each option and describe why there has been move toward rights-based instruments in recent years: ITQ (individual transferable quotas), tradable emission permits, and private water rights. Introductions to the papers in the special issue follow. [source] Enforcing Emissions Trading ProgramsPOLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002Performance, Practice, Theory Combining an analysis of the compliance incentives faced by firms in an emissions trading program, a comprehensive review of the enforcement strategies employed in Sulfur Dioxide Allowance and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) programs, and a review of the compliance performance of these programs thus far, we are able to propose several practical guidelines for enforcing emissions trading programs. We stress the importance of prevailing market prices for emissions permits in determining compliance incentives, the importance of accurately measuring firms' emissions, and the importance of implementing enforcement strategies that remove the incentives firms may have to falsify emissions reports. [source] Tradeable Emissions Permits, Emissions Taxes and GrowthTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 4 2004Bertrand Crettez This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in order to analyse and to compare emissions taxes and tradeable emissions permits. Even in the context of a perfect environment, i.e. with perfect information, perfect competition,, it is shown that privately owned emissions permits have some disadvantages. An equilibrium with emissions permits would certainly be better than a laissez-faire equilibrium since it would entail a lower pollution level. However, it is far from clear that an economy with pollution permits would be preferable over an economy with emissions taxes. While in both cases pollution would be lower, growth would be higher in an economy with emissions taxes. This is because emissions permits divert saving from ,productive' resources and have a negative impact on capital accumulation. This happens whatever the way emissions taxes are redistributed. [source] New policies create a new politics: issues of institutional design in climate change policyAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Henry Ergas Institutional design focuses on the task of providing accountability and effective monitoring of decision-making by bodies vested with the coercive powers of the state in a context where information is inherently limited, costly to acquire and asymmetrically distributed. This paper focuses on issues of institutional design in the context of climate change policy. It examines proposals advanced in the June 2008 Draft and Final Reports of the Garnaut Climate Change Review (,Garnaut Reports'), and in the Government's July 2008 Green Paper and December 2008 White Paper on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (,Green and White Papers') with respect to how revenues raised by the sale of emissions permits would be used; and second, the proposed governance arrangements for the emissions trading scheme. [source] Strategic issues in global climate change policy,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Harry Clarke An analysis of prospects for deriving self-enforcing, global, greenhouse gas emission mitigation agreements is provided. Policy spillovers and carbon leakages are accounted for. Situations where mitigation effort should be concentrated in particular countries and where efficient outcomes can be fostered by international trade in emissions permits are discussed. The use of auxiliary policies to transform intractable Prisoner's Dilemma incentive problems to more tractable problems, the role of policy commitments and the strategic implications of ,no regret' and ,adaptation' policies are analysed. Dynamic and repeated game formulations are outlined. [source] The logic of collective action and Australia's climate policy,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010John C.V. Pezzey We analyse the long-term efficiency of the emissions target and of the provisions to reduce carbon leakage in the Australian Government's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, as proposed in March 2009, and the nature and likely cause of changes to these features in the previous year. The target range of 5,15 per cent cuts in national emission entitlements during 2000,2020 was weak, in that on balance it is too low to minimise Australia's long-term mitigation costs. The free allocation of output-linked, tradable emissions permits to emissions-intensive, trade-exposed (EITE) sectors was much higher than proposed earlier, or shown to be needed to deal with carbon leakage. It plausibly means that EITE emissions can rise by 13 per cent during 2010,2020, while non-EITE sectors must cut emissions by 34,51 per cent (or make equivalent permit imports) to meet the national targets proposed, far from a cost-effective outcome. The weak targets and excessive EITE assistance illustrate the efficiency-damaging power of collective action by the ,carbon lobby'. Resisting this requires new national or international institutions to assess lobby claims impartially, and more government publicity about the true economic importance of carbon-intensive sectors. [source] Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2010Regina Betz The allocation of permits is an important design aspect of an emissions trading scheme. Traditionally, governments have favoured the free allocation of greenhouse gas permits based on individual historical emissions (,grandfathering') or industry benchmark data. Particularly in the European Union (EU), the free allocation of permits has proven complex and inefficient and the distributional implications are politically difficult to justify; auctioning emissions permits has therefore become more popular. The EU is now moving to auction more than 50 per cent of all permits in 2013, and in the US the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has begun auctioning more than 90 per cent of total allowances. Another case in point is the Australian proposal for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), which provides for auctioning a significant share of total permits. This paper discusses the proposed Australian CPRS's auction design. A major difference to other emissions trading schemes is that the CPRS plans to auction multiple vintages of emissions permits simultaneously. [source] | |||||||||||||