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Electoral Success (electoral + success)
Selected AbstractsREVISITING BLACK ELECTORAL SUCCESS: OAKLAND (CA), 40 YEARS LATERJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2009FRÉDÉRICK DOUZET ABSTRACT:,The city of Oakland, California, was one of the case studies Browning, Marshall and Tabb picked in their book,Protest Is not Enough,(1984) as a significant example of successful liberal black-and-white coalitions, leading to strong black incorporation. Yet over the past 40 years, the balance of power has dramatically changed in the city of Oakland. After several decades of experience with African-American mayors and changing demographics, we need to reflect on the adequacy of this paradigm in light of the contemporary situation. The city once governed by a black mayor with a majority black city council in a traditional white progressive-black coalition has now become intrinsically multicultural, leading to the election of former Governor Jerry Brown as a Mayor in 1998. Despite Ron Dellums's election in 2006, the black hold and control over the city seems to be more tenuous and fragile than it was 15 years ago. This article raises the question of the future of black urban political power in cities undergoing demographic and political changes. Our main findings are that black urban power in Oakland is still predominantly coalition-based but involves new coalition partners with the demographic growth and the electoral mobilization of Hispanics and Asians. While the black-led coalition still relies on white progressive support, this support has weakened, mostly because of the broadening of the progressives' agenda. Finally, the black community seems less likely to vote on pure identity grounds and seems increasingly inclined to vote along issues and interests. [source] CONTRIBUTIONS AND ELECTIONS WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIESECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2005Adam Meirowitz This paper develops a model of campaign contributions and electoral competition. Contributors have separable preferences over policy and the electoral success of the candidate they support, as in influence buying. Policy preferences are single peaked over a single policy dimension. A candidate's chances of victory are increasing in the relative size of her war chest. In equilibrium, potential contributors balance incentives to donate to a candidate that is desirable on policy grounds and ensuring that they back the likely winner. With exogenous candidate positions, we find conditions under which, in equilibrium, contributors donate to the candidate that is less desirable on policy grounds solely because they consider the candidate viable. We also find that there is a degree of indeterminacy, wherein multiple equilibria inducing different lotteries over the final policy often exist. With endogenous candidate locations, we find that while median policies are always supportable as equilibrium, it is often the case that any pair of candidate locations is supportable in equilibrium. These results suggest that in settings with substantial influence buying, median policy interests may not be represented. [source] The frog pond beauty contest: Physical attractiveness and electoral success of the constituency candidates at the North Rhine-Westphalia state election of 2005EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2008ULRICH ROSAR Since posters with photographs of these candidates are omnipresent on the streets during the election campaign, many voters are at least familiar with their facial appearance. As a consequence, the attractiveness of the constituency candidates substantially influences voter behaviour. This is shown by the example of the North Rhine-Westphalia state election of 2005. Judgments about the attractiveness of the constituency candidates were collected by means of a web survey among members of an online access panel. Respondents were confronted with portrait photographs of local candidates and asked to rate their attractiveness. According to the truth-of-consensus method, the attractiveness score of a candidate is computed by averaging across the different ratings he or she has received. Voter behaviour is captured by the real-life election results in the constituencies. [source] Subnational political opportunity structures and the success of the radical right: Evidence from the March 2004 regional elections in FranceEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2007ELINA KESTILÄ The concept of ,political opportunity structure' refers to the degree of openness of a particular political system and the external institutional or socio-economic constraints and opportunities that it sets for political parties. Comparative analysis across subnational units is conducted where the 94 departments of mainland France are the units of analysis. The significance of electoral institutions (district magnitude), party competition (effective number of parties), electoral behaviour (turnout) and socioeconomic conditions (immigration and unemployment) on the ability of the FN to gather votes across the departments is assessed by means of multiple regression. The empirical results show that the subnational political opportunity structures have been of great importance for the FN. Some four out of the five independent variables are statistically significant and explain a great deal of the variance in the two dependent variables (electoral support for FN list and index of electoral success). Turnout and district magnitude are negatively correlated with the electoral fortunes of the FN, while unemployment and the effective number of party lists are positively correlated with the success of the FN in the regional elections. The variable that indicates the share of non-European immigrants does not provide additional explanatory power in a statistically significant way. [source] Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party successEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006KAI ARZHEIMER West European right-wing extremist parties have received a great deal of attention over the past two decades due to their electoral success. What has received less coverage, however, is the fact that these parties have not enjoyed a consistent level of electoral support across Western Europe during this period. This article puts forward an explanation of the variation in the right-wing extremist party vote across Western Europe that incorporates a wider range of factors than have been considered previously. It begins by examining the impact of socio-demographic variables on the right-wing extremist party vote. Then, it turns its attention to a whole host of structural factors that may potentially affect the extreme right party vote, including institutional, party-system and conjunctural variables. The article concludes with an assessment of which variables have the most power in explaining the uneven electoral success of right-wing extremist parties across Western Europe. The findings go some way towards challenging the conventional wisdom as to how the advance of the parties of the extreme right may be halted. [source] The Electoral Impact of Direct-Democratic PracticesINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2008EVA ANDUIZA Abstract In recent years there has been a growing interest in the integration of mechanisms of direct citizen participation in the institutional structure of representative democracy, particularly at the local level. This essay examines the electoral impact of mechanisms of direct citizen participation. Although it is often considered that participatory schemes can be a means to achieve electoral success in the hands of politicians seeking re-election, quantitative analyses of 65 Spanish municipalities demonstrate that electoral success is far from being an immediate consequence of direct democratic practices (DDPs). The qualitative analysis of four cases shows that electoral consequences directly attributable to participatory devices depend on their design and on how they fit into the whole political process. Participatory processes that are too rigid and those, especially, that generate expectations that cannot be translated into real policies may end up having a negative effect. On the other hand, DDPs may account for network-building and improved information among citizens that, in turn, may have electoral consequences. DDPs are thus neither a blessing nor a cure per se in their electoral effects. Instead, as with representative democracy, their consequences and success will ultimately depend upon their procedural dimension. Résumé Ces dernières années ont connu un intérêt croissant pour l'intégration de mécanismes de participation directe des citoyens dans le cadre institutionnel de la démocratie participative, notamment au niveau local. Cet article examine l'impact électoral des mécanismes de participation directe. Même si on estime souvent que les systèmes participatifs peuvent permettre la victoire d'hommes politiques en quête de réélection, des analyses quantitatives sur 65 municipalités espagnoles montrent que le succès électoral est loin de résulter automatiquement des pratiques de démocratie directe (PDD). L'analyse qualitative de quatre cas révèle que les incidences électorales imputables directement aux dispositifs participatifs dépendent du concept utilisé et de la manière dont ceux-ci s'intègrent dans le processus politique global. Si les démarches participatives sont trop rigides, et notamment si elles suscitent des attentes qui ne peuvent se traduire dans des politiques publiques concrètes, elles sont susceptibles d'avoir, en fin de compte, un effet négatif. En revanche, les PDD peuvent expliquer la construction de réseaux et l'amélioration de l'information entre les citoyens, ce qui peut influer sur des élections. Les PDD ne sont donc ni une bénédiction ni une malédiction en termes d'incidences électorales. A l'instar de celles de la démocratie représentative, leurs conséquences et leur réussite vont finalement dépendre de leur dimension procédurale. [source] ,A Tiny Little Footnote in History': Conservative Centre ForwardPARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Issue 2 2010STEPHEN EVANS In May 1985, two years after he had returned to the back benches, Francis Pym launched the first organised display of dissent within the parliamentary Conservative Party against Margaret Thatcher's leadership: Conservative Centre Forward. Those Conservative MPs who joined the group were very much believers in One Nation Conservatism. Conservative Centre Forward survived for barely a week after going public; it rapidly collapsed amid accusations of disloyalty and inept leadership. The group proved to be a short-lived experiment which achieved little of note and exposed those who were involved to widespread ridicule. Yet, it was precisely because Conservative Centre Forward collapsed so quickly and achieved so little that it was significant. In its own way, the short life of the group provided a revealing commentary upon the character of the mid-1980s Conservative Party. It was a party which, on the one hand, was moving inexorably to the right and therefore ever further away from the values of One Nation Conservatism which Conservative Centre Forward espoused. On the other hand, it was a party which was still traditional enough to view open displays of dissent, of whatever magnitude, as a threat to the unity upon which its continued electoral success depended. [source] Race and the Recall: Racial and Ethnic Polarization in the California Recall ElectionAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2008Gary M. Segura In the 2003 recall election in California, Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante received more than 1.25 million fewer votes in the replacement election than votes cast against the recall of Gray Davis. A much smaller group voted "yes" on the recall but voted for Bustamante. The principal underlying explanation is racial and ethnic polarization. Using L.A. Times exit poll data, we compare the characteristics of voters who displayed the two unusual behavioral patterns with those who voted in more conventional ways. We find that Latinos and African Americans are far less likely than non-Hispanic whites and Asian Americans to have defected from Bustamante given a "no" vote on the recall, and far more likely to have voted for Bustamante given a potentially strategic "yes" vote on the recall. The patterns of defection are consistent with racial polarization on Proposition 54, lending further credence to our claim that race and ethnicity persists as an important factor in vote choice, even in environments with a history of minority electoral success. [source] The Mobilization of Core Supporters: Campaigns, Turnout, and Electoral Composition in United States Presidential ElectionsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2005Thomas M. Holbrook Our objective is to investigate the relationship between presidential campaign activities and political mobilization in the states, with specific focus on the mobilization of core constituents. Using data on presidential campaign visits, presidential campaign media purchases, and party transfers to the states, we highlight some interesting mobilization patterns. First, voter turnout is positively influenced by presidential campaigns, though not by all campaign activities. Second, there is some evidence that campaigns have direct effects on the participation of core partisan groups. Finally, the ability of parties to mobilize their core groups has a strong effect on state electoral success that exists over and above the direct effect of campaign activity on electoral outcomes. All in all, we see the results as strong evidence that political mobilization in general and party transfers to the states in particular are an important component for understanding campaign effects in presidential elections. [source] Political manipulation in a majoritarian democracy: central government targeting of public funds to English subnational government, in space and across timeBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2001Peter John This article argues that it is rational for the executive to target resources in space and through time if it seeks to maximise its chances of electoral success. In majoritarian democracies such as the United Kingdom, there are particularly strong incentives to target resources to marginal legislative constituencies, although similar opportunies exist in other political systems. The benefits of such a practice could be growing, because the costs of forms of temporal targeting predicted by theories of the political business cycle have increased, owing to the effect of the global economy. In the United Kingdom one channel through which resources can be targeted is central grants to local authorities. This model is tested with pooled cross-section data on the central finance of English local government between 1981/1982,1995/1996. The article confirms that central government spatially targeted marginals after 1988/1989 while it continued to allocate greater funds near national elections, conditional on its opinion-poll ratings. Hypotheses from the literature on distributional politics are also tested, finding evidence for the temporal allocation of resources to win local elections. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||