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Electoral Participation (electoral + participation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences100%

Selected Abstracts

Electoral behaviour behind the gates: partisanship and political participation among Canadian gated community residents

AREA, Issue 1 2010
R. Alan Walks
Gated communities have been characterised as representing processes of ,forting up' and ,civic secession', in which their residents use gating as a strategy for withdrawing from political life and from taking collective responsibility for others. The assumption is that the residents of private gated communities should be less likely to participate in political life, and/or be more likely to support political parties on the right who advocate privatisation, reduced government expenditures and lower taxes. If the act of living in a gated community is associated with either greater support for parties and policies on the right of the political spectrum, or limited political participation, then the growth of such forms of privatised communities has potential implications for the future of urban politics and even for national political systems. However, despite surveys that have dealt with social attitudes ,behind the gates', insufficient attention has been paid to the politics of gated community residents. This paper fills this gap through a comparative analysis of electoral behaviour during the 2006 federal election at the level of the polling station. Electoral participation and partisanship in 27 gated communities in three Canadian metropolitan areas is compared against that of non-gated residents. Regression analysis is conducted in order to determine whether gated community residents differ from their non-gated counterparts in the way they vote and their levels of electoral turnout, after controlling for social composition. The potential implications of this research are then discussed. [source]

Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instability in Latin America

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2004
Josep M. Colomer
ABSTRACT This article discusses the relationship between certain institutional regulations of voting rights and elections, different levels of electoral participation, and the degree of political instability in several Latin American political experiences. A formal model specifies the hypotheses that sudden enlargements of the electorate may provoke high levels of political instability, especially under plurality and other restrictive electoral rules, while gradual enlargements of the electorate may prevent much electoral and political innovation and help stability. Empirical data illustrate these hypotheses. A historical survey identifies different patterns of political instability and stability in different countries and periods, which can be compared with the adoption of different voting rights regulations and electoral rules either encouraging or depressing turnout. [source]

Voters, Parties, and the Endogenous Size of Government

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2002
Jans-Peter Olters
Elections, often to a considerable degree, influence the fiscal policies of governments installed on the basis of their results. Yet, economists have tended to view politicians' behaviour either as being determined exogenously or as the result of a social planner's maximisation of a well-defined social-welfare function (subject to some appropriate technology and resource constraints). The latter approach, given (i) its inherent abstraction from important politico-economic interactions, (ii) the theoretical difficulty in deriving a non-contradictory "collective utility function" (as demonstrated by Arrow), and (iii) the inability to estimate a stable relationship that could explain political preferences with economic variables,is viewed as being an unsatisfactory tool for the joint description of a country's economy and polity. On the basis of explicit micro-economic foundations and a democratically coordinated decision-making mechanism over the "optimal" provision of public goods and the corresponding taxes required to finance them, this paper will introduce a simple economic model of politics that subjects individuals to a,two-tiered,political decision-making process over party membership and electoral participation, thereby endogenising the evolution of the competing parties' ideologies, households' electoral behaviour, and the key factors explaining the design of fiscal policies. Having the majority party's median delegate determine on the "optimal" degree of income redistribution suggests that a country's wealth distribution is a crucial explanatory variable explaining its politico-economic development path. [source]

Institutions, Inequality and Social Norms: Explaining Variations in Participation

BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2007
Michael Lister
This article seeks to explain why electoral participation varies over time and space. It develops a hypothesis that one factor is the nature of social citizenship rights, which relates to welfare state provision. The article argues that institutions shape and influence social norms and, in so doing, affect individual behaviour. Rights which are more universal in nature encourage norms of solidarity and participation in ways that more residual systems do not. Therefore, where welfare states are more universalist in nature, we should see higher levels of participation. I use inequality rates as a measure of welfare state outputs to investigate this and find a significant negative relationship between inequality and electoral turnout. This suggests that the nature of welfare state institutions has an effect upon individuals' political behaviour. [source]