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Electoral Institutions (electoral + institution)
Selected AbstractsMarket Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade PolicyINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009Daniel Yuichi Kono The view that intra-industry trade is politically easier to liberalize than inter-industry trade is widely held and potentially explains key features of the global trading system. This view, however, rests on weak theoretical and empirical foundations. I argue that intra-industry trade can in fact lead to higher protection, but only where electoral institutions privilege narrow protectionist interests. I support this hypothesis with an analysis of trade barriers in 4,400 sectors in 65 countries and an analysis of lobbying in the US. My results imply that scholars should stop invoking intra-industry trade as an explanation for low trade barriers in wealthy countries and advanced manufacturing sectors. They also have important implications for the more general relationship between political institutions, collective action, and policy outcomes. [source] Thinking Outside the (Ballot) Box: Informal Electoral Institutions and Mexico's Political OpeningLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2003Todd A. Eisenstadt ABSTRACT This article studies the development of informal bargaining tables to mitigate postelectoral conflicts in some 15 percent of Mexico's local elections between 1989 and 2000, even as formally autonomous electoral commissions and courts were being constituted. By documenting the dual institutions that resulted, the study qualifies theories of institutional design that take actor consent for granted. It argues that in the Mexican case and perhaps others, elections, particularly subnational elections, are focal points for informal bargaining over rules that are the true motors of protracted transitions. It finds electoral institutions to be critical to democratization, but for reasons beyond those given by most institutionalists. [source] Ideological Congruence and Electoral InstitutionsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010Matt Golder Although the literature examining the relationship between ideological congruence and electoral rules is quite large, relatively little attention has been paid to how congruence should be conceptualized. As we demonstrate, empirical results regarding ideological congruence can depend on exactly how scholars conceptualize and measure it. In addition to clarifying various aspects of how scholars currently conceptualize congruence, we introduce a new conceptualization and measure of congruence that captures a long tradition in democratic theory emphasizing the ideal of having a legislature that accurately reflects the preferences of the citizenry as a whole. Our new measure is the direct counterpart for congruence of the vote-seat disproportionality measures so heavily used in comparative studies of representation. Using particularly appropriate data from the,Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,,we find that governments in proportional democracies are not substantively more congruent than those in majoritarian democracies. Proportional democracies are, however, characterized by more representative legislatures. [source] The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local LegislaturesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2010Melissa J. Marschall In this study we revisit the question of black representation on city councils and school boards using a novel substantive and methodological approach and longitudinal data for a sample of over 300 boards and councils. Conceptualizing black representation as a two-stage process, we fit Mullahy's hurdle Poisson models to explain whether and to what extent blacks achieve representation in local legislatures. We find that while the size of the black population and electoral arrangements matter more than ever, especially for overcoming the representational hurdle, the extent to which the black population is concentrated is also strongly associated with black council representation. Further, whereas black resources and opportunities to build "rainbow" coalitions with Latinos or liberal whites are marginally if at all related to black legislative representation, we find that legislative size is an underappreciated mechanism by which to increase representation, particularly in at-large systems, and is perhaps the best predictor of moving towards additional representation. [source] Subnational political opportunity structures and the success of the radical right: Evidence from the March 2004 regional elections in FranceEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2007ELINA KESTILÄ The concept of ,political opportunity structure' refers to the degree of openness of a particular political system and the external institutional or socio-economic constraints and opportunities that it sets for political parties. Comparative analysis across subnational units is conducted where the 94 departments of mainland France are the units of analysis. The significance of electoral institutions (district magnitude), party competition (effective number of parties), electoral behaviour (turnout) and socioeconomic conditions (immigration and unemployment) on the ability of the FN to gather votes across the departments is assessed by means of multiple regression. The empirical results show that the subnational political opportunity structures have been of great importance for the FN. Some four out of the five independent variables are statistically significant and explain a great deal of the variance in the two dependent variables (electoral support for FN list and index of electoral success). Turnout and district magnitude are negatively correlated with the electoral fortunes of the FN, while unemployment and the effective number of party lists are positively correlated with the success of the FN in the regional elections. The variable that indicates the share of non-European immigrants does not provide additional explanatory power in a statistically significant way. [source] Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies' Responses to Operation Iraqi FreedomFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 2 2006STEVE CHAN A central logic of the democratic peace theory claims that public opinion acts as a powerful restraint against war. Democratic officials, unlike their autocratic counterparts, are wary of going to war because they expect to pay an electoral penalty for fighting even successful wars. Several democracies, however, recently joined Operation Iraqi Freedom despite substantial and even overwhelming domestic opposition. We argue that electoral institutions can heighten or lessen the impact of public opinion on democratic officials' concerns for their reelection prospects, thus pointing to an important dimension of variation that has been overlooked in the democratic peace literature. However, contrary to conventional attributions of a greater incentive motivating the parties and candidates in predominantly two-party systems with majority/plurality decision rules to respond to national public opinion, we suggest mitigating factors that tend to reduce such responsiveness. Conversely, we point out that multiparty competition in proportional representation systems can reduce electoral disproportionality without sacrificing responsiveness to public opinion. The pertinent electoral institutions therefore present varying opportunities (or, conversely, constraints) for democratic officials to override their constituents' sentiments when they are so inclined. [source] Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade PolicyINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009Daniel Yuichi Kono The view that intra-industry trade is politically easier to liberalize than inter-industry trade is widely held and potentially explains key features of the global trading system. This view, however, rests on weak theoretical and empirical foundations. I argue that intra-industry trade can in fact lead to higher protection, but only where electoral institutions privilege narrow protectionist interests. I support this hypothesis with an analysis of trade barriers in 4,400 sectors in 65 countries and an analysis of lobbying in the US. My results imply that scholars should stop invoking intra-industry trade as an explanation for low trade barriers in wealthy countries and advanced manufacturing sectors. They also have important implications for the more general relationship between political institutions, collective action, and policy outcomes. [source] Thinking Outside the (Ballot) Box: Informal Electoral Institutions and Mexico's Political OpeningLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2003Todd A. Eisenstadt ABSTRACT This article studies the development of informal bargaining tables to mitigate postelectoral conflicts in some 15 percent of Mexico's local elections between 1989 and 2000, even as formally autonomous electoral commissions and courts were being constituted. By documenting the dual institutions that resulted, the study qualifies theories of institutional design that take actor consent for granted. It argues that in the Mexican case and perhaps others, elections, particularly subnational elections, are focal points for informal bargaining over rules that are the true motors of protracted transitions. It finds electoral institutions to be critical to democratization, but for reasons beyond those given by most institutionalists. [source] Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the SenateAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2009Sean Gailmard A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal-agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi-experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives,as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions. [source] Thinking for Thousands: Emerson's Theory of Political Representation in the Public SphereAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2005Hans Von Rautenfeld This article develops Emerson's theory of representative democracy as it applies to a deliberative public sphere. By highlighting the democratic content of Emerson's thought, this article challenges tradition readings of Emerson that claim his thought to be elitist or antipolitical. According to Emerson, the public sphere is structured by representative individuals who are analogous to those representatives found in electoral institutions. These representatives make public the beliefs and values present in their "constituencies." They deliberate in the name of their constituencies, saying what their constituencies could and would say, were they to also directly engage in such deliberations. Representative individuals are tied to their constituencies through bonds of "sympathy and likeness." The moral consequences of a representative public sphere include the development of a sense of deliberative justice on the part of the citizenry and the reduction of the possibility of domination and oppression by ideologically oriented elites. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||