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Electoral Commission (electoral + commission)
Selected AbstractsInvisible Business: The Unregulated World of Political Party CommercePOLITICS, Issue 2 2005Sue Granik This article explores an area of British political party funding that is overlooked, under-researched and under-regulated: party commerce. A comparison of the trading activities of five large and five small political party headquarters units is presented using audited political party accounts made public by the Electoral Commission in 2003, the first year in which such data became available. The anomalies in party funding transparency arising from the lack of regulation of political party commerce are discussed. The dangers of allowing party commerce to continue unregulated, or of inappropriate regulation, are debated. [source] Dietary and health supplement use among older Australians: results from a national surveyAUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL ON AGEING, Issue 4 2003Sonya Brownie Objectives: To measure the extent of dietary and health supplement use among older Australians and to contrast older supplement users from older non-supplement users. Method: Survey participants (n= 1,263) provided information related to demographic, health and lifestyle features. The target population were Australians aged 65 years and over, randomly chosen from the Australian Electoral Commission. Data was obtained using a 12-page self-administered, mail questionnaire. Results: Forty-three percent (n=548) of the sample reported using at least one dietary and health supplement, 52% of females and 35% of males. Supplement use was significantly related to several demographic and lifestyle features including: gender, educational level, smoking status and number of visits to complementary health therapists. Conclusions: Clearly, supplements were chosen more for their perceived ability to attenuate or modify ailments, rather than their role in correcting nutritional deficiencies. Older Australians appear intent on taking health matters in their own hands. Approximately one third of them rarely inform their doctor about the supplements they use, which raises concerns about the safety and appropriateness of this action. [source] Funding Local Political Parties in England and Wales: Donations and Constituency CampaignsBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2007Ron Johnston The funding of political parties is an issue of considerable contemporary concern in the UK. Although most attention has been paid to the situation regarding national parties, the new funding regime introduced in 2001 also applies to constituency parties, and some concerns have been raised regarding the limits on spending and expenditure there. Using data released by the Electoral Commission on all donations above a specified minimum to constituency parties, this article looks at the pattern of donations over the period 2001,05. It then analyses the impact of spending on the 2005 constituency campaigns, showing that for the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats substantial donations enhanced their vote-winning performances in seats where their candidates were challengers whereas for Labour substantial donations aided its performance in marginal seats that it was defending. [source] The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian RuleAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2010Beatriz Magaloni How can autocrats be restrained from rigging elections when they hold a huge military advantage over their opponents? This article suggests that even when opposition parties have no military capacity to win a revolt, opposition unity and a consequent threat of massive civil disobedience can compel autocrats to hold clean elections and leave office by triggering splits within the state apparatus and the defection of the armed forces. Opposition unity can be elite-driven, when parties unite prior to elections to endorse a common presidential candidate, or voter-driven, when elites stand divided at the polls and voters spontaneously rebel against fraud. Moreover, the article identifies some conditions under which autocrats will tie their hands willingly not to commit fraud by delegating power to an independent electoral commission. The article develops these ideas through a formal game and the discussion of various case studies. [source] Thinking Outside the (Ballot) Box: Informal Electoral Institutions and Mexico's Political OpeningLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2003Todd A. Eisenstadt ABSTRACT This article studies the development of informal bargaining tables to mitigate postelectoral conflicts in some 15 percent of Mexico's local elections between 1989 and 2000, even as formally autonomous electoral commissions and courts were being constituted. By documenting the dual institutions that resulted, the study qualifies theories of institutional design that take actor consent for granted. It argues that in the Mexican case and perhaps others, elections, particularly subnational elections, are focal points for informal bargaining over rules that are the true motors of protracted transitions. It finds electoral institutions to be critical to democratization, but for reasons beyond those given by most institutionalists. [source] |