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Adverse Selection Problem (adverse + selection_problem)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Efficiency Pricing, Tenancy Rent Control and Monopolistic Landlords

ECONOMICA, Issue 278 2003
Kaushik Basu
This paper presents a model of ,tenancy rent control' where rent increases on, and evictions of, sitting tenants are prohibited but nominal rents for new tenants are unrestricted. If there is any inflation, landlords prefer to take short-staying tenants. If there is no way for landlords to tell a tenant's type, an adverse selection problem arises. If landlords have monoply power, then they may prefer not to raise the rent even when there is excess demand for housing. These ,efficiency rents' show that tenancy rent control can give rise to equilibria that look as if there were a flat ceiling on rents. [source]

On the Cost of Adverse Selection in Individual Annuity Markets: Evidence From Singapore

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 2 2002
Wai Mun Fong
New evidence is presented on the cost of adverse selection in individual annuity markets using Singapore data. The Singapore annuity market is an interesting setting to examine the cost of adverse selection for three reasons. First, unlike many Western countries, the Singapore government provides very limited public financial assistance for retirees. Second, while social security contributions mandated under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) result in a high forced savings rate, a large proportion of CPF savings, are used up for housing. Third, to ensure that retirees have sufficient funds to meet basic needs, individuals who reach age 55 are required to set aside a minimum amount of their CPF savings, which can be withdrawn at age 62. The CPF Board allows various options for investing the minimum sum, but the most attractive option is to purchase an annuity. The institutional setting in Singapore in effect provides insurers with a large captive market for annuities. It is conjectured that this should be reflected in a significantly lower cost of adverse selection for annuities sold in Singapore as compared with other countries. The results herein, using data for CPF-approved insurers, are strongly consistent with this conjecture. On average, money's worth of annuities is higher than annuities sold to a similar age-gender mix in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Adverse selection accounts for less than 13 percent of the cost of longevity insurance compared to 30,50 per- cent documented in many previous studies. These results suggest that one way to resolve the adverse selection problem is to adopt a universal individual defined contribution pension scheme that mandates or provides strong incentives for retirees to purchase annuities. [source]

Consumer rationality and credit card pricing: An explanation based on the option value of credit lines

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2004
Sangkyun Park
An option is embedded in credit cards. Since credit cards offer open credit lines, cardholders can borrow at the same terms when they become riskier. This option value raises the zero-profit card rate. Furthermore, adverse selection occurs if cardholders are better informed about the probability of becoming riskier in the future and borrow more when they become riskier. The adverse selection can limit rate competition and keep the card rate above the zero-profit card rate. An up-front fee is not a good alternative because it is also vulnerable to adverse selection. A low introductory card rate is an effective way to avoid the adverse selection problem when asymmetric information is mainly about the change in the borrower's risk profile in the future, as opposed to the riskiness in the present period. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Activity-Based Pricing in a Monopoly

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2003
V. G. Narayanan
abstract In this article, I study the interaction between cost accounting systems and pricing decisions in a setting where a monopolist sells a base product and related support services to customers whose preference for support services is known only to them. I consider two pricing mechanisms,activity-based pricing (ABP) and traditional pricing,and two cost-accounting systems,activity-based costing (ABC) and traditional costing, for support services. Under traditional pricing, only the base product is priced, whereas support services are provided free because detailed cost-driver volume information on the consumption of support services by each customer is unavailable. Under ABP, customers pay based on the quantities consumed of both the base product and the support services because detailed cost-driver volume information is available for each customer. Likewise, under traditional costing for support services the firm makes pricing decisions on cost signals that are noisier than they are under ABC. I compare the equilibrium quantities of the base product and support services sold, the information rent paid to the customers, and the expected profits of the monopolist under all four combinations of cost-driver volume and cost-driver rate information. I show that ABP helps reduce control problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems, for the supplier and increases the supplier's ability to engage in price discrimination. I show that firms are more likely to adopt ABP when their customer base is more diverse, their customer support costs are more uncertain, their costing system has lower measurement error, and the variable costs of providing customer support are higher. Firms adopt ABC when their cost-driver rates for support services under traditional costing are noisier measures of actual costs relative to their cost-driver rates under ABC and when the actual costs of support services are inherently uncertain. I also show that cost-driver rate information and cost-driver volume information for support services are complements. Although the prior literature views ABC and activity-based management (ABM) as facilitating better decision making, I show that ABC and ABP (a form of ABM) are useful tools for addressing control problems in supply chains. [source]