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Economic Voting (economic + voting)
Selected AbstractsEconomic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level AnalysisAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2006Cameron D. Anderson An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance. [source] Economic voting: The effect of political context, volatility and turnout on voters' assignment of responsibilityEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 5 2004ÅSA BENGTSSON Voters' assignment of responsibility for the state of the national economy is assumed to vary according to the context of the election. Building on previous research, the importance of the political context , clarity of responsibility and availability of alternatives , is analysed. The study also breaks new ground by introducing two new contexts of importance: volatility, seen from a systemic perspective, and the trend in turnout. The contextual hypothesis is confirmed. The universal economic effect as such is very weak indeed. However, given a favourable political and institutional environment (clear responsibility structure and availability of alternatives), an economic effect appears. Tests including the new contexts created on the basis of behavioural patterns in the electorate (system volatility and turnout trend) identify elections where the economic effects are even stronger. [source] The Political Economy of Polarization: The Italian Case, 1963,1987POLITICS & POLICY, Issue 1 2003Riccardo Pelizzo Economic voting in Italy has received scant attention in the literature, and the few studies available show little or no empirical support for economic voting hypotheses as applied to Italy. We argue that this dearth of results is primarily due to poor operationalization and study design. In contrast to previous studies that focused on the relationship between the state of the economy and the electoral performance of individual parties, we investigate the impact of prices, employment, and economic output on the polarization of the party system. Using data on seven Italian national elections covering the period 1963,87, we show that polarization is, in fact, closely related to macroeconomic performance. Additionally, in contrast to past studies of Italy, the results are robust with respect to the lag period of the economic variables. [source] DOES THE ECONOMY MATTER?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2005AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSAL CHAIN CONNECTING THE ECONOMY AND THE VOTE IN GALICIA In this paper the causal chain connecting the economy and the vote in 2001 Galician regional elections is analyzed. Our findings demonstrate that economic voting is not just a matter of reactions to economic perceptions. It also depends to a great extent on two intermediate mechanisms: whether or not the incumbent is held responsible for economic outcomes and performance and voters' views of the relative economic management capabilities of opposition parties. [source] Empirical investigation of party preferences and economic voting in TurkeyEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2005CEM BA, LEVENT The economic variables can be used to test the familiar hypotheses of economic voting theory , whether individuals vote retrospectively and/or prospectively, and whether they are sociotropic and/or egotropic. The non-economic factors include sociodemographic characteristics as well as identity and issue variables likely to be good predictors of party choice. The analysis focuses on comparing the characteristics of those who intend to vote for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) with those of other parties. According to multinomial logit estimates, young people, especially males, constitute the electoral base for the AKP. Those who have been affected adversely by recent economic developments, as well as those who are against Turkey's accession to the European Union are also more likely to vote for the AKP. The empirical work also provides evidence in support of economic voting hypotheses. [source] Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level AnalysisAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2006Cameron D. Anderson An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance. [source] |