			Home About us Contact

Economic Sanctions (economic + sanction)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	78%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	21%

Selected Abstracts

International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2004
William H. Kaempfer
Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition. [source]

Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 3 2008
Susan Hannah Allen
Institutional constraints within the target state not only influence a leader's ability to resist economic sanctions, but they also affect the decision-making process within the target state and the nature of information that a sender can ascertain about likely response. Autocratic leaders, who are less constrained, send noisier signals about their probable behavior. This lack of constraint also allows more freedom to resist sanctions, as they can shunt the costs of sanctions off onto the general public, who have little influence over policy outcomes or leadership retention. Democratic leaders are more constrained and more susceptible to sanctions pressure. As result, there is less uncertainty for senders about probable response. Using a heteroskedastic probit model to explore potential systematic components of the variation surrounding sanctions response, the impact of sanctions is shown to differ by regime type,both in the response to coercion as well as in the variance surrounding that response. The results presented here suggest that as expected, democracies are more susceptible to sanctions pressure, but the response of mixed and authoritarian systems are more difficult to predict. These findings have implications for the design of future sanctions policy as well as suggesting which states make the best targets for economic coercion. [source]

"A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation": Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976,2001

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008
Reed M. Wood
While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention, sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign-policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability. [source]

U.S. Presidents and the Use of Economic Sanctions

PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2000
A. COOPER DRURY
What conditions lead the U. S. president to use and alter economic sanctions? Both relations with the target country and domestic politics are considered as conditions leading to the employment and later removal of economic sanctions. Using time-series cross-sectional data, the analysis shows that the president considers both the relations with the target country and U. S. domestic factors when deciding to impose economic sanctions, although the relations with the target have a much greater impact on the decision. Once the economic sanctions are in place and the president must decide to maintain or alter them, the domestic political influence disappears, and the president considers only the relations with the target when modifying sanction policy. [source]

International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator

A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2008
Jean-Marc F. Blanchard
When can economic sanctions and incentives achieve important political objectives? Why do they often fail? We propose a political theory of economic statecraft, arguing that the success of economic statecraft does not depend on the magnitude of its economic effect. Instead, it succeeds when the economic pain or gain it engenders translates into political costs or opportunities. We argue that the political effects of economic signals will depend on a variety of international and domestic political factors, the most important of which is the target state's level of stateness, comprised of three components: autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy. When economic statecraft motivates key domestic coalitions to push for policy change, high stateness enables target state leaders to resist their calls and defy the sender. Conversely, when economic statecraft convinces target leaders that they ought to comply with the sender's demands, high stateness enable them to overcome domestic opposition to compromise. To evaluate the usefulness of our theory, we employ a plausibility probe, testing our approach against three leading alternatives (the realist, economic liberal, and domestic conditionalist approaches) with case studies of Western economic incentives to Hungary and Romania after the Cold War and Indian sanctions against Nepal in the late 1980s. [source]

Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions

Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers,

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2010
Abel Escribà-Folch
This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other types of regimes. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression. Using data on sanction episodes and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes, however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability. [source]

"A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation": Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976,2001

Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 4 2003
Philippe Le Billon
Although corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule-based institutions, it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by the existence of corruption itself. Such changes, frequently associated with domestic or external shocks, can lead to armed conflict as increasingly violent forms of competitive corruption between factions ,fuel war' by rewarding belligerents. Controversially, ,buying-off' belligerents can facilitate a transition to peace; but ,sticks' such as economic sanctions, rather than ,carrots', have dominated international conflict resolution instruments. While ,buying peace' can present a short-term solution, the key challenge for peace-building initiatives and fiscal reforms is to shift individual incentives and rewards away from the competition for immediate corrupt gains. This may be facilitated by placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Evidence that the terms of petroleum contracts influence the rate of development of oil fields

OPEC ENERGY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002
Mustafa Bakar Mahmud
This paper presents evidence that the main determinant of the rate of development of Libya's crude oil upstream activities, from 1961 to 1999, was the terms of the petroleum contractual agreements, which existed between the state and the international oil industry during that period, and that US sanctions against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya failed to affect this rate of development. In keeping with other Members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Libya has, over three decades, been a key player in helping to regulate global production levels of oil and gas. However, the economic and political strengths and weaknesses of individual Members of OPEC vary widely and it is inevitable that the stresses arising from adherence to OPEC policies will vary proportionately to these strengths and weaknesses. It is instructive, therefore, to analyse how successfully Libya has exploited its own petroleum resources. The results are thought-provoking and send signals to the superpowers of the futility of economic sanctions against countries whose political policies they find distasteful. Further, the analysis highlights the need for OPEC Members to be fully informed of the significance of the terms of the petroleum agreements they employ in their countries. [source]

The U.S. Policy and Strategy toward DPRK: Comparison and Evalution of the Clinton and Bush Administrations

PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2002
Hun Kyung Lee
This article focuses on studying and evaluating the Clinton and Bush administrations' policies and strategies toward North Korea. The Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea's change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self-imposed isolation. To the contrary, the Bush administration points out that the Clinton administration's engagement policy did not lead to North Korea's change, and even left the wrong precedent in nuclear and missile negotiations. Focusing on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis of transparency, monitoring, and verification, the Bush administration has claimed a broad agenda. This includes an improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. With the different views of these two administrations as a background, this article explores the U.S. efforts for achieving such policy goals as freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program and halting its missile development and sales, together with looking at North Korea's response. American efforts for supporting the necessities for life, easing of some economic sanctions toward DPRK are also described. At the same time, the U.S. policy toward DPRK is evaluated on the whole in considering U.S. policy limits for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance. Lastly, this article suggests a way for an alternative solution by thinking about some dilemmas for the U.S. and the DPRK. [source]

Liberation in One Organization: Apartheid, Nonviolence, and the Politics of the AFSC

PEACE & CHANGE, Issue 4 2002
David Hostetter
The antiapartheid activism of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) employed active nonviolence within the context of an internationally supported liberation movement. As the struggle against the white racist regime in South Africa intensified, the strategies of the AFSC's South Africa Program staff and South African Friends (Quakers) diverged. Because of the AFSC's involvement in the movements for civil rights and against the Vietnam War in the 1960s, its ideological emphasis shifted from relief work to pursuit of peaceful justice via action based on liberation pacifism in the 1970s and 1980s. The AFSC's South Africa Program reflected this change. South African Friends and the AFSC staff clashed over differing definitions of nonviolence. Critics in the United States opposed the AFSC's support for economic sanctions. The controversy around the AFSC's South Africa Program emcompasses debates about race relations within an antiracist social movement, the relationship of first world pacifists to armed third world liberation movements, and the role of pacifist witness in a transnational liberation struggle. [source]