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Economic Governance (economic + governance)
Selected AbstractsThe Theory and Practice of Economic Governance in EMU Revisited: What Have we Learnt About Commitment and Credibility?,JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2006WALTRAUD SCHELKLE This special issue asks commentators who made seminal contributions to our understanding of economic governance to revisit their analyses. This introductory article discusses the example of a major contribution, namely the ,advantage of tying one's hands' (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988), relating it to the other contributions along the way. [source] Europe and the Future of Economic GovernanceJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 1 2004Pascal Lamy First page of article [source] U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the AmericasLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2005Nicola Phillips ABSTRACT This article examines the nature of the emerging regional economic regime in the Americas and argues that the dominant approach to economic governance is one defined by the assertion of U.S. power in the region and oriented toward distinctively U.S. interests and preferences. This has been clearly evident in the evolution of the Free Trade Area of the Americas but also, with the deceleration and fragmentation of that process during 2002 and 2003, in the growing prioritization of bilateralism. The leverage afforded by the bilateral negotiation of trade agreements acts to situate primary influence in shaping the rules that constitute the regional economic regime, and the primary functions associated with governing in this context, firmly within the agencies of the U.S. state. This essay therefore explores how the hegemonic power of the United States manifests itself in the substance of the hemispheric project and the shape of the economic regime associated with it. [source] Externalities, Learning and Governance: New Perspectives on Local Economic DevelopmentDEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 2 2001Bert Helmsing In spite of growing mobility of production and production factors, economic development is increasingly localized in economic agglomerations. This article reviews three partially overlapping perspectives on local economic development, which derive from three factors intensifying the localized nature of economic development: externalities, learning and governance. Externalities play a central role in the new geographical economics of Krugman and in new economic geography of clusters and industrial districts. The dynamics of local economic development are increasingly associated with evolutionary economic thinking in general and with collective learning in particular. Inter-firm and extra-firm organization has experienced considerable innovation in the last few decades. New institutional devices are based on the notions of commodity chain, cluster and milieu. These innovations introduce new issues of economic governance both at the level of industry and of territory. [source] Explaining Australian Economic Success: Good Policy or Good Luck?GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2006HERMAN SCHWARTZ Australia and some European countries experienced economic "miracles" in the 1990s that reversed prior poor export, employment, and fiscal performance. The miracles might provide transferable lessons about economic governance if it were true that economic governance institutions are malleable, and that actors deliberately changed those institutions in ways that contributed to the miracles. This paper analyzes Australian policy responses to see whether remediation should be attributed to pluck (intentional, strategic remediation of dysfunctional institutions to make them conform with the external environment), luck (environmental change that makes formerly dysfunctional institutions suddenly functional), or just being stuck (endogenous or path-dependent change that brings institutions into conformity with the environment). These distinctions help establish whether actors can consciously engineer institutional change that is "off-path." While pluck appears to explain more than either stuck or luck in the Australian case, the analysis suggests that both off-path behavior and policy transfer are probably rare. [source] Civil Servants, Economic Ideas, and Economic Policies: Lessons from ItalyGOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2005LUCIA QUAGLIA Building on theoretically oriented and empirically grounded research on two key macroeconomic institutions in Italy, this article explains how and why civil servants can engineer major policy changes, making a difference in a country's trajectory. Italy provides a challenging testing ground for this kind of analysis, as it is generally portrayed as a highly politicized system in which political parties and politicians fully control public policies. Three general lessons can be learned, the first being that the role of civil servants in changing modes of economic governance depends on the resources that they master in the system in which they operate. "Intangible assets" are of primary importance in complex and perceived technical policies, such as monetary and exchange rate policy, which have high potential for "technocratic capture." Second, in these policies, certain intangible assets, such as specific bodies of economic knowledge or policy paradigms, have a considerable impact on policy making. Third, besides interactions in international fora, the professional training of civil servants is a mainstream way through which economic policy beliefs circulate and gain currency, laying the foundations for policy shifts. By highlighting the importance of the intangible assets of macroeconomic institutions, this research makes an unorthodox contribution to the primarily economic literature on central bank independence. [source] The Theory and Practice of Economic Governance in EMU Revisited: What Have we Learnt About Commitment and Credibility?,JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2006WALTRAUD SCHELKLE This special issue asks commentators who made seminal contributions to our understanding of economic governance to revisit their analyses. This introductory article discusses the example of a major contribution, namely the ,advantage of tying one's hands' (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988), relating it to the other contributions along the way. [source] Governance and institutional development of the Chilean economyJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 8 2000Eugenio Lahera Chile's economic growth process during the 1990s is often considered as exemplary, therefore, it is worthwhile to examine its institutional development and governance. By the end of the decade there were signs that economic governance was weakening in Chile: the political economy of reforms looked increasingly difficult and the institutional flexibility to accommodate and support the changes required by a dynamic economy did not seem assured. This is the background against which the socialist Ricardo Lagos was sworn in as the new president of Chile in March 2000. Developments in Chile give insights to other countries' experiences. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the AmericasLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2005Nicola Phillips ABSTRACT This article examines the nature of the emerging regional economic regime in the Americas and argues that the dominant approach to economic governance is one defined by the assertion of U.S. power in the region and oriented toward distinctively U.S. interests and preferences. This has been clearly evident in the evolution of the Free Trade Area of the Americas but also, with the deceleration and fragmentation of that process during 2002 and 2003, in the growing prioritization of bilateralism. The leverage afforded by the bilateral negotiation of trade agreements acts to situate primary influence in shaping the rules that constitute the regional economic regime, and the primary functions associated with governing in this context, firmly within the agencies of the U.S. state. This essay therefore explores how the hegemonic power of the United States manifests itself in the substance of the hemispheric project and the shape of the economic regime associated with it. [source] "We Have A Consensus": Explaining Political Support for Market Reforms in Latin AmericaLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2002Leslie Elliott Armijo ABSTRACT By the 1990s, to the astonishment of many ob0servers, most Latin American countries had reformed their systems of national economic governance along market lines. Many analysts of this shift have assumed that it circumvented normal political processes, presuming that such reforms could not be popular. Explanations emphasizing economic crisis, external assistance, and politically insulated executives illustrate this approach. Through a qualitative investigation of the reform process in the region's four most industrialized countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, this study argues, to the contrary, that reforming governments found or created both elite and mass political support for their policies. [source] | ||||||||||