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Dominant Strategy (dominant + strategy)
Selected AbstractsCharacterization of Revenue EquivalenceECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2009Birgit Heydenreich The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. We give a characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any (possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases where existing theorems are silent. [source] Economic Evaluation of Oseltamivir Phosphate for Postexposure Prophylaxis of Influenza in Long-Term Care FacilitiesJOURNAL OF AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, Issue 3 2005Nancy A. Risebrough MPhil Candidate Objectives: To compare the cost-effectiveness of oseltamivir postexposure prophylaxis during influenza A outbreaks with that of amantadine postexposure prophylaxis or no postexposure prophylaxis in long-term care facilities (LTCFs). Design: Cost-effectiveness analysis based on decision analytic model from a government-payer perspective. Setting: A Canadian LTCF, with high staff vaccination, at the beginning of influenza season. Participants: Elderly, influenza-vaccinated patients living in a Canadian LTCF. Measurements: Incremental costs (or savings) per influenza-like illness case avoided compared with usual care. Results: From a government-payer perspective, this analysis showed that oseltamivir was a dominant strategy because it was associated with the fewest influenza-like illness cases, with cost savings of $1,249 per 100 patients in 2001 Canadian dollars compared with amantadine and $3,357 per 100 patients compared with no prophylaxis. Costs for amantadine dose calculation and hospitalization for adverse events contributed to amantadine being a more-expensive prophylaxis strategy than oseltamivir. Both prophylaxis strategies were more cost-effective than no prophylaxis. Conclusion: Despite high influenza vaccination rates, influenza outbreaks continue to emerge in LTCFs, necessitating cost-effective measures to further limit the spread of influenza and related complications. Although amantadine has a lower acquisition cost than oseltamivir, it is associated with more adverse events, lower efficacy, and individualized dosing requirements, leading to higher overall costs and more influenza-like illness cases than oseltamivir. Therefore the use of oseltamivir postexposure prophylaxis is more cost-effective than the current standard of care with amantadine prophylaxis or no prophylaxis. [source] Free Riding on Altruism and Group SizeJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2002Jean Hindriks It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish voluntary contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups. The only qualification to our results is when the probability of altruism is so high that it is a dominant strategy for all egoistic players to free ride. In this case, actually, both altruism and the larger group facilitate public good provision. [source] Assessing Cost-Effectiveness of Sealant Placement in ChildrenJOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH DENTISTRY, Issue 2 2005Rocio B. Quiñonez DMD Abstract Objective: The lack of cost-effectiveness information regarding sealant placement strategies is thought to have influenced reimbursement policies and subsequent sealant utilization in dental practice. This study compared three strategies for managing the occlusal surfaces of first permanent molars: seal all (SA), risk-based (RBS), and seal none (SN). Methods: A decision tree was developed for various possible outcomes following each of the above strategies. Due to the complexity of the decision tree, a Markov model was used to allow for the construction of a chain of events representing the natural history of sealant retention, caries formation, and their associated health states. The outcome measures were the incremental cost per month gained in a cavity-free state over a ten-year period. Results: Our theoretical model showed that RBS strategy improved clinical outcomes, in the form of cavity-free months, and saved money over SN. The strategy of sealing both high and low risk teeth (SA) further improved outcomes but at an additional cost compared to RBS. However, the cost was small, $08 for each additional cavity-free month gained per tooth. Further, minor changes in the baseline assumptions resulted in the SA strategy being the dominant strategy. Conclusion: This study provides evidence that sealing children's first permanent molars can improve outcomes and save money by delaying or avoiding invasive treatment and the destructive cycle of caries. In a time of limited funds for dental services, these results can assist payers in establishing more rational sealant reimbursement policies. [source] Personal view: victim blaming as management strategy for the gastroenterologist , a game theoretical approachALIMENTARY PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS, Issue 10 2005A. Sonnenberg Summary Background :,A multitude of digestive diseases elude simple management strategies. Rather than admit failure of disease management, a gastroenterologist could resort to blaming patients for their own medical conditions. Blaming the patient constitutes an easy exit strategy for otherwise unsolvable disease conditions. Aim :,To shed light on the problem of patient blaming in gastroenterology and provide means for its resolution. Methods :,The interaction between physician and patient can be formulated in terms of a non-zero-sum game between two adversaries. The outcomes associated with two behavioural strategies available to both adversaries are arranged in a two-by-two game matrix. Results :,Blaming the patient is characterized by the general game pattern of the ,prisoner's dilemma'. If the physician,patient interaction is restricted to one single event, patient blaming represents the management strategy of choice with the highest expected payoff under all foreseeable circumstances. If there is a high probability for repeated physician,patient interactions, however, a physician admitting and a patient accepting the limits of medical performance yield a dominant strategy. Conclusion :,Only for single physician,patient encounters does a non-cooperative strategy of blaming one's adversary for a poor medical outcome yield the highest expected outcome. In the long run, the strategy of shifting blame becomes unproductive for both sides alike. [source] R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contestsMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004Matthias Kräkel Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Inventory sharing under decentralized preventive transshipmentsNAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 6 2010Ying Rong Abstract We consider preventive transshipments between two stores in a decentralized system with two demand subperiods. Replenishment orders are made before the first subperiod, and the stores may make transshipments to one another between the subperiods. We prove that the transshipment decision has a dominant strategy, called a control-band conserving transfer policy, under which each store chooses a quantity to transship in or out that will keep its second-subperiod starting inventory level within a range called a control band. We prove that the optimal replenishment policy is a threshold policy in which the threshold depends on the capacity level at the other store. Finally, we prove that there does not exist a transfer price that coordinates the decentralized supply chain. Our research also explains many of the differences between preventive and emergency transshipments, including differences in the optimal transfer policies and the existence or nonexistence of transfer prices that coordinate the system. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010 [source] Supply Chain Coordination in a Market with Customer Service CompetitionPRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004Tamer Boyaci We consider a market with two competing supply chains, each consisting of one wholesaler and one retailer. We assume that the business environment forces supply chains to charge similar prices and to compete strictly on the basis of customer service. We model customer service competition using game-theoretical concepts. We consider three competition scenarios between the supply chains. In the uncoordinated scenario, individual members of both supply chains maximize their own profits by individually selecting their service and inventory policies. In the coordinated scenario, wholesalers and retailers of each supply chain coordinate their service and inventory policy decisions to maximize supply chain profits. In the hybrid scenario, competition is between one coordinated and one uncoordinated supply chain. We discuss the derivation of the equilibrium service strategies, resulting inventory policies, and profits for each scenario, and compare the equilibria in a numerical study. We find that coordination is a dominant strategy for both supply chains, but as in the prisoner's dilemma, both supply chains are often worse off under the coordinated scenario relative to the uncoordinated scenario. The consumers are the only guaranteed beneficiaries of coordination. [source] The impact of prognosis without treatment on doctors' and patients' resource allocation decisions and its relevance to new drug recommendation processesBRITISH JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY, Issue 2 2008D. Ross Camidge What is already known about this subject ,,The dominant health economic units upon which new treatment funding decisions are made are the incremental cost per life year gained (LYG) or the cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained. ,,Neither of these units modifies the amount of health gained, by the amount of health patients would have had if they had not been given the treatment under consideration, which may unfairly undervalue the treatments for poor prognosis conditions. ,,How certain patients make decisions about their own treatment has previously been explored, but not how they, or doctors, would allocate hypothetical resource within a healthcare system given information on disease-treatment scenarios' prognoses with and without treatment. What this study adds ,,Information on prognosis without treatment is used within the resource allocation strategies of many doctors and most patients. ,,Individuals use this information in a variety of different ways and a single dominant strategy for quantitative modification of health units is not apparent. ,,Information on prognosis without treatment, or prognosis with standard treatment, is available from the control arm of randomized controlled clinical trials and should be used qualitatively to facilitate decision-making around the second inflexion point on cost per QALY/LYG acceptability curves. Aims Health economic assessments increasingly contribute to funding decisions on new treatments. Treatments for many poor prognosis conditions perform badly in such assessments because of high costs and modest effects on survival. We aimed to determine whether underlying shortness of prognosis should also be considered as a modifier in such assessments. Methods Two hundred and eighty-three doctors and 201 oncology patients were asked to allocate treatment resource between hypothetical patients with unspecified life-shortening diseases. The prognoses with and without treatment were varied such that consistent use of one of four potential allocation strategies could be deduced: life years gained (LYGs) , which did not incorporate prognosis without treatment information; percentage increase in life years (PILY); life expectancy with treatment (LEWT) or immediate risk of death (IRD). Results Random choices were rare; 47% and 64% of doctors and patients, respectively, used prognosis without treatment in their strategies; while 50% and 32%, respectively, used pure LYG-based strategies. Ranking orders were LYG > PILY > IRD > LEWT (doctors) and LEWT > LYG > IRD > PILY (patients). When LYG information alone could not be used, 76% of doctors prioritized shorter prognoses, compared with 45% of patients. Conclusions Information on prognosis without treatment is used within the resource allocation strategies of many doctors and most patients, and should be considered as a qualitative modifier during the health economic assessments of new treatments for life-shortening diseases. A single dominant strategy incorporating this information for any quantitative modification of health units is not apparent. [source] Low-Price Low-Capacity Traps and Government Intervention in the Québec Hog MarketCANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2004Bruno Larue This paper investigates the marketing of a primary commodity produced by competitive producers that sell to a single downstream processor. There is a significant lag between production and marketing decisions made by producers. If a credible price commitment cannot be made before producers make their output decision, it is a dominant strategy for the processor to buy producers' output at the world price adjusted for transportation costs. Producers fully anticipate this partial holdup ex ante and adjust production accordingly. When the processor's capacity is binding ex post, the equilibrium is described as a low-price, low-capacity trap. Under a specific condition, the processor finds it advantageous to credibly commit to a price increment before producers make their output decision. The ensuing equilibrium is Pareto-superior to the no-commitment equilibrium. We argue that the Québec hog/pork industry has experienced such a situation in the past few years. Government intervention is justified even if the processor has committed to a price increment. The modeling of strategic interactions between the government and the processor reveals that their price increments are strategic substitutes. However, given that the processor's (government's) payoff is increasing with the government's (processor's) price increment, the first-mover advantage entails committing early to a low-price increment to force one's rival to offer a high-price increment. Cet article analyse la mise en marché d'un produit primaire vendu par des producteurs preneurs de prix à un seul et unique transformateur. Les décisions de production et de mise en marché sont séparées dans le temps. Si le transformateur ne peut pas s'engager à payer un certain prix avant que les producteurs prennent leur décision de production, alors la stratégie dominante du transformateur est d'offrir aux producteurs le prix mondial diminué par les coûts de transport. Les producteurs anticipant ce hold-up partiel et réduisent leur production en conséquence. Lorsque le transformateur est confrontéà une contrainte de capacité ex post, les producteurs et le transformateur sont piégés dans un équilibre de « petit prix et petit volume ». Si une condition est respectée, il peut être avantageux pour le transformateur d'offrir un supplément aux producteurs avant leur décision de production. L'équilibre qui s'en suit constitue alors une amélioration au sens de Pareto. Nous soumettons que l'industrie porcine québécoise a vécu pareille expérience durant les dernières années. L'intervention du gouvernement demeure justifiée même si le transformateur s'est commis à payer un supplément. En fait, les interventions du transformateur et du gouvernement sont des substituts stratégiques. Puisque le gain du transformateur (gouvernement) croit avec le supplément offert par le gouvernement (transformateur), il y a un avantage àêtre le premier à se commettre à payer un faible supplément, tant pour le transformateur que pour le gouvernement, pour ainsi forcer l'autre partie à offrir un supplément plus généreux. [source] | |||||||||||||