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Domestic Politics (domestic + politics)
Selected AbstractsMachiavelli's Legacy: Domestic Politics and International ConflictINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2005David Sobek Research examining the effect of regime type on conflict has focused on the democracy/autocracy continuum expounded in the political philosophies of liberal thinkers such as Kant and Schumpeter. While this concentration has yielded impressive results (democratic peace), it seems plausible that other conceptions of regime type may yield similar success. This paper examines the philosophy of Machiavelli and develops a measure of his "imperial regimes." These states, which can either be democratic or autocratic, should exhibit an increased propensity to initiate international conflict. Testing this contention in Renaissance Italy (1250,1494) and the modern international system (1920,1992), this paper finds strong empirical support. Machiavelli's views illuminate key differences between democracies and autocracies that have been previously overlooked. Thus, it deepens rather than replaces our conception of how domestic institutions affect international conflict. [source] Domestic Politics and International RelationsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2002Bruce Bueno De Mesquita In reviewing the history of portions of international studies I reflect on how we might best advance knowledge. I dwell on two issues: questions of method and the urgency of refocusing our efforts on leaders and domestic affairs as the centerpiece for understanding the world of international relations. I argue that scientific progress is best made by combining three methodological approaches in our research: formal, mathematical logic to ensure internal consistency in arguments about complex and contingent relations among variables; case studies and archival research to evaluate verisimilitude between theory and action; and statistical analysis to establish the generality of the hypothesized relations among variables. Often such methodologically diverse and progressive research will best be accomplished by encouraging collaboration rather than by perpetuating the current norm of penalizing co-authorship especially among junior scholars. I offer concrete examples of advances in knowledge achieved through the employment of mathematical reasoning and statistical analysis as many have cast doubts about the substantive contributions of these particular approaches. My perspective is, of course, personal and may not be shared by many others. I set out my thoughts, therefore, with the hope that they will stimulate constructive debate and dialogue and that they will serve to integrate diverse approaches to international affairs. [source] International Prosecutions and Domestic Politics: The Use of Truth Commissions as Compromise Justice in Serbia and CroatiaINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 4 2009Brian Grodsky Since the end of the Cold War, increased efforts at international criminal justice have begun to transform transitional justice for the worst cases of atrocities from a predominantly domestic affair to an international one. I examine side-effects of international pressure for criminal justice, arguing that political elites struggling to balance conflicting international and domestic demands may launch "compromise justice" policies designed to satisfy both, but which in effect weaken mechanisms that transitional justice scholars posit make postconflict reconciliation most likely. I apply this argument to the former Yugoslavia, examining Serbian and Croatian truth commissions as a form of "compromise justice." [source] European Elections and Domestic Politics: Lessons from the Past and Scenarios for the Future , Edited by W. van der Brug and C. van der EijkJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2009JULIET LODGE No abstract is available for this article. [source] In the Wake of War: Geo,strategy, Terrorism, Oil and Domestic PoliticsMIDDLE EAST POLICY, Issue 1 2003Leon T. Hadar The following is an edited transcript of the thirty,first in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on January 10, 2003, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., moderating. [source] Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why Did Britain Stay Out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2007Stephen Benedict Dyson In the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, British Prime Ministers were asked to contribute forces to an American-led war that was deeply unpopular in the United Kingdom. This presented Harold Wilson and Tony Blair with conflicting incentives and constraints: to support their senior ally or to make policy based upon domestic considerations. Why did Harold Wilson decline to commit British forces while Tony Blair agreed to do so? With situational factors generating conflicting predictions, I argue that investigation of individual-level variables is necessary. In particular, I suggest that leaders vary systematically in their willingness to subordinate the concerns of constituents to strategic imperatives, and that introducing the leadership style categories of "constraint challenger" and "constraint respecter" can make more determinate the linkage between domestic politics and strategic concerns. [source] COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISESECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2009SEBASTIAN M. SAIEGH This article examines the domestic politics of sovereign debt crises. I focus on two alternative mechanisms that aggregate the preferences of domestic actors over debt repayment: single-party versus multiparty coalition governments. I uncover a very strong empirical regularity using cross-national data from 48 developing countries between 1971 and 1997. Countries that are governed by a coalition of parties are less likely to reschedule their debts than those under single-party governments. The effect of multiparty coalitions on sovereign defaults is quantitatively large and roughly of the same order of magnitude as liquidity factors such as debt burden and debt service. These results are robust to numerous specifications and samples. [source] Corporatism and income inequality in the global economy: A panel study of 17 OECD countriesEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2003DANIEL J. MINNICH The conventional wisdom of domestic politics in the global economy holds that that the globalization of the market economy has spelled the imminent collapse of corporatist bargaining institutions and the corporatist goal of economic equality. This conventional wisdom, however, highlights an interesting puzzle: it was the process of internationalization and economic openness itself that generated corporatist institutions. This study examines whether corporatist institutions are still effective in ensuring the corporatist goal of equality in the ,global' economy. Income inequality from the early 1980s to the middle 1990s is used as a measure of institutional effectiveness. It is argued that corporatism, as a form of interest mediation, is a path-dependent institution that generates increasing returns in terms of equality in the most internationalized economies. Results of a panel study of 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries indicate that corporatism reduces income inequality and, contrary to the conventional wisdom, income inequality is lowest in the most ,global' national economies. [source] Ideas and Change in U.S. Foreign Aid: Inventing the Millennium Challenge CorporationFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 2 2008Steven W. Hook Recent scholarship on foreign policy change focuses on the role of ideas in altering policies and related governing institutions. While a welcome antidote to the previous preoccupation with static analysis, this research has yet to provide adequate understanding of whether and how ideas produce change in specific instances. This study seeks to narrow this gap by examining a recent program change in U.S. foreign aid policy: the creation in 2004 of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent agency designed to reward the world's most impoverished countries that had previously undertaken neoliberal economic reforms and democratic political reforms. The study identifies a convergence of widely shared principled and causal beliefs which, mediated through U.S. domestic structures, produced the most significant change in U.S. aid strategy and structures in nearly half a century. In melding societal theories that emphasize the role of transnational norm diffusion with theories of domestic politics, the study answers the call for multilevel explanations of foreign policy change. And by applying constructivist notions of ideas and discursive framing with rationalist conceptions of power and interests, the study further responds to the need for theoretical synthesis in the study of foreign policy. [source] Poliheuristic Theory, Bargaining, and Crisis Decision MakingFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2007Min Ye In the past decade, the application of the Poliheuristic (PH) theory to foreign policy decisions of various types, by numerous leaders, and in association with different research methods, has demonstrated its theoretical merit in integrating the divided rational choice and psychological/cognitive approaches. This article argues for a complementary relationship between PH and formal theory. On the one hand, PH can provide a framework in which abstract formal models can be connected with specific domestic as well as international circumstances. On the other hand, formal theory sharpens the rational analysis used in the second conceptual stage of PH. In this study, I formulate a revised Rubinstein bargaining model with war as an outside option and apply it to Chinese crisis decision making during the Second and Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. In sum, this study makes three contributions to the literature on international crises and foreign policy analysis. First, it gives formal explanations on how PH can contribute to the game-theoretic approach in foreign policy analysis. Second, it presents what Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) called a "domestic politics version" of the canonical Rubinstein bargaining game, connecting international interactions with individual participants' domestic politics. Finally, it provides a way to test abstract game-theoretic models in particular domestic and international contexts of foreign policy making. [source] An Empirical Examination of Religion and Conflict in the Middle East, 1950,1992FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2006BRIAN LAI This article examines the influence of religion on conflict in the Middle East. It develops a more refined approach to studying the effects of religion by examining intra-Islamic differences as well as the effects of domestic politics and religion on conflict. It tests these hypotheses on all Middle Eastern dyads from 1950 to 1992, including appropriate control variables. This article finds that religious identity does matter but only when its relationship with conflict is more clearly specified. Religious differences between the leaders of states influence the likelihood of militarized disputes, but not religious differences between the populations of two states. Ethnic differences and power politics also influence the likelihood of an militarized interstate dispute. [source] NATO expansion: ,a policy error of historic importance'INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 6 2008MICHAEL MCCGWIRE European security depends on the effective collaboration of the five major powers; it will be undermined by the extension of NATO, a policy driven by US domestic politics. The main threats to security are: the breakdown of political and economic stability; unintended nuclear proliferation and/or failure of the START process; Russia's evolving political and territorial aspirations. All three will remain marginal as long as Russia is constructively engaged with the West. NATO expansion threatens that engagement. It is seen by all strands of Russian opinion as violating the bargain struck in 1990 and will likely lead to the withdrawal of cooperation. Invitations to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic cannot be rescinded, but the consequences can be mitigated by refraining from integrating them into NATO's military structure, by ceasing to insist that NATO membership is open to all, and by perpetuating the de facto nuclear-weapons-free zone that presently exists in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain's stance could be pivotal. [source] Engineered Migration and the Use of Refugees as Political Weapons: A Case Study of the 1994 Cuban Balseros CrisisINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, Issue 4 2002Kelly M. Greenhill This paper presents a case study of the August 1994 Cuban balseros crisis, during which more than 35,000 fled the island and headed toward Florida in the span of a few weeks. It argues that Castro launched the crisis in an attempt to manipulate US fears of another Mariel, and in order to compel a shift in US policy, both on immigration and on a wider variety of issues. The paper further contends that from Castro's perspective, this exercise in coercion proved a qualified success , his third such successful use of the Cuban people as an asymmetric political weapon against the US. In addition, the paper argues that Castro's success was predicated on his ability to internationalize his own domestic crisis and transform it into an American domestic political and foreign policy crisis. Finally, it offers a novel explanation of how, why, and under what conditions, states and/or non,state actors may attempt to use refugees as coercive political weapons. Although dwarfed in size by the larger 1980 Mariel boatlift, the 1994 crisis is important for several reasons. First, despite its brevity, it had far reaching consequences for US,Cuban relations. Without warning or preamble, it catalyzed a shift in US policy vis,à,vis Cuban immigration that represented a radical departure from what it had been for the previous three decades. Second, it influenced US domestic politics on the national level, by expanding the scope and salience of the issue, and mobilizing not only Floridians, but also the larger public concerned about illegal immigration. Third, the crisis illustrated the potential potency of engineered migration as an asymmetric weapon of the weak. Finally, the brief, but significant, interactions of international and domestic actors in this case warrant examination because, although the 1994 crisis was limited, in its dynamics it resembles myriad other international refugee crises, large and small. Thus the case offers valuable lessons that may aid in dealing with future (real or threatened) crises. [source] Mapping Internationalization: Domestic and Regional ImpactsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001Etel Solingen This article introduces a conceptual design for mapping the domestic impact of internationalization. It proposes that internationalization leads to a trimodal domestic coalitional profile and advances a set of expectations about the regional effects of each profile. Aggregate data from ninety-eight coalitions in nineteen states over five regions suggests that between 1948 and 1993 the three coalitional types differed in their international behavior. Internationalizing coalitions deepened trade openness, expanded exports, attracted foreign investments, restrained military-industrial complexes, initiated fewer international crises, eschewed weapons of mass destruction, deferred to international economic and security regimes, and strove for regional cooperative orders that reinforced those objectives. Backlash coalitions restricted or reduced trade openness and reliance on exports, curbed foreign investment, built expansive military complexes, developed weapons of mass destruction, challenged international regimes, exacerbated civic-nationalist, religious, or ethnic differentiation within their region, and were prone to initiate international crises. Hybrids straddled the grand strategies of their purer types, intermittently striving for economic openness, contracting the military complex, initiating international crises, and cooperating regionally and internationally, but neither forcefully nor coherently. These findings have significant implications for international relations theory and our incipient understanding of internationalization. Further extensions of the conceptual framework can help capture international effects that are yet to be fully integrated into the study of the domestic politics of coalition formation. [source] The Intra-National Struggle to Define "US": External Involvement as a Two-Way StreetINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2001Andrea Grove Three perspectives on the causes of communal conflict are visible in extant work: a focus on ancient hatreds, on leaders, or on the context that leaders "find" themselves in. Leaders therefore have all the power to mobilize people to fight (or not to) or leaders are driven by circumstantial opportunities or the primordial desires of the masses to resist peace or coexistence with historical enemies. Analysts who focus on leaders or context recognize that external actors affect internal conflicts, but little systematic research has explored the processes relating the domestic politics of nationalist mobilization to factors in the international arena. How does the international arena affect the competition among leaders? How do skillful leaders draw in external actors to lend credibility to their own views? This article asserts that leaders compete to frame identity and mission, and explores the degree to which international factors affect whose "definitions of the situation" are successful in precipitating mobilization shifts among potential followers. A unique finding of this longitudinal study of Northern Ireland is that the role played by international institutions and actors is affected by how domestic actors perceive, cultivate, and bring attention to the linkages between the two spheres. [source] Institutional Effects on State Behavior: Convergence and DivergenceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001Liliana Botcheva We develop a new typology for examination of the effects of international institutions on member states' behavior. Some institutions lead to convergence of members' practices, whereas others result, often for unintended reasons, in divergence. We hypothesize that the observed effect of institutions depends on the level of externalities to state behavior, the design of the institution, and variation in the organization and access of private interests that share the goals of the institution. We illustrate these propositions with examples drawn from international institutions for development assistance, protection of the ozone layer, and completion of the European Union's internal market. We find that significant externalities and appropriately designed institutions lead to convergence of state behavior, whereas divergence can result from the absence of these conditions and the presence of heterogeneity in domestic politics. [source] National Preferences and International Institutions: Evidence from European Monetary IntegrationINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2001James I. Walsh How do states reach agreement on creating or changing international institutions? The dominant theory of international cooperation,institutional theory,specifies how states with shared interests use institutions to realize joint gains and to minimize the possibility of defection. But institutional theory has little to say about when states will hold the shared interests that lead them to create international institutions in the first place. I evaluate two general explanations of national preferences regarding international institutions against the record of attempts to institutionalize monetary cooperation in the European Union since the 1970s. Drawing on central insights of the constructivist tradition, idea diffusion theory holds that national preferences converged on those of German decision-makers by the late 1980s and that European governments willingly accepted German terms for monetary union. Recognition that German institutions and policies produced superior economic outcomes drove this change in preferences. A domestic-politics explanation holds that preferences varied because of differences in the structure of the domestic political economy and the political costs of achieving price stability, which was one of Germany's conditions for monetary integration. Lower inflation in the late 1980s reduced these costs enough for French and Italian governments to pursue a monetary union that included Germany. The evidence indicates that idea diffusion had little influence on the development of European monetary institutions. Governments held and advocated distinctly different preferences regarding such institutions from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. The finding that domestic politics rather than idea diffusion drives national preferences challenges some of the claims of recent constructivist literature in international politics about the importance of communication and ideas in promoting cooperation. In the conclusion I discuss how the findings of this article might be squared with constructivism by paying more attention to domestic politics. [source] The Right and the Righteous?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 1 2001Domestic Politics, European Norms, the Sanctions Against Austria In February 2000, 14 EU Member States collectively took the unprecedented step of imposing bilateral sanctions on their Austrian EU partner. How can this be explained? Was it, as the 14 governments argued, because the inclusion in the Austrian government of Jörg Haider's extreme right FPö opposes many of the ideas making up the common identity of the EU? Or, were the sanctions motivated, as the Austrian government argued, by narrow-minded party political interests that lurked beneath the rhetoric of shared European norms and values? Our analysis suggests that, without the particular concerns about domestic politics of certain politicians, it is unlikely that the sanctions against Austria would have been adopted in this form. On the other hand, without the recent establishment of concerns about human rights and democratic principles as an EU norm, it is unlikely that these particular sanctions would have been adopted collectively by all member governments. Thus, while norms might have been used instrumentally, such instrumental use only works, in the sense of inducing compliant behaviour, if the norms have acquired a certain degree of taken-for-grantedness within the relevant group of actors or institution. [source] Investment Rules and the New ConstitutionalismLAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 3 2000David Schneiderman The new model for economic and political renovation mandates the entrenchment, beyond the reach of majoritarian control, of rules for the free movement of transnational capital. This "new constitutionalism" removes key aspects of economic life from the influence of domestic politics within nation states. A manifestation of this new orthodoxy is the network of bilateral investment treaties designed to ensure foreign investors security from "discrimination" and "expropriation," and conferring standing on investors to sue in the event that their investment interests are impaired. This paper examines the agency of the state in promoting this self-binding regime of investment rules and its potential impact on domestic constitutional regimes. Of particular concern here are constitutional arrangements that protect property, such as that recently enacted in the Republic of South Africa, that deviate from the norms expressed in the transnational investment-rules regime. [source] The New Dynamics of East Asian Regional Economy: Japanese and Chinese Strategies in AsiaPACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2006Yasumasa Komori The Japan-led flying-geese pattern of economic development has become obsolete as an accurate description of the pattern of economic relations in East Asia. Meanwhile, the rise of China as the world's production platform has become the most significant factor in transforming the East Asian regional economy. Although the Asian financial crisis served as a major catalyst for the emergence of ASEAN+3, the China factor looms increasingly important in the subsequent development of East Asian regionalism. Despite its enhanced position in the region, however, China's new role in East Asia is clearly different from the role that Japan played at the zenith of its economic prosperity. While Japan's economic engagement in Asia was based on economic penetration by Japanese multilateral firms, China's rapid growth is still predicated upon foreign capital and technology. China's strength lies in its ability to open up its economy for trade and investment. In trade negotiations with ASEAN, China has taken the lead, surpassing Japan, a country constrained by domestic politics. However, Japan remains an important partner for ASEAN countries, not only in providing financial and developmental assistance, but also in hedging against China's dominance. [source] Alliances, Domestic Politics, and Leader Psychology: Why Did Britain Stay Out of Vietnam and Go into Iraq?POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2007Stephen Benedict Dyson In the Vietnam and Iraq conflicts, British Prime Ministers were asked to contribute forces to an American-led war that was deeply unpopular in the United Kingdom. This presented Harold Wilson and Tony Blair with conflicting incentives and constraints: to support their senior ally or to make policy based upon domestic considerations. Why did Harold Wilson decline to commit British forces while Tony Blair agreed to do so? With situational factors generating conflicting predictions, I argue that investigation of individual-level variables is necessary. In particular, I suggest that leaders vary systematically in their willingness to subordinate the concerns of constituents to strategic imperatives, and that introducing the leadership style categories of "constraint challenger" and "constraint respecter" can make more determinate the linkage between domestic politics and strategic concerns. [source] The Political Consequences of the CrashPOLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 1 2010Andrew Gamble The financial crash of 2008 precipitated a major recession. It shattered the financial growth model that had dominated the previous twenty years and plunged the international economy into a period of economic and political restructuring of uncertain duration. The immediate origins of the crash lay in the lending practices associated with the sub-prime mortgages in the United States which produced the credit crunch in 2007, but the wider causes were the unbalanced character of growth in the international economy and the particular role played by finance. The crisis has been explained in a number of different ways, focusing on the behaviour of the financial markets, the institutional and policy conditions that made the boom possible and then undermined it, longer-term economic and policy cycles and the nature of uncertainty and risk in complex social systems. The political impact of the crash and the recession has not been uniform; it has been highly uneven, depending on the position of particular states in the international economy. The rapid interventions by governments to stave off financial collapse at the end of 2008 were successful, but at the cost of creating serious problems of adjustment for the future. The political debate around what were the causes, who should be blamed and what should be done is only just beginning, and the way this crisis comes to be understood will play a major part in determining how it is eventually resolved and how far-reaching will be the changes to the international economy and to domestic politics. [source] U.S. Presidents and the Use of Economic SanctionsPRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2000A. COOPER DRURY What conditions lead the U. S. president to use and alter economic sanctions? Both relations with the target country and domestic politics are considered as conditions leading to the employment and later removal of economic sanctions. Using time-series cross-sectional data, the analysis shows that the president considers both the relations with the target country and U. S. domestic factors when deciding to impose economic sanctions, although the relations with the target have a much greater impact on the decision. Once the economic sanctions are in place and the president must decide to maintain or alter them, the domestic political influence disappears, and the president considers only the relations with the target when modifying sanction policy. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||