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Distressed Firms (distressed + firm)
Selected AbstractsAssessing the Information Content of Mark-to-Market Accounting with Mixed Attributes: The Case of Cash Flow HedgesJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 2 2007FRANK GIGLER ABSTRACT We examine how outsiders rationally interpret a reported loss on derivatives when the application of mark-to-market accounting to cash flow hedges creates a mixed attribute problem. We find that because of the mixed attribute problem, the information content of mark-to-market accounting is related to the information content of historical cost accounting in a very specific way. This relationship allows us to identify the circumstances under which mark-to-market accounting facilitates and when it detracts from the objective of providing an early warning of potential financial distress. We show that the reporting of an impending derivative loss by a distressed firm can actually lead outsiders to infer that the firm is in a better financial position than what they would have inferred under the silence associated with historical cost accounting. Without the mixed attribute problem, mark-to-market accounting would always yield more accurate assessments of the firm's financial position. [source] The Role of Debt Purchases in Takeovers: A Tale of Two RetailersJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 3 2006Thomas H. Noe In this paper, we examine acquisitions of two financially distressed retailers,Federated's takeover of Macy's, and Zell Chilmark's takeover of Carter Hawley Hale. In both cases the raider purchased some of the target's outstanding debt to launch its takeover attempt. These debt purchases appear to have been facilitated by two salient factors,the raider's expertise in dealing with distressed firm restructuring and the ability of the raider to acquire a large blockholding of debt. Our analysis indicates that, when these factors are present, it is optimal for a raider to initiate a takeover of a distressed firm through purchasing a block of the firm's debt. Target bondholder reaction will be favorable whereas shareholder reaction may be either favorable or unfavorable. [source] Audit Committee Independence and Disclosure: choice for financially distressed firmsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2003Joseph V. Carcello This study examines the relation between audit committee independence and disclosure choice for financially distressed US firms. The tenor of both the financial statement notes and Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) is considered. For firms experiencing financial distress, there is a significant positive relation between the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee and the optimism of the going-concern discussion in both the notes and the MD&A. These results add to the growing body of literature documenting a relation between audit committee independence and financial reporting quality. [source] Does Financial Distress Risk Drive the Momentum Anomaly?FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2008Vineet Agarwal This paper brings together the evidence on two asset pricing anomalies,continuation of prior returns (momentum) and the market mispricing of distressed firms,using UK data. Our analysis demonstrates both these effects are driven by market underreaction to financial distress risk. In particular, we find momentum is proxying for distress risk, and is largely subsumed by our distress risk factor. We also find, as with US studies, no evidence that size and book-to-market (B/M) effects in stock returns are linked to financial distress. [source] Measuring Distress Risk: The Effect of R&D IntensityTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2007LAUREL A. FRANZEN ABSTRACT Because of upward trends in research and development activity, accounting measures of financial distress have become less accurate. We document that (1) higher research and development spending increases the likelihood of misclassifying solvent firms, (2) adjusting for conservative accounting of research and development increases the number of correctly identified distressed firms, and (3) adjusted measures of distress alleviate previously documented anomalously low returns of large, high distress risk, low book-to-market firms. The results hold after updating stale parameters and under various tax assumptions. Our evidence raises concerns about interpretation of extant literature that relies on accounting measures of distress. [source] | ||||||||||