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Discretionary Power (discretionary + power)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Law and Criminology40%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting40%

Selected Abstracts

Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court

JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2004
Stephen B. Burbank
This article offers some reflections stimulated by Professor Galanter's materials, which were the common springboard for the Vanishing Trials Symposium. It suggests that other data, quantitative and qualitative, may be helpful in understanding the vanishing trials phenomenon in federal civil cases, notably data available for years prior to 1962, and questions whether it is meaningful to use total dispositions as the denominator in calculating a trial termination rate. The article argues that care should be taken in using data from state court systems, as also data from criminal cases, administrative adjudication, and ADR, lest one put at risk through careless assimilation of data or muddled thinking a project quite difficult enough without additional baggage. The article describes the limitations of data previously collected by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and highlights unique opportunities created by the AO's switch to a new Case Management/Electronic Case Files system. It argues that Professor Galanter may underestimate the influence of both changing demand for court services (docket makeup) and of changing demand for judicial services (resources) on the trial rate. Finally, the article argues that conclusions about either the causes or consequences of the vanishing trials phenomenon in federal civil cases are premature, suggesting in particular reasons to be wary of emphasis on "institutional factors" such as the discretionary power of first-instance judges and the ideology of managerial judging. [source]

Decentralization in Kerala: Panchayat government discretion and accountability,

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 4 2009
Varsha Venugopal
Kerala is regarded as one of the most decentralized states in India. Through a ,big bang' approach, Kerala implemented a significant fiscal decentralization program and then built the capacity of its local governments. We employ a diagnostic framework to analyze its local government discretion and accountability in political, administrative and fiscal domains. We find that Kerala's local governments have a very high degree of discretionary power accompanied by a high degree of accountability towards citizens. But the areas of administrative accountability and financial management need to be strengthened. Also there may have been excessive focus and investment on social accountability mechanisms at the cost of local government discretion and formal public sector accountability mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Contractual Discretion and Administrative Discretion: A Unified Analysis

THE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 4 2005
Article first published online: 1 JUL 200, Terence Daintith
While judicial control of discretionary power is at the centre of administrative law, it is a topic which has received little attention in contract. By tracing the development of the relevant case law in administrative law judicial review and in contract, the paper seeks to show how review in both contexts has converged upon a single core technique of control through decisional standards. The paper further argues that the consequent identity of method in public and private law review of discretion does not in itself weaken basic public/private law distinctions. While the territories of legislation and contract may overlap, they present basic differences as contexts for the exercise of judicial control of discretion, and these differences of context may weigh more heavily than identity of approach in determining the outcomes of litigation.1 [source]

Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002
Ibeas, Roberto Rodríguez
In this paper, we focus on the determination of the optimal fine set by a regulator when a firm can litigate to avoid paying the fine and the monitoring agency has discretionary power to negotiate with the firm the size of the fine. The regulator needs to balance the positive effect of the fine's size on the degree of non,compliance and the possibility of litigation if the fine is too high. We find that the optimal fine is not necessarily set at its maximum level. [source]

The Use of Discretion in a Rule-Bound Service: Housing Benefit Administration and the Introduction of Discretionary Housing Payments in Great Britain

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 1 2005
Bruce Walker
This paper is concerned with how administrators in the Housing Benefit (HB) service in Great Britain have reacted to the discretionary powers given to local authorities as a result of the introduction of Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs). DHPs can be awarded to HB claimants deemed to require additional assistance with their housing costs. The paper first argues that the HB service can be categorized as ,rule-bound' before outlining the DHP regime and the nature of the discretion that it affords HB administrators. A brief review of the literature on discretionary decision making in public service organizations suggests four propositions in respect of DHP decision making. The paper then seeks to test these propositions. It concludes that in general HB administrators do not appear to have experienced the difficulties associated with discretionary decision making in rule-bound services that might have been expected on the basis of previous work in this field. [source]