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Disease Concept (disease + concept)
Selected AbstractsLovers and Livers: Disease Concepts in History , Jacalyn DuffinTHE HISTORIAN, Issue 4 2006K. F. Kiple No abstract is available for this article. [source] The Tyranny of Diagnosis: Specific Entities and Individual ExperienceTHE MILBANK QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2002Charles E. Rosenberg Diagnosis has always played a pivotal role in medical practice, but in the past two centuries, that role has been reconfigured and has become more central as medicine,like Western society in general,has become increasingly technical, specialized, and bureaucratized. Disease explanations and clinical practices have incorporated, paralleled, and, in some measure, constituted these larger structural changes. This modern history of diagnosis is inextricably related to disease specificity, to the notion that diseases can and should be thought of as entities existing outside the unique manifestations of illness in particular men and women. During the past century especially, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment have been linked ever more tightly to specific, agreed-upon disease categories, in both concept and everyday practice. In fact, this essay might have been entitled "Diagnosis Mediates an Invisible Revolution: The Social and Intellectual Significance of Specific Disease Concepts." It would have been even more precise, if rather less arresting. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. [source] Defining and classifying periodontitis: need for a paradigm shift?EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ORAL SCIENCES, Issue 1 2003Vibeke Baelum The past two decades have witnessed a large number of proposals for the classification of periodontitis. These proposals are all founded in an essentialistic disease concept, according to which periodontitis is a link between the causes and the signs and symptoms of periodontitis. Essentialistic definitions are necessarily rather imprecise and thereby subject to multiple interpretations. Consequently, it remains unknown to what extent current knowledge regarding ,different' forms of periodontitis is based on the ,same' type of patients. However, periodontitis is a syndrome, the clinical manifestations of which may come in all sizes. Thereby, periodontitis has no diagnostic truth, just as there is no natural basis for a sharp distinction between health and disease or between ,different' forms of periodontitis. Recognition of these facts and adoption of a nominalistic approach to the definition of periodontitis is needed to provide a rational framework for the development of a classification system that meets the needs of both clinicians and scientists. [source] Atopic eruption of pregnancy: a new disease conceptJOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF DERMATOLOGY & VENEREOLOGY, Issue 12 2009M.-M. Roth [source] Clinical and inflammatory features of occupational asthma caused by persulphate salts in comparison with asthma associated with occupational rhinitisALLERGY, Issue 6 2010G. Moscato To cite this article: Moscato G, Pala G, Perfetti L, Frascaroli M, Pignatti P. Clinical and inflammatory features of occupational asthma caused by persulphate salts in comparison with asthma associated with occupational rhinitis. Allergy 2010; 65: 784,790. Abstract Background:, The relationships between asthma and rhinitis are still a crucial point in respiratory allergy and have scarcely been analysed in occupational setting. We aimed to compare the clinical and inflammatory features of subjects with occupational asthma only (OA) to subjects with OA associated to occupational rhinitis (OAR) caused by persulphate salts. Methods:, The clinical charts of 26 subjects diagnosed in our Unit as respiratory allergy caused by ammonium persulphate (AP), confirmed by specific inhalation challenge (SIC), were reviewed. Twenty-two out of twenty-six patients underwent pre-SIC-induced sputum challenge test (IS) and 24/26 underwent nasal secretion collection and processing. Results:, Twelve out of twenty-six patients received a diagnosis of OA-only and 14/26 of OAR. Duration of exposure before diagnosis, latency period between the beginning of exposure and asthma symptom onset, basal FEV1, airway reactivity to methacholine and asthma severity did not differ in the two groups. Eosinophilic inflammation of upper and lower airways characterized both groups. Eosinophil percentage in IS tended to be higher in OAR [11.9 (5.575,13.925)%] than in OA-only [2.95 (0.225,12.5)%] (P = 0.31). Eosinophilia in nasal secretions was present both in subjects with OAR [55 (46,71)%] and in subjects with OA-only [38 (15,73.5)%], without any significant difference. Discussion:, Our results indicate that OA because of ammonium persulphate coexists with occupational rhinitis in half of the patients. Unexpectedly, rhinitis did not seem to have an impact on the natural history of asthma. The finding of nasal inflammation in subjects with OA-only without clinical manifestations of rhinitis supports the united airway disease concept in occupational respiratory allergy as a result of persulphates. [source] Psychiatric endophenotypes and the development of valid animal modelsGENES, BRAIN AND BEHAVIOR, Issue 2 2006T. D. Gould Endophenotypes are quantifiable components in the genes-to-behaviors pathways, distinct from psychiatric symptoms, which make genetic and biological studies of etiologies for disease categories more manageable. The endophenotype concept has emerged as a strategic tool in neuropsychiatric research. This emergence is due to many factors, including the modest reproducibility of results from studies directed toward etiologies and appreciation for the complex relationships between genes and behavior. Disease heterogeneity is often guaranteed, rather than simplified, through the current diagnostic system; inherent benefits of endophenotypes include more specific disease concepts and process definitions. Endophenotypes can be neurophysiological, biochemical, endocrine, neuroanatomical, cognitive or neuropsychological. Heritability and stability (state independence) represent key components of any useful endophenotype. Importantly, they characterize an approach that reduces the complexity of symptoms and multifaceted behaviors, resulting in units of analysis that are more amenable to being modeled in animals. We discuss the benefits of more direct interpretation of clinical endophenotypes by basic behavioral scientists. With the advent of important findings regarding the genes that predispose to psychiatric illness, we are at an important crossroads where, without anthropomorphizing, animal models may provide homologous components of psychiatric illness, rather than simply equating to similar (loosely analogized) behaviors, validators of the efficacy of current medications or models of symptoms. We conclude that there exists a need for increased collaboration between clinicians and basic scientists, the result of which should be to improve diagnosis, classification and treatment on one end and to increase the construct relevance of model organisms on the other. [source] Sweet's syndrome revisited: a review of disease conceptsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF DERMATOLOGY, Issue 10 2003Philip R. Cohen MD Sweet's syndrome, also referred to as acute febrile neutrophilic dermatosis, is characterized by a constellation of symptoms and findings: fever, neutrophilia, erythematous and tender skin lesions that typically show an upper dermal infiltrate of mature neutrophils, and prompt improvement of both symptoms and lesions after the initiation of treatment with systemic corticosteroids. Hundreds of patients with this dermatosis have been reported. The manifestations of Sweet's syndrome in these individuals have not only confirmed those originally described by Dr Robert Douglas Sweet in 1964, but have also introduced new features that have expanded the clinical and pathologic concepts of this condition. The history, clinical characteristics, laboratory findings, associated diseases, pathology, and treatment options of Sweet's syndrome are reviewed. The evolving and new concepts of this dermatosis that are discussed include: (i) Sweet's syndrome occurring in the clinical setting of a disease-related malignancy, or medication, or both; (ii) detection of additional sites of extracutaneous Sweet's syndrome manifestations; (iii) discovery of additional Sweet's syndrome-associated diseases; (iv) variability of the composition and/or location of the cutaneous inflammatory infiltrate in Sweet's syndrome lesions; and (v) additional efficacious treatments for Sweet's syndrome. [source] The Tyranny of Diagnosis: Specific Entities and Individual ExperienceTHE MILBANK QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2002Charles E. Rosenberg Diagnosis has always played a pivotal role in medical practice, but in the past two centuries, that role has been reconfigured and has become more central as medicine,like Western society in general,has become increasingly technical, specialized, and bureaucratized. Disease explanations and clinical practices have incorporated, paralleled, and, in some measure, constituted these larger structural changes. This modern history of diagnosis is inextricably related to disease specificity, to the notion that diseases can and should be thought of as entities existing outside the unique manifestations of illness in particular men and women. During the past century especially, diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment have been linked ever more tightly to specific, agreed-upon disease categories, in both concept and everyday practice. In fact, this essay might have been entitled "Diagnosis Mediates an Invisible Revolution: The Social and Intellectual Significance of Specific Disease Concepts." It would have been even more precise, if rather less arresting. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. The articulation and acceptance of specific disease entities constitute one of the most important intellectual and cultural events of the past two centuries. This notion is central to how we organize health care delivery, think about ourselves, debate and formulate social policy, and define and manage deviance. Diagnosis is indispensable to linking specific disease concepts with doctor and patient and the social and economic institutions shaping such clinical interactions. Disease is a social entity, not an array of ideal types. The history of medicine is partly the story of how disease entities have become social entities, accumulating the flesh of diagnostic and therapeutic practice, social expectation, and bureaucratic reification. Despite criticism of reductionist medicine in the West and less focus on disease entities and mechanisms, our social response still depends on this concept of sickness. But this concept can no longer remain invisible if we are to understand contemporary medicine as both a social and a technological system. [source] |