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Administrative Agencies (administrative + agencies)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting42%

Selected Abstracts

Devolution and Innovation: The Adoption of State Environmental Policy Innovations by Administrative Agencies

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 2 2004
Alka Sapat
Do states act as laboratories for reform? Are state administrative agencies likely to adopt policy innovations? This study analyzes the adoption of environmental policy innovations by state administrative agencies in the area of hazardous waste regulation. Four explanations are developed to explain the factors that affect innovation adoption: the severity of the problem, the importance of institutional factors, the role played by interest groups, and contextual factors. Institutional factors, such as state wealth and administrative professionalism, are important determinants of innovation adoption. State agencies are also likely to adopt innovations to deal with problems created by hazardous waste contamination. In addition, state environmental managers are not directly influenced by interest groups, and the inclusion of all stakeholders is likely to lead to greater support for new policy initiatives. Implications for practitioners are drawn based on the study's findings. [source]

At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985,1996),

LAW & POLICY, Issue 3-4 2004
Kiki Caruson
This study seeks to expand our understanding of judicial deference to administrative agencies within the context of one particularly important legal forum , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The DC circuit functions as a key venue for administrative law cases and the opinions of the court constitute a growing body of common law in the field of administrative law. We investigate the importance of several agency-centered and judge-centered variables in explaining judicial deference to administrative agencies in cases before the DC circuit court during a twelve-year period (1985,1996). We find that an integrated model of judicial deference, combining both legal and attitudinal factors, best explains judicial deference. Like judges on so many other courts, judges on the DC circuit are politically motivated, but their political activism is tempered by agency-centered factors such as the type of case before the court, and environmental factors such as the composition of the judicial panel reviewing the case and the behavior of the Supreme Court. [source]

Coercion, Cooperation, and Control: Understanding the Policy Impact of Administrative Courts and the Ombudsman in the Netherlands

LAW & POLICY, Issue 1 2001
Marc Hertogh
This article examines the way in which administrative courts and the National Ombudsman in the Netherlands seek to control administrative action, and is aimed at developing a heuristic model that can also be useful in a wider context. Two styles of control will be introduced: "coercive" and "cooperative." An exploratory empirical study was conducted of two administrative agencies, investigating the implementation process of court and ombudsman decisions. This article argues that it is likely that the policy impact of the courts and the ombudsman is directly related to their style of control. More empirical research is needed to evaluate this hypothesis. [source]

Policymaking in the Parallelogram of Forces: Common Agency and Human Service Provision

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 3 2004
Anthony M. Bertelli
The "congressional dominance" literature in political science provides valuable insights into the legislative control of administrative agencies. However, this literature tends to be conceptualized with respect to regulatory agencies, and it is not especially helpful in understanding the dynamics of policymaking in the provision of human services. After distinguishing the tasks of regulation and human services provision, we present an alternative: a common agency model of human service policy as the outcome of interest group bargaining. We illustrate its implications with an analytic narrative of service provision for the seriously mentally ill. [source]

Policymaking in the Parallelogram of Forces: Common Agency and Human Service Provision

POLICY STUDIES JOURNAL, Issue 2 2004
Anthony Bertelli
The "congressional dominance" literature in political science provides valuable insights into the legislative control of administrative agencies. However, this literature tends to be conceptualized with respect to regulatory agencies, and it is not especially helpful in understanding the dynamics of policymaking in the provision of human services. After distinguishing the tasks of regulation and human services provision, we present an alternative: a common agency model of human service policy as the outcome of interest group bargaining. We illustrate its implications with an analytic narrative of service provision for the seriously mentally ill. [source]

Devolution and Innovation: The Adoption of State Environmental Policy Innovations by Administrative Agencies

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 2 2004
Alka Sapat
Do states act as laboratories for reform? Are state administrative agencies likely to adopt policy innovations? This study analyzes the adoption of environmental policy innovations by state administrative agencies in the area of hazardous waste regulation. Four explanations are developed to explain the factors that affect innovation adoption: the severity of the problem, the importance of institutional factors, the role played by interest groups, and contextual factors. Institutional factors, such as state wealth and administrative professionalism, are important determinants of innovation adoption. State agencies are also likely to adopt innovations to deal with problems created by hazardous waste contamination. In addition, state environmental managers are not directly influenced by interest groups, and the inclusion of all stakeholders is likely to lead to greater support for new policy initiatives. Implications for practitioners are drawn based on the study's findings. [source]

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations, Political Principals' Priorities, and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE, Issue 2 2007
JAY EUNGHA RYU
This article addresses a long-standing question in public budgeting: What factors influence bureau/agency budget request decisions? Empirical results confirm the complexity of variables that explain different levels of budget requests by over 1,000 state administrative agencies. The expected significant influence of administrator (agency head) aspirations was clearly present. But other important sources enter into the decision of agencies to satisfy rather than maximize. These include the strategic roles, activities, and priorities of governors, legislatures, and interest groups. These political principals' influence operates to constrain, discipline, or even augment agency budget requests. [source]