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Direct Realism (direct + realism)
Selected AbstractsDirect Realism, Intentionality, and the Objective Being of IdeasPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2002Paul Hoffman My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler's account in Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. I argue contrary to Nadler that Descartes and Arnauld are representationalists, and I also argue that Aquinas is a representationalist. [source] Indirect Perceptual Realism and Multiple ReferenceDIALECTICA, Issue 3 2008Derek Brown Indirect realists maintain that our perceptions of the external world are mediated by our ,perceptions' of subjective intermediaries such as sensations. Multiple reference occurs when a word or an instance of it has more than one reference. I argue that, because indirect realists hold that speakers typically and unknowingly directly perceive something subjective and indirectly perceive something objective, the phenomenon of multiple reference is an important resource for their view. In particular, a challenge that A. D. Smith has recently put forward for indirect realists can be overcome by appreciating how multiple reference is likely to arise when a projectivist variety of indirect realism is interpreted by speakers adhering to a naïve direct realism. [source] The Model Theoretic Argument, Indirect Realism, and the Causal Theory of Reference ObjectionPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2003Steven L. Reynolds This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception. [source] Direct Realism, Intentionality, and the Objective Being of IdeasPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2002Paul Hoffman My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler's account in Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. I argue contrary to Nadler that Descartes and Arnauld are representationalists, and I also argue that Aquinas is a representationalist. [source] |