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DIFFERENT VOICE' (different + voice)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Law and Criminology50%

Selected Abstracts

GENDER AND ETHICS COMMITTEES: WHERE'S THE ,DIFFERENT VOICE'?

BIOETHICS, Issue 3 2006
DONNA DICKENSON
ABSTRACT Prominent international and national ethics commissions such as the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee rarely achieve anything remotely resembling gender equality, although local research and clinical ethics committees are somewhat more egalitarian. Under-representation of women is particularly troubling when the subject matter of modern bioethics so disproportionately concerns women's bodies, and when such committees claim to derive ,universal' standards. Are women missing from many ethics committees because of relatively straightforward, if discriminatory, demographic factors? Or are the methods of analysis and styles of ethics to which these bodies are committed somehow ,anti-female'? It has been argued, for example, that there is a ,different voice' in ethical reasoning, not confined to women but more representative of female experience. Similarly, some feminist writers, such as Evelyn Fox Keller and Donna Haraway, have asked difficult epistemological questions about the dominant ,masculine paradigm' in science. Perhaps the dominant paradigm in ethics committee deliberation is similarly gendered? This article provides a preliminary survey of women's representation on ethics committees in eastern and western Europe, a critical analysis of the supposed ,masculinism' of the principlist approach, and a case example in which a ,different voice' did indeed make a difference. [source]

Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity

JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2008
Dermot Feenan
The under-representation of women in judicial office has led to calls for greater female representation based on an argument that women offer a different voice from that of men. This argument has largely foundered, and a more recent rationale rests on the need for diversity in the judiciary. However, the disadvantage experienced by women applicants to judicial office is rooted in deeply entrenched structural discrimination and exclusion, imbricated in the constitution of the judge, judging, and judicial authority as male, masculine, white, heterosexual, able-bodied, and class-privileged. Arguments for wider representation in judicial office need to address more effectively how the judge, judging, and judicial authority are constituted. A survey of women holders of judicial office in Northern Ireland confirms this exclusion. While few respondents in the survey support the concept of a different voice, many identify distinctive approaches which can potentially enrich notions of judging and judicial authority. [source]

GENDER AND ETHICS COMMITTEES: WHERE'S THE ,DIFFERENT VOICE'?

BIOETHICS, Issue 3 2006
DONNA DICKENSON
ABSTRACT Prominent international and national ethics commissions such as the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee rarely achieve anything remotely resembling gender equality, although local research and clinical ethics committees are somewhat more egalitarian. Under-representation of women is particularly troubling when the subject matter of modern bioethics so disproportionately concerns women's bodies, and when such committees claim to derive ,universal' standards. Are women missing from many ethics committees because of relatively straightforward, if discriminatory, demographic factors? Or are the methods of analysis and styles of ethics to which these bodies are committed somehow ,anti-female'? It has been argued, for example, that there is a ,different voice' in ethical reasoning, not confined to women but more representative of female experience. Similarly, some feminist writers, such as Evelyn Fox Keller and Donna Haraway, have asked difficult epistemological questions about the dominant ,masculine paradigm' in science. Perhaps the dominant paradigm in ethics committee deliberation is similarly gendered? This article provides a preliminary survey of women's representation on ethics committees in eastern and western Europe, a critical analysis of the supposed ,masculinism' of the principlist approach, and a case example in which a ,different voice' did indeed make a difference. [source]

Divided justice, different voices: inheritance and family provision

LEGAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2003
Fiona Cownie
Both the Family Division of the High Court and the Chancery Division of the High Court exercise jurisdiction over the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, with the applicant being able to elect the Division that they wish to proceed in. Many practitioners believe that the two Divisions have different attitudes towards the Act. This paper argues the structure of the 1975 Act makes it highly likely that the two Divisions will approach in different ways and that a close analysis of judgments shows that there is a discernible difference in the rhetoric that is used in judgments in the two Divisions, that this difference in rhetoric affects the way in which applicants are viewed and that thus sometimes it affects the outcome of cases. Since there is no advantage in practice to having the two jurisdictions and since the difference between the jurisprudences in the two Divisions can result in like cases not being treated alike, an elementary form of injustice. The paper concludes that it would be better if one Division exercised sole jurisdiction over the Act. [source]