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Different Incentives (different + incentive)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting60%
Humanities and Social Sciences40%

Selected Abstracts

Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information: A Game-Theoretic Model*

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 4 2003
Kevin Zhu
ABSTRACT In this paper we explore strategic decision making in new technology adoption by using economic analysis. We show how asymmetric information affects firms' decisions to adopt the technology. We do so in a two-stage game-theoretic model where the first-stage investment results in the acquisition of a new technology that, in the second stage, may give the firm a competitive advantage in the product market. We compare two information structures under which two competing firms have asymmetric information about the future performance (i.e., postadoption costs) of the new technology. We find that equilibrium strategies under asymmetric information are quite different from those under symmetric information. Information asymmetry leads to different incentives and strategic behaviors in the technology adoption game. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our model shows that market uncertainty may actually induce firms to act more aggressively under certain conditions. We also show that having better information is not always a good thing. These results illustrate a key departure from established decision theory. [source]

Emission trading regimes and incentives to participate in international climate agreements

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2004
Barbara Buchner
This paper analyses whether different emission trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source]

Organizational Alternatives for Companies' Management of Occupational Risks: The Examples of Spain and Argentina

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 1 2001
Eugenia Suárez Serrano
This study discusses the various options available to companies for the management of occupational risks. In this context, occupational accident insurance schemes in Spain and Argentina are analysed, with reference to the theory of organizational economics. Spain has 75 years' experience of such schemes, while in Argentina they have only recently been introduced. Although the two models have similar goals, their differences, in terms of competition, regulation and ownership, lead to different incentives for those concerned: workers, companies, insurers and regulatory bodies. [source]

The Politics of Financial Development: Evidence from Trade Liberalization

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2008
MATIAS BRAUN
ABSTRACT Incumbents in various industries have different incentives to promote or oppose financial development. Changes in the relative strength of promoter and opponent industries thus result in changes in the political equilibrium level of financial development. We conduct an event study using a sample of 41 countries that liberalized trade during 1970 to 2000, and show that the strengthening of promoter relative to opponent industries resulting from liberalization is a good predictor of subsequent financial development. The benefits of developing the financial system are insufficient for financial development, and rents in particular hands appear to be necessary to achieve it. [source]

Strategic FDI and industrial ownership structure

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2002
Christopher J. Ellis
We argue that different industrial ownership structures generate different incentives for firms to engage in FDI. A comparison is made between (partially) cooperative structures such as the Japanese kieretsu and Korean chaebol systems and competitive structures such as U.S. firms. It is found that ownership structure has significant implications for the probability of initial FDI. Whether or not a cooperative structure is also coordinated turns out to be crucial in predicting FDI behaviour. This has further implications for the optimal FDI incentives of potential host countries and for how empirical studies might be designed. JEL classification: F10, F21, F23 Stratégie d'investissements directs à l'étranger et structure de propriété de l'industrie. Les auteurs suggèrent que des structures différentes de propriété dans l'industrie engendrent des incitations diverses pour les entreprises à investir directement à l'étranger. On fait des comparaisons entre des structures partiellement coopératives comme celles des kieretsus au Japon et des chaebol en Corée, et des structures concurrentielles comme celles qui existent aux Etats,Unis. Il appert que la structure de propriété a un impact significatif sur la probabilité de faire initialement un investissement direct à l'étranger. Le fait que la structure de coopération engendre aussi une coordination s'avère d'une importance centrale pour prédire le comportement d'investissement direct à l'étranger. Voilà qui a des implications pour le design des incitations à investir par les pays hôtes potentiels, et pour le design des études empiriques de ces phénomènes. [source]