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Demographic Transition (demographic + transition)
Selected AbstractsTHE INAUGURAL NOEL BUTLIN LECTURE: WORLD FACTOR MIGRATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONSAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Jeffrey G. Williamson This lecture explores the connection between demographic transitions, mass migrations and international capital flows. It reviews how demographic transitions influence the size of age cohorts, and then how these changes in age distribution influence excess demands in receiving regions and excess supplies in sending regions. The lecture offers four examples , two from the first global century and two from the second global century , where shocks generated by demographic transitions have had an enormous impact on factor flows: European mass migrations to the New World before 1914; African mass migrations to the OECD over the past two decades; British capital export to the New World before 1914; and capital flows across East Asian borders after 1950 and before the melt down of the 1990s. The lecture concludes with an assessment of the demographic contribution to the East Asian miracle (and slowdown) over the past half century. [source] Stages of the Demographic Transition from a Child's Perspective: Family Size, Cohort Size, and Children's ResourcesPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 2 2008David Lam This article provides a new characterization of stages of the demographic transition from the perspective of children competing for resources within families and cohorts. In Stage 1 falling mortality increases the size of both families and birth cohorts. In Stage 2 falling fertility overtakes falling mortality to reduce family size, but population momentum causes continued growth in cohort size. In Stage 3 falling fertility overtakes population momentum to produce declining cohort size. We apply our framework to census microdata for eight countries and to United Nations population projections for a larger set of countries. The results suggest that most countries spend two to three decades in Stage 2, with declining family size offset by increasing cohort size. From the perspective of children aged 9,11, many countries enter Stage 3 between 2000 and 2010. Other countries, especially in Africa, will continue to experience increasing cohort size for several more decades. [source] Long-term Forecast of the Demographic Transition in Japan and AsiaASIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009Takao KOMINE J11 Abstract The demographic structure of Asia is expected to change rapidly from around 2020 up to around 2050. Following Japan, which is already at an advanced stage of aging and birthrate decline, China, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore will also witness a further decline in their birthrates and an aging of their populations. Next in line will be the remaining countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations as well as India. Such changes, accompanied by a decline in the labor force, will not only adversely affect economic growth, but also have a major impact on voting structures, savings rates, and social security systems. Moreover, the process of demographic aging in Asia will be faster than in Japan, and its extent will be substantial, both of which exacerbates the negative effects. On positive side, these trends will give rise to the emergence of new markets. [source] Childhood Personality Predicts Long-Term Trajectories of Shyness and Aggressiveness in the Context of Demographic Transitions in Emerging AdulthoodJOURNAL OF PERSONALITY, Issue 1 2008Jaap J. A. Dennissen ABSTRACT In a 19-year longitudinal study, childhood personality characteristics (assessed by teachers at ages 4 to 6) were significantly related to both initial levels and changes in parental judgments of shyness and aggressiveness. Long-term stability was demonstrated by the fact that overcontrollers had consistently higher scores in shyness and undercontrollers in aggressiveness. However, undercontrollers' shyness and overcontrollers' aggressiveness changed over time from a low to a high level. Also, both types assumed adult social roles, such as leaving the parental home, establishing a first romantic relationship, and getting a part-time job, at a later time than the resilient participants. A mediation analysis indicated that under- and overcontrollers' increasing aggressiveness between age 17 and 23 was due to their longer latency of getting a part-time job. Together, results demonstrate the importance of considering person-environment transactions in explaining both change and stability in personality between childhood and adulthood. [source] Challenge Facing China's Economic Growth in Its Aging but not Affluent EraCHINA AND WORLD ECONOMY, Issue 5 2006Fang Cai J1; J3; J21; O4 Abstract Demographic transition has occurred more rapidly in China than in most developed countries. As the population ages, the growth rate of the working age population has started to decline and the absolute quantity of the working age population will begin to shrink after 2015, which will inevitably result in structural labor shortage. Under the circumstance where comparative advantage is still embodied in its labor-intensive commodities, timely and sufficient supply of a skilled labor force is vital for China to sustain fast economic growth. (Edited by Zhinan Zhang) [source] Healthcare for Older Persons, A Country Profile: NigeriaJOURNAL OF AMERICAN GERIATRICS SOCIETY, Issue 7 2002Bola O. Akanji PhD The Nigerian population is undergoing demographic transition, with an increasing population of older people. Nuclear and extended family members traditionally care for older persons at home. We have observed changes in home living conditions due to reduced family size, and urban migration for economic reasons are likely to affect the care of older people. The inadequately funded healthcare system has placed little emphasis on the care of older people because there are more-pressing health problems and funding for older people is limited. This paper advocates improved attention to the health needs of older people through improved budgetary allocation, revision of the training curriculum of all cadres of health staff to include geriatrics, and utilization of primary healthcare facilities. [source] Why some regions will decline: A Canadian case study with thoughts on local development strategies,PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2006Mario Polèse Regional development; local development; periphery; location; economic decline Abstract., The authors present the case of five Canadian peripheral regions, which they argue are destined to decline. The explanation of the reasons why future decline (in absolute population and employment numbers) is inevitable constitutes the article's central focus. The authors suggest that regional decline will become an increasingly common occurrence in nations at the end of the demographic transition whose economic geographies display centre-periphery relationships. Such broad structural trends cannot be easily altered by public policy. The authors reflect on the implications of regional decline for the formulation of local economic development strategies. Local economic development strategies should not, they argue, be advanced as a means of arresting population and employment decline. To suggest that the regions studied in this article will decline because of a lack of social capital or insufficient number of local entrepreneurs, is not only misleading but may also be counterproductive. [source] Zur nachhaltigen Finanzierung der GRV: Der Beitrag der Altersgrenzenanhebung im RentenreformprozessPERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 4 2008Oliver Ehrentraut In this article we analyze the effects of the latest reforms on the future development of the contribution rate as well as the public pension level. Furthermore, we quantify the extent of an increase of the average retirement age on the funding of the pension scheme, as the increase can temporarily dilute the financial burden due to demographic transition. [source] Socioeconomic status, education, and reproduction in modern women: An evolutionary perspectiveAMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 5 2010Susanne Huber Although associations between status or resources and reproduction are positive in premodern societies and also in men in modern societies, in modern women the associations are typically negative. We investigated how the association between socioeconomic status and reproductive output varies with the source of status and resources, the woman's education, and her age at reproductive onset (proxied by age at marriage). By using a large sample of US women, we examined the association between a woman's reproductive output and her own and her husband's income and education. Education, income, and age at marriage are negatively associated with a woman's number of children and increase her chances of childlessness. Among the most highly educated two-thirds of the sample of women, husband's income predicts the number of children. The association between a woman's number of children and her husband's income turns from positive to negative when her education and age at marriage is low (even though her mean offspring number rises at the same time). The association between a woman's own income and her number of children is negative, regardless of education. Rather than maximizing the offspring number, these modern women seem to adjust investment in children based on their family size and resource availability. Striving for resources seems to be part of a modern female reproductive strategy,but, owing to costs of resource acquisition, especially higher education, it may lead to lower birthrates: a possible evolutionary explanation of the demographic transition, and a complement to the human capital theory of net reproductive output. Am. J. Hum. Biol. 22:578,587, 2010. © 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Relatives as spouses: Preferences and opportunities for kin marriage in a Western societyAMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 6 2009Hilde Bras This article investigates the determinants of kin marriage on the basis of a large-scale database covering a major rural part of The Netherlands during the period 1840,1922. We studied three types of kin marriage: first cousin marriage, deceased spouse's sibling marriage, and sibling set exchange marriage. Almost 2% of all marriages were between first cousins, 0.85% concerned the sibling of a former spouse, while 4.14% were sibling set exchange marriages. While the first two types generally declined across the study period, sibling set exchange marriage reached a high point of almost 5% between 1890 and 1900. We found evidence for three mechanisms explaining the choice for relatives as spouses, centering both on preferences and on opportunities for kin marriage. Among the higher and middle strata and among farmers, kin marriages were commonly practiced and played an important role in the process of social class formation in the late nineteenth century. An increased choice for cousin marriage as a means of enculturation was observed among orthodox Protestants in the Bible Belt area of The Netherlands. Finally, all studied types of kin marriage took place more often in the relatively isolated, inland provinces of The Netherlands. Sibling set exchange marriages were a consequence of the enlarged supply of same-generation kin as a result of the demographic transition. Am. J. Hum. Biol., 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Tradeoffs and sexual conflict over women's fertility preferences in MpimbweAMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 4 2009Monique Borgerhoff Mulder There are two principle evolutionary models for why women reduce their fertility, which can be used to explain the modern demographic transition. The first derives from optimality theory (specifically the "quantity-quality" tradeoff hypothesis), and the second from models of biased cultural transmission ("prestige bias" and "kin influence" hypotheses). Data on family planning preferences collected in 1996 and 1998 in a rural African village (in Mpimbwe, Tanzania) are used to test predictions derived from each hypothesis and show that both "quantity-quality" tradeoffs and biased cultural transmission underlie Pimbwe women's decisions. Reproductive decisions, however, are not made in a vacuum. Men and women's ideal family sizes often differ, and sexual conflict is particularly likely to affect a woman's success in limiting her family size. Pimbwe women's reproductive output between the initial family planning survey in 1996 and the most recent demographic survey (2006) is analyzed in relation to both the woman's preferences to limit her family and her exposure to husbands and husbands' kin. Despite wide differences in desired family sizes between men and women the extent of sexual conflict in this population is restricted to husbands and wives, and affects not a woman's use or planned use of modern contraception but her success in employing such methods effectively. There is also some evidence that a woman's mother and her kin assist in the use and effective use of modern methods, offering a prevailing force to the high-fertility objectives of the husband. Am. J. Hum. Biol., 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Testing three evolutionary models of the demographic transition: Patterns of fertility and age at marriage in urban South IndiaAMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 4 2009Mary K. Shenk Over the last three decades many authors have addressed the demographic transition from the perspective of evolutionary theory. Some authors have emphasized parental investment factors such as the costs of raising children, others have emphasized the effects of mortality and other forms of risk, and others have emphasized the biased transmission of cultural norms from people of high status. Yet the literature says little about the relative strengths of each of these types of motivations or about which ones are more likely to serve as the primary impetus for large-scale demographic change. In this paper, I examine how each of these factors has influenced the demographic transition in urban South India during the course of the 20th century using two measures of fertility transition: number of surviving children and age at marriage. I find that investment-related, risk-related, and cultural transmission predictors all have significant individual effects on the outcome variables, which persist when they are entered in combination. When the three types of predictors are compared, however, investment-related models appear to provide more robust explanations for patterns in both fertility and age of marriage. Am. J. Hum. Biol., 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Inbreeding and demographic transition in the Orozco Valley (Basque Country, Spain)AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 6 2002J.A. Peña Inbreeding in the Orozco Valley (Basque Country, Spain) between the 18th and 20th centuries was investigated on the basis of ecclesiastical dispensations and surname lists. The variations over time are very similar to those observed elsewhere in Europe, with a major increase in the coefficient of inbreeding in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This is due mainly to an increase in marriages between first cousins. A highly marked decrease in inbreeding is observed during the 20th century. The secular trends described by the coefficient calculated on the basis of dispensations and by that calculated on isonymy are very similar. The nonrandom component of isonymy reveals a selective search for a related spouse during the period of maximum inbreeding. These results are associated with the process of demographic transition which affected European populations as a whole in the 19th century, resulting in a greater availability of kin among potential mates and thus enabling inbreeding to increase to levels far higher than those observed for earlier centuries. Am. J. Hum. Biol. 14:713,720, 2002. © 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Beyond Material Explanations: Family Solidarity and Mortality, a Small Area-level AnalysisPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 1 2010Jon Anson Social solidarity, being embedded in a network of binding social relationships, tends to extend human longevity. Yet while average incomes in the Western world, and with them, life expectancies, have risen dramatically, the second demographic transition has occasioned a breakdown in traditional family forms. This article considers whether these trends in family life may have slowed the rise in life expectancy. I present a cross-sectional analysis of Israeli statistical areas (SAs), for which I construct indexes of Standard of Living (SOL), Traditional Family Structure (TFS), and Religiosity (R). I show that (1) increases in all three of these indexes are associated with lower levels of mortality, (2) male mortality is more sensitive to differences in SOL and TFS than is female mortality, and (3) net of differences in SOL and TFS, there is no difference in the mortality levels of Arab and Jewish populations. [source] "Population Invasion" versus Urban Exclusion in the Tibetan Areas of Western ChinaPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2008Andrew Martin Fischer This article examines the confluence of local population transitions (demographic transition and urbanization) with non-local in-migration in the Tibetan areas of western China. The objective is to assess the validity of Tibetan perceptions of "population invasion" by Han Chinese and Chinese Muslims. The article argues that migration to Tibet from other regions in China has been concentrated in urban areas and has been counterbalanced by more rapid rates of natural increase in the Tibetan rural areas,among the highest rates in China. Overall, it is not clear whether there is any risk of population invasion in the Tibetan areas. However, given that non-Tibetan migration to Tibet has been concentrated in urban areas, Tibetans have probably become a minority in many of their strategic cities and towns, and non-Tibetan migrants definitely dominate urban employment. Therefore, while the Tibetan notion of population invasion may be a misperception, it reflects a legitimate concern that in-migration may be exacerbating the economic exclusion of Tibetan locals in the context of rapid urban-centered development. [source] Stages of the Demographic Transition from a Child's Perspective: Family Size, Cohort Size, and Children's ResourcesPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 2 2008David Lam This article provides a new characterization of stages of the demographic transition from the perspective of children competing for resources within families and cohorts. In Stage 1 falling mortality increases the size of both families and birth cohorts. In Stage 2 falling fertility overtakes falling mortality to reduce family size, but population momentum causes continued growth in cohort size. In Stage 3 falling fertility overtakes population momentum to produce declining cohort size. We apply our framework to census microdata for eight countries and to United Nations population projections for a larger set of countries. The results suggest that most countries spend two to three decades in Stage 2, with declining family size offset by increasing cohort size. From the perspective of children aged 9,11, many countries enter Stage 3 between 2000 and 2010. Other countries, especially in Africa, will continue to experience increasing cohort size for several more decades. [source] Rethinking Historical Reproductive Change: Insights from Longitudinal Data for a Spanish TownPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 4 2007David Sven Reher A set of linked reproductive histories taken from the Spanish town of Aranjuez between 1871 and 1950 is used to address key issues regarding reproductive change during the demographic transition. These include the role of child survival as a stimulus for reproductive change, the use of stopping and/or spacing strategies to achieve reproductive goals, and the timing of change. Straightforward demographic measures are used and robust results are achieved. Initial strategies of fertility limitation are shown to exist but are inefficient, are mostly visible during the latter part of the reproductive period, are designed mostly to protect families from the effects of increases in child survival, and are based almost entirely on stopping behavior. As mortality decline accelerates, strategies become much more efficient, are visible at the outset of married life, include spacing behavior, and eventually lead to important declines in completed family size. The results of this study have implications for our understanding of the demographic transition both in historical Europe and in other regions of the world. [source] Bridewealth and Birth Control: Low Fertility in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500,1900POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 2 2003Peter Boomgaard Before the onset of the present demographic transition, population growth in Indonesia had reached unprecedentedly high levels. This article demonstrates that such high levels were a recent phenomenon. Prior to 1900 rates of natural population increase were low to very low in most areas in Indonesia. This runs counter to expectations based on Hajnal's "Eastern marriage pattern," which could imply high growth levels in extended family areas, such as most Indonesian regions outside Java in the past. Usually, the low population growth rates in Southeast Asia are attributed to high mortality owing to high levels of violent conflict. It is argued that other factors contributing to such high levels of mortality should receive more attention. In this article it is also argued that low fertility rates, too, played a role in generating low rates of natural increase. The article discusses the influence of marriage patterns, household structure, methods of birth control, adoption, and slavery on fertility. [source] Is There a Stabilizing Selection Around Average Fertility in Modern Human Populations?POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 3 2001Ulrich Mueller Possibly the greatest challenge for an evolutionary explanation of demographic transition is the fact that fertility levels universally start to fall first among the well-to-do, well-educated, healthy classes, which can be explained only by some voluntary or at least adaptive action. The problem of how restraints on fertility could have evolved by natural selection has been tackled with group selection models as well as with stabilizing selection models. The latter model, which is critically discussed in this article, posits that some intermediate (rather than maximal) level of fertility is optimal for long-term reproductive success. Tests of stabilizing selection in human populations are rare, their results inconclusive. Here four sets of data are analyzed: they are samples drawn from the 'class of 1950 of the US Military Academy at West Point (cohorts 1923,29), retired US noncommissioned officers (cohorts 1913,37), and western German and eastern German physicians (cohorts 1930,35), all containing fertility data over two generations, and from European royalty (cohorts 1790,1939) containing fertility data over four generations. Deterministic as well as stochastic fitness measures are used. It is found that maximal, not average, fertility in the first generation leads to maximal long-term reproductive success. Also against prediction, no decreasing marginal fitness gains by increasing fertility can be observed. The findings leave little space for considering stabilizing selection as a plausible mechanism explaining the course of demographic transition but indicate instead that biological evolution today is as fast and vigorous as ever in human history. Even in large populations, all people living today may be the descendants of just some few percents,a much smaller proportion than generally believed, of the people living some generations ago. [source] Relative Cohort Size: Source of a Unifying Theory of Global Fertility Transition?POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 2 2000Diane J. Macunovich Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five-year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950,not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15,24 relative to males aged 25,59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold-ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a "cascade" or "snowball" effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change. [source] The demographic transition revisited as a global processPOPULATION, SPACE AND PLACE (PREVIOUSLY:-INT JOURNAL OF POPULATION GEOGRAPHY), Issue 1 2004David S. Reher Abstract With dramatic declines in fertility taking place throughout the world, it is increasingly important to understand the demographic transition as a global process. While this universality was a cornerstone of classic transition theories, for many decades it was largely neglected by experts because fertility in the developing world did not seem to follow the expected pattern. When comparing earlier and more recent transition experiences, important similarities and disparities can be seen. Everywhere mortality decline appears to have played a central role for fertility decline. The differences in the timing of the response of fertility to mortality decline, with very small gaps historically and prolonged ones in more recent transitions, plus the much more rapid decline in vital rates in many developing countries, constitute an important challenge to any general explanation of the process. The specific characteristics of recent transitions have led to decades of higher population growth rates, and promise to give way to much more rapid dynamics of population ageing in many countries. This may limit the ability of newcomers to take full advantage of the demographic transition for the social and economic modernisation of their societies. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Demographic Change and Economic Growth in AsiaASIAN ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2009David E. BLOOM J11; O11 Abstract Trade openness, high savings rates, human capital accumulation, and macroeconomic policy only accounted for part of the 1965,1990 growth performance in East Asia. Subsequently, demographic change was shown to be a missing factor in explaining the East Asian growth premium. Since 1990, East Asia has undertaken major economic reforms in response to financial crises and other factors. We reexamine the role of the demographic transition in contributing to cross-country differences in economic growth through to 2005, with a particular focus on East Asia. We highlight the need for policy to offset potential negative effects of aging populations in the future. [source] The Coming of an Aged Society in Taiwan: Issues and PoliciesASIAN SOCIAL WORK AND POLICY REVIEW, Issue 3 2010Wan-I Lin For most advanced industrialized countries, an aging society has been a national issue since the 1970s. However, Taiwan was not aware of this issue until 1993, the year when the old-age population reached 7.0%. As an aging nation under the definition of the United Nations, the Taiwanese government began to pay more attention to the aging population, and executed several policies in response to this demographic transition. First, this article examines Taiwan's demographic transition from an aging society to an aged society, and its impacts. Second, it demonstrates the responses of Taiwan to the coming of an aged society and explores crucial issues that Taiwanese society is facing. [source] The Politics of PopulationINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 4 2006TADEUSZ KUGLER This essay evaluates the implications of international political development on demographic transitions and economic outcomes from 1980 to 2050. Countries with high levels of political capacity experience the sharpest declines in birth and death rates as well as the greatest gains in income. Politics indirectly and directly affects the environment within which individuals make decisions about the size of families; these decisions, in turn, change the future economic dynamics of a country. We find that political capacity ensures that rules are evenly applied, allowing investment for long-term gain. Our projections show that under conditions of high political capacity, anticipated demographic and economic transformations will allow China to supersede the dominance of the United States by the end of this century and will also enable the rise of India into the ranks of the dominant powers. We assess the consequences of these changes in world politics. [source] An evolutionary ecological perspective on demographic transitions: Modeling multiple currenciesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 2 2002Bobbi S. Low Life history theory postulates tradeoffs of current versus future reproduction; today women face evolutionarily novel versions of these tradeoffs. Optimal age at first birth is the result of tradeoffs in fertility and mortality; ceteris paribus, early reproduction is advantageous. Yet modern women in developed nations experience relatively late first births; they appear to be trading off socioeconomic status and the paths to raised SES, education and work, against early fertility. Here, [1] using delineating parameter values drawn from data in the literature, we model these tradeoffs to determine how much socioeconomic advantage will compensate for delayed first births and lower lifetime fertility; and [2] we examine the effects of work and education on women's lifetime and age-specific fertility using data from seven cohorts in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Am. J. Hum. Biol. 14:149,167, 2002. © 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] Demographic consequences of unpredictability in fertility outcomesAMERICAN JOURNAL OF HUMAN BIOLOGY, Issue 2 2002Paul Leslie Child survival is probabilistic, but the unpredictability in family formation and completed family size has been neglected in the fertility literature. In many societies, ending the family cycle with too few or too many surviving offspring entails serious social, economic, or fitness consequences. A model of risk- (or variance-) sensitive adaptive behavior that addresses long-term fertility outcomes is presented. The model shows that under conditions likely to be common, optimal, risk-sensitive reproductive strategies deviate systematically from the completed family size that would be expected if reproductive outcome is were predictable. This is termed the "variance compensation hypothesis." Variance compensation may be either positive or negative, resulting in augmented or diminished fertility. Which outcome obtained is a function of identifiable social, economic, and environmental factors. Through its effect on fertility behavior, variance compensation has a direct bearing on birth spacing and completed fertility, and thereby on problems in demography and human population biology ranging from demographic transitions to maternal depletion and child health. Risk-sensitive models will be a necessary component of a general theory of fertility. Am. J. Hum. Biol. 14:168,183, 2002. © 2002 Wiley-Liss, Inc. [source] THE INAUGURAL NOEL BUTLIN LECTURE: WORLD FACTOR MIGRATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONSAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Jeffrey G. Williamson This lecture explores the connection between demographic transitions, mass migrations and international capital flows. It reviews how demographic transitions influence the size of age cohorts, and then how these changes in age distribution influence excess demands in receiving regions and excess supplies in sending regions. The lecture offers four examples , two from the first global century and two from the second global century , where shocks generated by demographic transitions have had an enormous impact on factor flows: European mass migrations to the New World before 1914; African mass migrations to the OECD over the past two decades; British capital export to the New World before 1914; and capital flows across East Asian borders after 1950 and before the melt down of the 1990s. The lecture concludes with an assessment of the demographic contribution to the East Asian miracle (and slowdown) over the past half century. [source] | |||||||||||||