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Democratic Systems (democratic + system)
Selected AbstractsToo much of a good thing: the ,problem' of political communications in a mass media democracyJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2007Ivor Gaber Francis Fukuyama asks: ,,,is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?' This paper argues that one of these ,internal contradictions' is the political communications process and it can be sufficiently serious to undermine the democratic system,but such an undermining is not inevitable. The problem can be described as follows: Democratic systems require that citizens are kept fully informed by governments (and others) in the interests of transparency and ultimately accountability. Hence, all political communications have, as their final objective, the accountability of politicians at the ballot box. Thus all political communications have what can be described as ,above' and ,below' the line content. The above-the-line is the actual content of the message, the below-the-line is the implicit one of ,think better of me and my colleagues think worse of my opponents'. Consequently, no matter how personally honest and open an individual politician might be, the democratic system requires her or him to be always thinking about securing a successful result at the ballot box. Thus we have the ,political communications paradox'. Voters want politicians to be honest and accountable but this very demand means that politicians, implicitly, always have to have another agenda in operation when they are communicating with the public, i.e. securing their approval and then their support. As a result the trust which is a fundamental to the workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. This has two effects. First, that governments are obliged to make communications, rather than delivery, their real priority and second trust, not just in politicians but in the political system as a whole, tends to wane over time, which in turn endangers the very system it was designed to underpin. But this decline is not inevitable because the system has some in-built self-correcting mechanisms These include: the rise of new parties and/or leaders who portray themselves as ,new' and ,untainted',New Labour, New Conservatives, etc., an almost regular ,re-balancing' of the power relationship that exists between politicians and the civil service, particularly in the communications field, the rise of new forms of communication that seek to by-pass the institutional roadblocks that are perceived as being the cause of the problems and finally increased attention by journalists and academics to the process of political communications makes it more difficult for politicians to continue with ,business as usual' as far as their communication activities are concerned. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Psychology of Enfranchisement: Engaging and Fostering Inclusion of Members through Voting and Decision-Making ProceduresJOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, Issue 3 2008Celia M. Gonzalez Democratic systems have many advantages. They elicit perceptions of appropriateness and legitimacy, they engage the psychological investment and commitment of those participating in the system and invite the voluntary cooperation of these persons. We argue that these advantages are conferred in large part through two features of democratic institutions and societies: the participative nature of procedures used to elect leaders, and the fairness of decision-making procedures used by these leaders once in power. In particular, we emphasize the capacity of these procedures to engage community members and foster their inclusion, because they convey that members' concerns are taken seriously and that they are valued by the group that developed and employed those procedures, as well as by the leaders that utilize them. Implications for creating a sense of social inclusion in members of the population, and for encouraging public confidence among those who feel marginalized, in climates of distrust, and during times of crisis are discussed. [source] Reflections and findings on the critical citizen: Civic education , What for?EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2008BRIGITTE GEISSEL This article focuses on the question of whether satisfied and supportive citizens or critical citizens have attitudes that promote democracy. The discussion of this question is based on empirical results from a survey of German citizens (N = 2,000), applying bivariate and multivariate methods. Political criticism is measured by indicators of dissatisfaction, attentiveness and system preference; five types of citizens are constructed: satisfied-attentive, satisfied-inattentive, dissatisfied-attentive, dissatisfied-inattentive citizens with a preference for a democratic system, and one type preferring nondemocratic systems. The article examines which of these types are more consistent with the ,ideal citizen', defined as a citizen who participates, is well-informed, identifies with democracy and politics, has good internal efficacy and is willing to defend democracy. The data show that attentive citizens are more likely to promote democracy than inattentive ones. Attentive citizens are politically more knowledgeable, identify more strongly with the democratic system, feel more politically competent and are more willing to defend democracy. Political satisfaction or dissatisfaction has less of an influence on these dispositions. [source] Defending democracy: Reactions to political extremism in inter,war EuropeEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2001GIOVANNI CAPOCCIA While the strategies of political actors and institutions have been largely analyzed with reference to cases of democratic breakdown, democratic survival has often been viewed as a consequence of socio,economic and cultural ,preconditions'. The analysis of successful reactions to strong extremist challenges in three cases of democratic survival (Czechoslovakia, Finland and Belgium in the inter,war period) against the background of two cases of breakdown in the same historical context (Italy and the Weimar Republic) is a useful complement to this view. The analysis of the selected cases shows how a stable coalition of democratic forces can effectively protect the democratic system from dangerous extremist attacks by pursuing both repressive and inclusive strategies. [source] Positively negative: the impact of negativity upon the political consumerINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING, Issue 4 2008Jenny LloydArticle first published online: 15 OCT 200 For years there has been an ongoing debate as to the role and impact that ,marketing' has had on politics. Yet, it is the case that many of the concepts associated with the field of marketing have real relevance and have, in fact, been employed within the field of political campaigning for many decades. This is an empirical paper that focuses upon the concept of political brands and the impact that current trends in campaign strategy, and in particular the growth and continued use of negative campaigning, have upon them. Using a constructivist grounded theory approach, the implications associated with such activity are examined and, in particular, its effect upon the consumer/brand relationship. Within the consideration of the results, it becomes clear that political brands' use of negative campaigning is somewhat shortsighted; offering short-term gains but at the cost of long-term damage not only to their brand image but also to the wider democratic system as it stands. In a search for political ,brands' that more effectively meet their needs, there appears a tendency for political consumers to now look outside of the conventional political sector. The emergent concept of the ,negative brand' is explored together with the implications for political consumers, political brands and the wider field of conventional party politics. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Too much of a good thing: the ,problem' of political communications in a mass media democracyJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2007Ivor Gaber Francis Fukuyama asks: ,,,is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?' This paper argues that one of these ,internal contradictions' is the political communications process and it can be sufficiently serious to undermine the democratic system,but such an undermining is not inevitable. The problem can be described as follows: Democratic systems require that citizens are kept fully informed by governments (and others) in the interests of transparency and ultimately accountability. Hence, all political communications have, as their final objective, the accountability of politicians at the ballot box. Thus all political communications have what can be described as ,above' and ,below' the line content. The above-the-line is the actual content of the message, the below-the-line is the implicit one of ,think better of me and my colleagues think worse of my opponents'. Consequently, no matter how personally honest and open an individual politician might be, the democratic system requires her or him to be always thinking about securing a successful result at the ballot box. Thus we have the ,political communications paradox'. Voters want politicians to be honest and accountable but this very demand means that politicians, implicitly, always have to have another agenda in operation when they are communicating with the public, i.e. securing their approval and then their support. As a result the trust which is a fundamental to the workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. This has two effects. First, that governments are obliged to make communications, rather than delivery, their real priority and second trust, not just in politicians but in the political system as a whole, tends to wane over time, which in turn endangers the very system it was designed to underpin. But this decline is not inevitable because the system has some in-built self-correcting mechanisms These include: the rise of new parties and/or leaders who portray themselves as ,new' and ,untainted',New Labour, New Conservatives, etc., an almost regular ,re-balancing' of the power relationship that exists between politicians and the civil service, particularly in the communications field, the rise of new forms of communication that seek to by-pass the institutional roadblocks that are perceived as being the cause of the problems and finally increased attention by journalists and academics to the process of political communications makes it more difficult for politicians to continue with ,business as usual' as far as their communication activities are concerned. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Political Parties in South Korea and Taiwan after Twenty Years of Democratization*PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2009Heike Hermanns South Korea and Taiwan are often cited as successful cases of third-wave democracies where democracy has taken roots. However, electoral volatility is high and disenchantment among citizens is rising, especially regarding the performance of politicians and political parties. Since political parties play a vital role in the democratic process their institutionalization is seen as an indicator of democratic consolidation. An analysis of Taiwanese and South Korean parties in terms of age, organization and structure, as well as programs and leadership style of parties indicates that parties are weakly institutionalized. The Korean party system is a weak point in democratic deepening, as it is reminiscent of a carousel of party creations, mergers and dissolutions. Parties lack distinguishing ideological or programmatic markers and remain cadre parties, focusing on their charismatic leader and their home regions. In Taiwan, in contrast, a clear cleavage in the form of Taiwanese identity led to the appearance of two distinct political camps, each consisting of several parties. Taiwanese parties have progressed in their institutionalization in terms of longevity, organization and programmatic differences. However, membership numbers and party identification remain low and regular corruption scandals show the slow attitudinal change among Taiwanese politicians. In the light of politicians' behavior, citizens in both countries thus are feeling increasingly disenchanted with the ruling elite as well as the democratic system. [source] Losing the voters' trust: evaluations of the political system and voting at the 1997 British general electionBRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2001Charles Pattie Questions of standards in public life came to the fore of British politics during the 1992,1997 parliament. Concerns were expressed over the probity of individual politicians and of political parties and worries extended to the health of the British system of government as a whole. Underlying these news stories, however, were wider issues concerning attitudes towards government. Furthermore, these concerns about standards were also extensively reported during the 1997 election campaign, and were widely held, in popular accounts, to have played a part in the Conservative government's dramatic defeat. But, surprisingly, few academic analyses have tried to gauge either the extent of public concerns in 1997, or whether they really had an impact on party support. More generally, recent political science interest has focused on fears of declining public trust in the democratic system, throughout the western world. This article explores British voters' trust in their polity. [source] Five Ways of Institutionalizing Political Opposition: Lessons from the Advanced DemocraciesGOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 1 2004Ludger Helms ABSTRACT Legitimate political opposition constitutes a key component of any form of liberal democracy, which has, however, received surprisingly scant attention in the more recent political science literature. In an attempt to revitalize the debate about the various forms of political opposition, this paper starts with distinguishing five different ways or models of institutionalizing political opposition in liberal democratic systems. It goes on to look at how these different models have worked in the constitutional practice of selected western democracies. In the second part of this article, the focus is on the possible lessons that constitution-makers in democratizing countries could draw from this experience. Whereas there is no best model of opposition in general, some models would seem to be better suited to meet the particular needs of new democracies than others. [source] Challenging the Democratic Peace?PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2008Historical Memory, South Korea, the Security Relationship between Japan The logic of the democratic peace suggests that as two democracies, Japan and South Korea should not have militarized conflicts between them, while mutual recognition of their democratic systems should have a corresponding mutual reassurance effect. On the other hand, historical memories of Japan's colonialization of Korea provide a basis for Koreans to mistrust Japan's disposition, if not its intentions. This article considers whether the 2006 Japanese,Korean dispute over maritime exploration near the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima was a militarized dispute, and whether Japan's status as a democracy has been sufficient to reassure South Korea that Japan does not pose a military threat. The results of this case study will shed light on the question of whether, and if so under what conditions, historically rooted mistrust might trump the causal variables underpinning the democratic peace. [source] Strengthening democratic governance of the security sector in conflict-affected countries,PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 1 2005Nicole Ball Security for people, communities and states is essential for sustainable development, democratisation and conflict mitigation. Politicised, badly managed or ineffective security bodies and justice systems often create instability and insecurity, largely due to the lack of effective democratic systems. Strengthening democratic security-sector governance after conflict presents enormous challenges, particularly: (1) developing and implementing a legal framework consistent with international law and democratic practice; (2) developing effective, well-functioning civil management and oversight bodies; (3) developing viable, accountable and affordable security forces; (4) ensuring that the institutional culture of the security forces supports the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice and civil management and oversight bodies. Addressing these challenges requires professional security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional approaches. Reform activities should be guided by local ownership, sensitivity to the politics of reform, local capacity, local context and a comprehensive sector-wide framework. Local stakeholders must make hard decisions about priorities on the availability of domestic resources available and the costs and benefits of accepting external assistance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Regulation lite: The rise of emissions tradingREGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2008Robert Baldwin Abstract Emissions trading is the governmentally promoted hope for a sustainable world. In different contexts, trading regimes display varying potential , both in absolute terms and in comparison with other regulatory instruments. Emissions trading, however, is a device that raises urgent issues regarding its objectives, cost-effectiveness, fairness, transparency, and legitimacy. Its use places emphasis on its "acceptability" and the virtues of regulation that is "lite" because it is non-threatening to the most powerful interests. Emissions trading is resonant with assumptions that are highly contentious , notably that it is acceptable because it involves no losers, or because, in desperate global circumstances, we have no choice but to use it. There is a need to confront the difficult issues presented by emissions trading and to face the challenges of combining "market" and "democratic" systems of legitimization. It is also necessary to avoid taking refuge in all too comfortable beliefs in cumulative checks and balances. [source] The Role of Individual Characteristics in Predicting the Stability of Party Identification: A Cross-Cultural StudyAPPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 3 2008Maria-Magdalena Farc The present study examined political partisanship stability in the context of transitional and consolidated democracies. We hypothesised that (a) in both democratic systems, personality differences as well as socialisation patterns and socioeconomic factors would be related to the stability of party identification directly, and that (b) the relationship between individual factors and party identification patterns would be moderated by democracy type and by socialisation strength. A total of 521 participants (293 American, 228 Romanian) completed surveys assessing partisanship stability, individual dispositions, socialisation strength, and socioeconomic status. In support of hypothesis (a), the stability of party identification was significantly predicted by socialisation, desire for control, and positive economic perceptions. In support of hypothesis (b), type of democracy moderated the relationship between economic perceptions and partisanship stability, and parental socialisation moderated the relationship between desire for control/self-consciousness and the stability of party identification. La présente étude examine la stabilité de la préférence politique dans un contexte de démocraties en transition ou consolidées. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que (a) dans les deux systèmes démocratiques, les différences de personnalité, comme les modèles de socialisation et les facteurs économiques sont directement liés à la stabilité d'identification à un parti et que (b) la relation entre les facteurs individuels et les modèles d'identification à un parti est affaibli par le type de démocratie et la force de la socialisation. Un total de 521 participants (293 Américains et 228 Roumains) ont répondu à une enquête évaluant la stabilité de la préférence, les dispositions individuelles, la force de la socialisation et le statut socio-économique. En accord avec l'hypothèse (a), la stabilité d'identification à un parti est significativement prédictible par la socialisation, le désir de contrôle et la perception positive de l'économie. En accord avec l'hypothèse (b), d'une part, le type de démocratie affaiblit la relation entre les perceptions de l'économie et la stabilité de la préférence, d'autre part, la socialisation parentale affaiblit le lien entre le contrôle/la conscience de soi et la stabilité de l'identification à un parti. [source] Peasants and the Process of Building Democratic Polities: Lessons from San MarinoAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND HISTORY, Issue 2 2003Ulf Sundhaussen This essay challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy must be built upon the foundation of an established middle class, a belief forthrightly asserted in Barrington Moore's resolute dictum of "no bourgeois, no democracy". Taking a lead from Aristotle who thought peasants to be the best social group on which to build a political order that would preserve liberty, I consider the hypothesis that peasants can construct democratic systems of government. The little-known little country of San Marino provides a case study. Its long history serves to demonstrate that the driving force behind the establishment of democracy need not be an educated and wealthy middle class but that a poor and uneducated peasantry can provide this impetus. This is a finding that calls into question the very formula that Western governments, scholars and institutions such as the IMF and World Bank routinely prescribe for Third World countries. [source] The Dilemma of Developing Financial Accountability without Election , A Study of China's Recent Budget ReformsAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 2009Jun Ma Until recently, the discussion on political accountability focused on accountability in democratic systems with free and regular elections. Using China as a case study, this article contends that there exists a possibility of financial accountability without election. However, as election serves the important function of potentially changing the chain of accountability, the route of creating financial accountability without election has its limitations. [source] | ||||||||||||||||