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Democratic Peace (democratic + peace)
Selected AbstractsDoes the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace?INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2006Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict A democratic leader, anticipating a "rally ,round the flag effect," may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Immanuel Kant's prescription for "perpetual peace." We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921,2001, using both directed and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the democratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful democracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Although economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant's hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced. [source] Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill ClintonINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006MARK SCHAFER Do the beliefs of leaders make a significant difference in determining if democracies are peaceful and explaining why democracies (almost) never fight one another? Our comparisons of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton reveal that both leaders view democracies as more friendly than nondemocracies, and they have significantly less cooperative beliefs toward the latter than toward the former, a difference that extends to the behavior of their respective governments during the Kosovo conflict. We also find that individual differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter in the management of conflict with nondemocracies; the leaders exhibit opposite leadership styles and behavior associated with the domestic political culture of the two states. Overall, these results support the dyadic version of the democratic peace and suggest that the conflict behavior of democratic states depends upon the beliefs and calculations of their leaders in dealing with nondemocracies. [source] The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and EvidenceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2003Michael Mousseau Drawing on literature from Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange within a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations. The theory accommodates old facts and yields a large number of new and testable ones, including the fact that the peace among democracies is limited to market-oriented states, and that market democracies,but not the other democracies,perceive common interests. Previous research confirms the first hypothesis; examination herein of UN roll call votes confirms the latter: the market democracies agree on global issues. The theory and evidence demonstrate that (a) the peace among democratic states may be a function of common interests derived from common economic structure; (b) all of the empirical research into the democratic peace is underspecified, as no study has considered an interaction of democracy with economic structure; (c) interests can be treated endogenously in social research; and (d) several of the premier puzzles in global politics are causally related,including the peace among democracies and the association of democratic stability and liberal political culture with market-oriented economic development. [source] Preferences and the Democratic PeaceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2000Erik Gartzke A debate exists over whether (and to what degree) the democratic peace is explained by joint democracy or by a lack of motives for conflict between states that happen to be democratic. Gartzke (1998) applies expected utility theory to the democratic peace and shows that an index of states' preference similarity based on United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes (affinity) accounts for much of the lack of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies. Oneal and Russett (1997b, 1998, 1999) respond by arguing that UN voting is itself a function of regime type,that democracy ,causes'affinity. Oneal and Russett seek to demonstrate their thesis by regressing affinity on democracy and other variables from a standard model of the democratic peace. I replicate results reported by Oneal and Russett and then extend the analysis in several ways. I find that the residuals from Oneal and Russett's regression of affinity remain highly significant as a predictor of the absence of MIDs. Further, significance for democracy is shown to be fragile and subject to variable construction, model specification, and the choice of estimation procedure. [source] The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 1 2004Fred Chernoff This essay argues that the field of international relations has exhibited "progress" of the sort found in the natural sciences. Several well-known accounts of "science" and "progress" are adumbrated; four offer positive accounts of progress (those of Peirce, Duhem, Popper, and Lakatos) and one evidences a negative assessment (Kuhn). Recent studies of the democratic peace,both supporting and opposing,are analyzed to show that they satisfy the terms of each of the definitions of scientific progress. [source] Challenging the Democratic Peace?PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2008Historical Memory, South Korea, the Security Relationship between Japan The logic of the democratic peace suggests that as two democracies, Japan and South Korea should not have militarized conflicts between them, while mutual recognition of their democratic systems should have a corresponding mutual reassurance effect. On the other hand, historical memories of Japan's colonialization of Korea provide a basis for Koreans to mistrust Japan's disposition, if not its intentions. This article considers whether the 2006 Japanese,Korean dispute over maritime exploration near the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima was a militarized dispute, and whether Japan's status as a democracy has been sufficient to reassure South Korea that Japan does not pose a military threat. The results of this case study will shed light on the question of whether, and if so under what conditions, historically rooted mistrust might trump the causal variables underpinning the democratic peace. [source] Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations TheoryINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009Patrick Thaddeus Jackson American scholars routinely characterize the study of international relations as divided between various Kuhnian "paradigms" or Lakatosian "research programmes." Although most international relations scholars have abandoned Kuhn's account of scientific continuity and change, many utilize Lakatosian criteria to assess the "progressive" or "degenerative" character of various theories and approaches in the field. We argue that neither specific areas of inquiry (such as the "democratic peace") nor broader approaches to world politics (such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism) deserve the label of "paradigms" or "research programmes." As an alternative, we propose mapping the field through Weberian techniques of ideal-typification. [source] Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace?INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2006Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict A democratic leader, anticipating a "rally ,round the flag effect," may have an incentive to divert attention from domestic economic problems by becoming involved in military conflict abroad, undermining Immanuel Kant's prescription for "perpetual peace." We assess the risk to the democratic peace by evaluating this diversionary incentive within a general dyadic model of interstate conflict, 1921,2001, using both directed and nondirected analyses. Our results indicate that economic conditions do affect the likelihood that a democracy, but not an autocracy, will initiate a fatal militarized dispute, even against another democracy. Economic growth rates sufficiently low to negate the democratic peace are, however, rare; and the behavior of five powerful democracies raises further doubts about the importance of diversions. We find no significant evidence that a bad economy makes a democratic state less likely to be targeted by others, nor does the timing of legislative elections influence the decision of democratic leaders to use force. Although economic conditions affect the likelihood of a fatal dispute for democracies, the influence is sufficiently small that Kant's hope for a more peaceful world does not seem misplaced. [source] Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill ClintonINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006MARK SCHAFER Do the beliefs of leaders make a significant difference in determining if democracies are peaceful and explaining why democracies (almost) never fight one another? Our comparisons of Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton reveal that both leaders view democracies as more friendly than nondemocracies, and they have significantly less cooperative beliefs toward the latter than toward the former, a difference that extends to the behavior of their respective governments during the Kosovo conflict. We also find that individual differences in the operational codes of the two leaders matter in the management of conflict with nondemocracies; the leaders exhibit opposite leadership styles and behavior associated with the domestic political culture of the two states. Overall, these results support the dyadic version of the democratic peace and suggest that the conflict behavior of democratic states depends upon the beliefs and calculations of their leaders in dealing with nondemocracies. [source] Machiavelli's Legacy: Domestic Politics and International ConflictINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2005David Sobek Research examining the effect of regime type on conflict has focused on the democracy/autocracy continuum expounded in the political philosophies of liberal thinkers such as Kant and Schumpeter. While this concentration has yielded impressive results (democratic peace), it seems plausible that other conceptions of regime type may yield similar success. This paper examines the philosophy of Machiavelli and develops a measure of his "imperial regimes." These states, which can either be democratic or autocratic, should exhibit an increased propensity to initiate international conflict. Testing this contention in Renaissance Italy (1250,1494) and the modern international system (1920,1992), this paper finds strong empirical support. Machiavelli's views illuminate key differences between democracies and autocracies that have been previously overlooked. Thus, it deepens rather than replaces our conception of how domestic institutions affect international conflict. [source] The Nexus of Market Society, Liberal Preferences, and Democratic Peace: Interdisciplinary Theory and EvidenceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2003Michael Mousseau Drawing on literature from Anthropology, Economics, Political Science and Sociology, an interdisciplinary theory is presented that links the rise of contractual forms of exchange within a society with the proliferation of liberal values, democratic legitimacy, and peace among democratic nations. The theory accommodates old facts and yields a large number of new and testable ones, including the fact that the peace among democracies is limited to market-oriented states, and that market democracies,but not the other democracies,perceive common interests. Previous research confirms the first hypothesis; examination herein of UN roll call votes confirms the latter: the market democracies agree on global issues. The theory and evidence demonstrate that (a) the peace among democratic states may be a function of common interests derived from common economic structure; (b) all of the empirical research into the democratic peace is underspecified, as no study has considered an interaction of democracy with economic structure; (c) interests can be treated endogenously in social research; and (d) several of the premier puzzles in global politics are causally related,including the peace among democracies and the association of democratic stability and liberal political culture with market-oriented economic development. [source] Preferences and the Democratic PeaceINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2000Erik Gartzke A debate exists over whether (and to what degree) the democratic peace is explained by joint democracy or by a lack of motives for conflict between states that happen to be democratic. Gartzke (1998) applies expected utility theory to the democratic peace and shows that an index of states' preference similarity based on United Nations General Assembly roll-call votes (affinity) accounts for much of the lack of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between democracies. Oneal and Russett (1997b, 1998, 1999) respond by arguing that UN voting is itself a function of regime type,that democracy ,causes'affinity. Oneal and Russett seek to demonstrate their thesis by regressing affinity on democracy and other variables from a standard model of the democratic peace. I replicate results reported by Oneal and Russett and then extend the analysis in several ways. I find that the residuals from Oneal and Russett's regression of affinity remain highly significant as a predictor of the absence of MIDs. Further, significance for democracy is shown to be fragile and subject to variable construction, model specification, and the choice of estimation procedure. [source] The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine's Cosmopolitanism and International RelationsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2000Thomas C. Walker The recent questions about the viability of political realism highlight a need for alternative theoretical frameworks to guide international relations research. These alternatives, however, have been slow to emerge, due in part to the field's traditional neglect of political theory. In this essay I present an alternative based on a survey of Paine's international thought. Sir Michael Howard referred to Paine as the most important internationalist writer of all time, but his contributions have been largely ignored by students of international relations. Paine was a classic second image theorist who first posited how democratic governance would promote a peaceful world. Paine's works leave us with all the features of cosmopolitan thinking in international relations: Faith in reason and progress, the evils of authoritarian regimes, the democratic peace, the peaceful effect of trade, nonprovocative defense policies, open diplomacy, obsolescence of conquest, the universal respect for human rights, and the democratic propensity to engage in messianic interventionism. I conclude with a comparison of Kant and Paine where I argue that Paine is the more faithful representative of the Enlightenment for students of international relations. [source] The Public and Peace: The Consequences for Citizenship of the Democratic Peace LiteratureINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 2 2006GORDON P. HENDERSON As policymakers are increasingly tempted to act on the apparent pacifying virtues of democratization, some scholars struggle to give them reliable reasons for why it occurs while others warn of the dangers of acting on empirical regularities whose nature and cause are not fully understood. This essay undertakes a review of the democratic peace literature in order to document its largely implicit, but sometimes explicit, conceptualizations of the role of democratic citizens in achieving or frustrating the democratic peace. Because citizenship is a distinctive and defining characteristic of democracy, it may well, and perhaps ought to, be the main source of explanation for the democratic peace. The essay begins by showing that the Enlightenment social contract tradition (for example, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant) is oriented toward the achievement of domestic and international peace and that the parties to the contract,the citizens,are responsible for desiring, achieving, and maintaining peace. The essay then proceeds to categorize and review the democratic peace literature according to the degree of support found for this proposition and the role of citizens in achieving or obstructing peace. [source] Can a Global Peace Last Even If Achieved?INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 3 2005Huntington, the Democratic Peace Current events have surfaced new challenges in the international state system. These are alternatively characterized as state versus substate conflicts, religious conflicts or the outgrowth of the rise in fundamentalism, class struggle between the West and the Third World resulting from globalization, and the lack of democratic government in those states that breed terrorists. Whereas religious conflict is difficult to fix if true and globalization hard to stop, the democratic peace offers promise because changing the form of government is a conceivable goal. But would it help? Samuel Huntington provides an interesting, if unintended, challenge to the democratic peace in both The Third Wave and The Clash of Civilizations. If democracy is reversible under some circumstances, can it really lead to a lasting peace? If there are cultural divisions in the world, are these necessarily united by polity? If racism is real, does polity really eliminate it? Based on Huntington, the democratic peace falters. [source] The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Relations,INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 1 2004Fred Chernoff This essay argues that the field of international relations has exhibited "progress" of the sort found in the natural sciences. Several well-known accounts of "science" and "progress" are adumbrated; four offer positive accounts of progress (those of Peirce, Duhem, Popper, and Lakatos) and one evidences a negative assessment (Kuhn). Recent studies of the democratic peace,both supporting and opposing,are analyzed to show that they satisfy the terms of each of the definitions of scientific progress. [source] 2.,The Democratic Peace Myth: From Hiroshima to BaghdadAMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY, Issue 1 2009Andrew Fiala This paper examines the ideal of the democratic peace and the recent misuse of this ideal in the war on terrorism. It argues against the idea that aggressive military force can be employed to bring about the ideal of the democratic peace. By looking at John Stuart Mill's utilitarian justification of benevolent despotism for "barbarians," it examines how idealism can lead to a defense of aggressive intervention. And it considers how idealistic zeal can lead to violations of just war principles, as in the case of Hiroshima. It concludes by arguing that Kant's deontological approach is better. Kant provides us with a reason to hope that as democracy spreads, peace will spread as well. But Kant also prohibits us from using force to actualize this ideal. [source] Challenging the Democratic Peace?PACIFIC FOCUS, Issue 2 2008Historical Memory, South Korea, the Security Relationship between Japan The logic of the democratic peace suggests that as two democracies, Japan and South Korea should not have militarized conflicts between them, while mutual recognition of their democratic systems should have a corresponding mutual reassurance effect. On the other hand, historical memories of Japan's colonialization of Korea provide a basis for Koreans to mistrust Japan's disposition, if not its intentions. This article considers whether the 2006 Japanese,Korean dispute over maritime exploration near the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima was a militarized dispute, and whether Japan's status as a democracy has been sufficient to reassure South Korea that Japan does not pose a military threat. The results of this case study will shed light on the question of whether, and if so under what conditions, historically rooted mistrust might trump the causal variables underpinning the democratic peace. [source] "Perpetual Peace": A Project by Europeans for Europeans?PEACE & CHANGE, Issue 3 2008ref Aksu Immanuel Kant's classic essay Perpetual Peace has famously informed much of the neoliberal "democratic peace" scholarship in International Relations over the past few decades. It has also influenced contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism and global governance. We need to realize, however, that Kant's essay is only one representative of the eighteenth-century European thought on perpetual peace. Several other writers have produced their own versions of the perpetual peace ideal. This article surveys some notable eighteenth-century perpetual peace proposals from a specific perspective: it seeks to find out the attitude of these various proposals toward non-European peoples. It asks, in other words, whether and to what extent non-Europeans were "included" in the eighteenth-century European visions of a perpetual peace. [source] Attachment to the Nation and International Relations: Dimensions of Identity and Their Relationship to War and PeacePOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 5 2009Richard K. Herrmann Since the rise of mass politics, the role national identities play in international relations has been debated. Do they produce a popular reservoir easily tapped for war or bestow dignity thereby fostering cooperation and a democratic peace? The evidence for either perspective is thin, beset by different conceptions of identity and few efforts to identify its effects independent of situational factors. Using data drawn from new national surveys in Italy and the United States, we advance a three-dimensional conception of national identity, theoretically connecting the dimensions to conflictive and cooperative dispositions as well as to decisions to cooperate with the United Nations in containing Iran's nuclear proliferation and Sudan's humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Attachment to the nation in Italy and the United States is found to associate with less support for militarist options and more support for international cooperation as liberal nationalists expect. This depends, however, on containing culturally exclusive conceptions of the nation and chauvinism. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||