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Democratic Institutions (democratic + institution)
Selected AbstractsReconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana FallacyFOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2006CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE Attempts to reconstruct weak and failed countries suffer from a nirvana fallacy. Where central governments are absent or dysfunctional, it is assumed that reconstruction efforts by foreign governments generate a preferable outcome. This assumption overlooks (1) the possibility that foreign government interventions can fail, (2) the possibility that reconstruction efforts can do more harm than good, and (3) the possibility that indigenous governance mechanisms may evolve that are more effective than those imposed by military occupiers. It is argued that reconstruction efforts focus on resolving the meta-level game of creating self-sustaining liberal democratic institutions while neglecting the nested games embedded within the general meta-game. An analysis of Somalia, a prototypical failed state, is provided to illuminate these claims. While Somalia lacks a central government, the private sector has developed coping mechanisms to fill the void. These mechanisms have proven to be more effective in generating widespread order than attempts by foreign occupiers to impose a self-sustaining liberal state. [source] State Building and Transitional Politics in Iraq: The Perils of a Top-down TransitionINTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 3 2007Katia Papagianni This article examines Iraq's transitional politics from June 2003 to the Constitutional Referendum of October 2005. It argues that the top-down political transition led by the United States and a narrow group of Iraqi elites was inappropriate for the task of reforming the Iraqi state and building democratic institutions. The article argues that, in countries going through regime change while also radically reforming the state, inclusive transitional institutions and consultative processes contribute to agreements being reached about the future of the state. Such transitions allow actors to guarantee the continued participation of opponents in the political process and to gradually develop agreements on constitutional questions. This did not occur in Iraq. An inclusive political process and a national debate on the country's future did not occur. Rather, a narrow group of political elites led the transitional process in the absence of wide consultations. The article argues that the management of Iraq's transition had an independent impact on the outcome of the transition, namely the failure to reach agreement on the sharing of political and economic power within one state by October 2005. [source] Preventive War and Democratic PoliticsINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2008Chicago, Presidential Address to the International Studies Association March I define the concept of preventive war, distinguish it from preemption and other sources of better-now-than-later logic, and examine numerous conceptual issues that confound theoretical and empirical analyses of prevention. I then consider the argument that democracies rarely if ever adopt preventive war strategies because such strategies are contrary to the preferences of democratic publics and to the values and identities of democratic states. I examine a number of historical cases of anticipated power shifts by democratic states, and analyze the motivations for war and the mobilization of public support for war. The evidence contradicts both the descriptive proposition that democracies do not adopt preventive war strategies and causal propositions about the constraining effects of democratic institutions and democratic political cultures. [source] Forging Democracy at GunpointINTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2006JEFFREY PICKERING Can liberal interventionism build liberal democracy? This manuscript examines the military interventions undertaken by the U.S., U.K., France, and the UN in the post-World War II era to see if they had a positive impact on democracy in target countries. Empirical analysis centers on multivariate time series, cross section PCSE and relogit regressions of political liberalization and democratization from 1946 to 1996. The former is operationalized with annual difference data drawn from the Polity IV data collection, whereas the latter is a binary variable denoting countries that cross a threshold commonly used to indicate the establishment of democratic institutions. An updated version of the International Military Intervention data set enumerates foreign military interventions. We find little evidence that military intervention by liberal states helps to foster democracy in target countries. Although a few states have democratized in the wake of hostile U.S. military interventions, the small number of cases involved makes it difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from the U.S. record. We find stronger evidence, however, that supportive interventions by the UN's "Blue Helmets" can help to democratize target states. [source] Assessing Democracy in a Contested PolityJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2001Christopher Lord After reviewing difficulties with the literature on the democratic deficit, this article concludes that a method is needed for assessing democracy in a political system where there is fundamental agreement on what would constitute adequately democratic institutions. It then goes on to explore two suggestions for such a method: the development of well-specified indicators of democratic performance for contrasting ideal-types of Euro-democracy; and the attribution of self- and peer assessments to institutional actors with competing perspectives on democratic standards in the EU. [source] The West Wing as Endorsement of the U.S. Presidency: Expanding the Bounds of Priming in Political CommunicationJOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, Issue 3 2003R. Lance Holbert This study uses priming as a theoretical basis from which to investigate potential effects of NBC's The West Wing on individual-level perceptions of the U.S. presidency. As a result, this work extends political communication-based priming research to entertainment television content. Josiah Bartlet, the fictional president portrayed on the show, is generally perceived more positively by viewers than either the Republican President George W. Bush or Democrat William Jefferson Clinton. Perceptions of the importance of being engaging to presidential success rose as a result of watching the program, and The West Wing viewers retained more positive images of Bush and Clinton after the viewing experience. Viewing The West Wing seems to prime more positive images of the U.S. presidency that subsequently influence individual-level perceptions of those individuals most directly associated with this office. The authors make theoretical connections to previous work on role display and trust in democratic institutions. [source] In the twilight of democracy: public affairs consultants in SwitzerlandJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2009Adrian Steiner Modernization processes within different fields of political communication rise new challenges. Public affairs consultants are said to meet these challenges in both an effective and efficient way. Nevertheless, the rise of public affairs consultants also poses the question of their accordance with basic principles of modern democracy. Do public affairs consultants foster or impede the democratic process with respect to participation and representation? This question is answered on the basis of empirical data on public affairs consultants in Switzerland. The analysis points out three distinguishable fields of service: lobbying, political public relations and campaigning. Whereas campaigning has the strongest public-orientation and emphasizes direct democratic institutions, the other two fields tend to be more in the backstage of the public. Results regarding public affairs services suggest a structural discrepancy between public and non-public forms of communication, which according to normative democracy theory has to be judged critically. With view to clients, policy fields and party affiliations, the results show strong imbalances in interest representation, which seem to have mainly structural and economic reasons. In the conclusion, these results are discussed with view to the necessity of more transparency and a further professionalization. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Psychology of Enfranchisement: Engaging and Fostering Inclusion of Members through Voting and Decision-Making ProceduresJOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, Issue 3 2008Celia M. Gonzalez Democratic systems have many advantages. They elicit perceptions of appropriateness and legitimacy, they engage the psychological investment and commitment of those participating in the system and invite the voluntary cooperation of these persons. We argue that these advantages are conferred in large part through two features of democratic institutions and societies: the participative nature of procedures used to elect leaders, and the fairness of decision-making procedures used by these leaders once in power. In particular, we emphasize the capacity of these procedures to engage community members and foster their inclusion, because they convey that members' concerns are taken seriously and that they are valued by the group that developed and employed those procedures, as well as by the leaders that utilize them. Implications for creating a sense of social inclusion in members of the population, and for encouraging public confidence among those who feel marginalized, in climates of distrust, and during times of crisis are discussed. [source] Strong Societies, Wed Parties: Regime Change in Cuba and Venzula in the 1950s and TodayLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2001Jauier Cowales ABSTRACT The literature on the origins of democratic institutions is split between bottom-up and top-down approaches. The former emphasize societal factors that press for democracy; the latter, rules and institutions that shape elites' incentives. Can these approaches be reconciled? This article proposes competitive political parties, more so than degrees of modernization and associationalism, as the link between the two. Competitive political parties enhance society's bargaining power with the state and show dominant elites that liberalization is in their best interest; the parties are thus effective conduits of democracy. In the context of party deficit, the prospects for democratization or redemocratization are slim. This is illustrated by comparing Cuba and Venezuela in the 1950s and 1330s. [source] Legal Weapons for the Weak?LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Issue 4 2001Democratizing the Force of Words in an Uncivil Society First Amendment absolutists and proponents of speech regulation are locked in a normative stalemate over the best way to diminish racial "hate speech." I argue that this stalemate can be overcome by considering a more expansive theory of the "force of words" and the risks the right of free speech entails for individuals. Drawing on a cultural theory of symbolic power, I discuss the merits and limitations of two recent texts which redefine hate speech as discriminatory conduct. As an alternative to this strategy, I develop an analytical framework for describing the social risks the right of free speech entails, and propose juridical and deliberative-democratic remedies that might redistribute and attenuate these risks. Cultural and legal theory can find common ground in the analysis of the undemocratic effects of symbolic power. Such common ground can be achieved if legal theorists consider the force of words as a problem for democracy and if cultural theorists consider the resources provided by democratic institutions and practices for the redistribution of the social risks of speech [source] Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish CaseLAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009Murat Tezcür Under what circumstances do courts act in ways that challenge the political hegemony of the military in countries with weak democratic institutions? This article addresses this question by focusing on a critical case of judicial activism in Turkey. It argues that lower courts unexpectedly can be centers of judicial activism that contributes to expansion of civil liberties and restrictions on arbitrary state power when the high judiciary supports the political status quo. This is because lower courts provide greater access to legal mobilization pursued by civil society actors. At the same time, judicial activism in lower courts is sustainable only when political power is distributed among elites with conflicting interests, and the civilian government offers support and protection to activist members of the judiciary. [source] Criminal justice, cultural justice: The limits of liberalism and the pragmatics of difference in the new south africaAMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Issue 2 2004John L. Comaroff ABSTRACT What are the limits of liberalism in accommodating the growing demands of difference? Can a Euromodernist nation-state, founded on One Law, infuse itself with another, with an African jurisprudence? And how is it to deal with cultural practices deemed "dangerous" by the canons of enlightenment reason? These questions are especially urgent in postcolonies like South Africa, with highly diverse populations whose traditional ways and means are accorded constitutional protection. Here we examine how South Africans are dealing with such "dangerous" practices in an era in which their nation is becoming ever more policultural; how, in the process, an Afromodernity is taking organic shape in the interstices between new democratic institutions and the kingdom of custom; how the confrontation between Culture, in the upper case, and a state founded on liberal universalism is beginning to reconfigure the political landscape of this postcolony,as it is, we argue, in many places across the planet. [source] Trust Your Compatriots, but Count Your Change: The Roles of Trust, Mistrust and Distrust in DemocracyPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 2 2008Patti Tamara Lenard Although trust is clearly central to human relations of all kinds, it is less clear whether there is a role for trust in democratic politics. In this article, I argue that trust is central to democratic institutions as well as to democratic political participation, and that arguments which make distrust the central element of democracy fail. First, I argue for the centrality of trust to the democratic process. The voluntary compliance that is central to democracies relies on trust, along two dimensions: citizens must trust their legislators to have the national interest in mind and citizens must trust each other to abide by democratically established laws. Second, I refute arguments that place distrust at the centre of democratic institutions. I argue, instead, that citizens must be vigilant with respect to their legislators and fellow citizens; that is, they must be willing to ensure that the institutions are working fairly and that people continue to abide by shared regulations. This vigilance , which is reflected both in a set of institutions as well as an active citizenry , is motivated by an attitude termed ,mistrust'. Mistrust is a cautious attitude that propels citizens to maintain a watchful eye on the political and social happenings within their communities. Moreover, mistrust depends on trust: we trust fellow citizens to monitor for abuses of our own rights and privileges just as we monitor for abuses of their rights and privileges. Finally, I argue that distrust is inimical to democracy. We are, consequently, right to worry about widespread reports of trust's decline. Just as distrust is harmful to human relations of all kinds, and just as trust is central to positive human relations of all kinds, so is distrust inimical to democracy and trust central to its flourishing. [source] Keeping them Honest: Public and Elite Perceptions of Ethical Conduct among Australian LegislatorsPOLITICAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2000Ian McAllister Public confidence in politicians across all democratic countries has fallen to historic lows in recent years. In Australia, around one in three voters believe that legislators use their public office for financial gain, and only one in four believe that legislators have a high moral code. Governments in many countries have attempted to deal with this problem by establishing codes of ethical conduct for legislators. This paper examines what standards citizens expect from their politicians and, in turn, what standards politicians themselves regard as important. The data come from the 1996 Australian Election Study survey which asked voters and elected representatives what importance they attributed to the eight principles laid out in the federal parliament's own ethical guide. The results show that voters expect higher standards from legislators than do legislators themselves, particularly with regard to the proper use of public resources and rejecting favouritism. A range of hypotheses are tested to account for citizen and elite beliefs about legislators' ethical conduct. The results show that stronger democratic culture and political skills are important for the public, and lengthy exposure to political parties and democratic institutions for the elite. [source] What Stops the Torture?AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 2 2010Courtenay Ryals Conrad States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93% chance of continuing to torture in the following year. What leads governments to stop,the use of torture? We focus on the principal,agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. We argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. These relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. Once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. Also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture. [source] Urban Ethnography's "Saloon Problem" and Its Challenge to Public SociologyCITY & COMMUNITY, Issue 2 2007Greggor Mattson This essay assesses the legacy of urban ethnography's (UE) early engagement with the "saloon problem." Early sociologists (1880,1915) intervened in the national debate on alcohol on the basis of their long-term, in-depth understanding of the urban poor. Ethnographers highlighted the role of the saloon as a haven for maintaining social ties while socializing immigrants to American norms. Instead of prohibition or temperance, sociologists advocated replacing the saloon's positive functions with more democratic institutions, especially an egalitarian domestic sphere. This position was shared by both academic and settlement house sociologists whose saloon investigations offer a coherent sociological research paradigm that antedates the Chicago School. The activism of early sociologists exemplifies the characteristics of Michael Burawoy's recent call for public sociology. Yet the early sociologists failed to redeem the saloon amongst Progressives, who increasingly rallied around the National Anti-Saloon League and constitutional Prohibition. By only investigating alcohol in its public manifestations, sociologists failed to challenge the way the social problem was framed and may even have contributed to the stigmatization of the saloon. This voyeuristic opportunism has plagued the American tradition of urban ethnography, the ineffective legacy of which poses a challenge to a contemporary revival of public sociology. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||