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Democratic Accountability (democratic + accountability)
Selected AbstractsProblems of Democratic Accountability in Network and Multilevel GovernanceEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2007Yannis Papadopoulos Such processes are usually analysed under the angle of their efficiency, while their impact on the quality of democracy is neglected. This article first defines the concepts of multilevel governance and accountability, and then identifies the various dimensions of the latter. It further argues that MLG generates novel forms of accountability, but undermines its democratic dimension mainly for the following reasons: the weak visibility of MLG networks, their selective composition and the prevalence of peer over public forms of accountability. [source] Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU AffairsEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2007Katrin Auel Such an evaluation, however, is flawed: Formal mandating rights are usually incompatible with the overall logic of parliamentary systems, which explains why most national parliaments make very little use of them. Even more importantly, it unduly reduces parliamentary functions to the legislative or policy-making function. Drawing on agency theory, it will instead be argued that the functions of public deliberation and of holding the government publicly to account are at least as important and therefore need to be included in a redefined concept of parliamentary strength. In particular, the article proposes a distinction between two different elements of accountability,monitoring and political scrutiny,which recognises parliamentary majority and opposition as two distinct agents of the electorate. [source] European Monetary Union: the dark sides of a major successECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 46 2006Charles Wyplosz SUMMARY European monetary union THE DARK SIDES OF A MAJOR SUCCESS This paper revisits the debates that have surrounded the launch of a unique experience: the adoption of a common currency among developed countries. A striking aspect of this history is that, pressed by what they correctly identified as a window of opportunity, policy-makers crafted this complex project in a short period of time, largely eschewing inputs from the academic profession. Academic research, in turn, developed its own views, which turned out to be critical of some ley orientations, yet it generally recognizes that, in the end, the launch of the euro has been a major success. Over time, many of the academic criticisms have been taken on board, but not yet fully. The monetary strategy has been slightly amended, but it remains the subject of disagreements between the European Central Bank and monetary economists. Events have confirmed that the Stability and Growth Pact was ill-designed; its reformulation goes some way to address some of the concerns but not all of them. Its ability to deliver fiscal discipline is in doubt. Another look at the experiment highlights the gap between the principles laid out by those who designed the monetary union and the pragmatism that has prevailed thereafter. The resulting tension between principles and actions sometimes obscures the fact that the Eurosystem has acted wisely so far. The widespread perception that monetary policy is not as transparent as it should be and suffers from a lack of adequate democratic accountability is not just annoying. The general public, including politicians, sometimes blames the Eurosystem for Europe's poor growth performance since the adoption of the euro. This is unfair and could dangerously undermine the monetary union if the Eurosystem were to become the scapegoat for the slow and incomplete reforms that are needed to revigorate the euro area's economies. , Charles Wyplosz [source] Was Mancur a Maoist?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2003An Essay on Kleptocracy, Political Stability Much of Mancur Olson's work explored the link between government structure and economic development. This paper provides a framework for thinking about this link that exposes both the powerful insights and the deep tensions in Olson's work. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson argued that instability was good for democratic accountability because it upset entrenched interests. In contrast, after the fall of the socialist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Olson argued that the stability of a single autocrat or "stationary bandit" was superior to the competitive rent seeking of competing "roving bandits." I argue that there is a real inconsistency in Olson's thinking on the role of stability and change in political life; I do this by developing the connections between Olson's classic Logic of Collective Action and his subsequent writing. The paper concludes by building on Olson's insights to point the way to a more complete analysis of democracy and transition. [source] New regionalism in five Swiss metropolitan areas: An assessment of inclusiveness, deliberation and democratic accountabilityEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2007DANIEL KÜBLER In the first, theoretical, part it draws upon the debate on old and new routes towards regionalism in order to identify four different types of metropolitan governance. It then develops two working hypotheses , an optimistic and a pessimistic one , in order to analyse the implications of various types of metropolitan governance on inclusiveness, modes of decision making and democratic accountability. In the second part, these hypotheses are tested on the basis of comparative case studies on twenty schemes of area-wide policy coordination in five Swiss metropolitan areas in the fields of water supply, public transport, social services for drug users and cultural amenities. The results suggest that ,governance' is superior to ,government' in terms of inclusiveness, that it cannot be seen as significantly linked to the fostering of deliberative decision making, and that it can present serious flaws in terms of accountability. It is noted, however, that a shift ,from government to governance' does not intrinsically imply democratic drawbacks. Contextual factors play a strong conditioning role. [source] Cooperative forms of governance: Problems of democratic accountability in complex environmentsEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2003YANNIS PAPADOPOULOS Various schools of research in public policy (the literature on ,governance' and its continental counterparts) are converging to focus on the growth of policy styles based on cooperation and partnership in networks, instead of on vertical control by the state. This article focuses on issues of democratic accountability and responsiveness with these governance arrangements. It argues that until recently the legitimacy of governance networks was not at the forefront of theoretical developments, even though the ,democratic deficit' of governance is problematic both for normative and for pragmatic reasons. There is now increased sensitivity to this problem, but the remedies presented in the literature are unsatisfactory, and critiques of governance presuppose a somewhat idealised image of representative democracy in terms of accountability or responsiveness of decision-makers. They also fail to offer adequate solutions to some of the central legitimacy problems of policy-making in complex societies. [source] Southern African social movements at the 2007 Nairobi World Social ForumGLOBAL NETWORKS, Issue 1 2009MILES LARMER Abstract How relevant is the anti-globalization movement to the ideas and activities of social movements seeking to achieve economic justice and greater democratic accountability in southern Africa? Case study research in four southern African countries (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Swaziland) indicates that, while aspects of the anti-globalization approach resonate with civil society and social movement actors (for example, an emphasis on mass participation and the internationalization of campaigning), the global social justice movement frequently displays the characteristics of globalization. These include: unaccountable decision-making; profound (yet largely unacknowledged) inequality of access to resources; and an imposed and uniform organizational form that fails to consider local conditions. The World Social Forum (WSF) held in Nairobi in January 2007 provided many southern African social movement actors with their first opportunity to participate in the global manifestation of the anti-globalization movement. The authors interviewed social movement activists across southern Africa before and during the Nairobi WSF about their experiences of the anti-globalization movement and the Social Forum. An assessment of the effectiveness of this participation leads to the conclusion that the WSF is severely limited in its capacity to provide an effective forum for these actors to express their grievances and aspirations. However, hosting national social forums, their precise form adapted to reflect widely varied conditions in southern African states that are affected by globalization in diverse ways, appears to provide an important new form of mobilization that draws on particular elements of anti-globalization praxis. [source] Defining Accountability Up: the Global Economic MultilateralsGOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 2 2004Miles Kahler Critics of the global economic multilaterals (GEMs) , the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization , allege that these organizations fail the test of democratic accountability. Two distinct measures of democratic accountability have been applied to the GEMs. To the degree that these organizations display ,accountability deficits', those deficiencies are the result of choices by the most influential national governments. Three techniques have been deployed to enhance the accountability of the GEMs: transparency (more information for those outside the institution), competition (imitation of democratic accountability) and changes in rules of representation (accountability to stakeholders rather than shareholders). Each of these may impose costs, however, and may conflict with other valued aims of the organizations. [source] Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory and Some EvidenceINTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger The first part of this paper outlines the concept of democratic accountability of central banks, and compares the legal accountability of the European Central Bank (ECB) with some other central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System). The second part presents a theory of central bank accountability. Two aspects of accountability are considered: transparency of actual monetary policy and the question of who bears final responsibility for monetary policy. The paper shows that accountability through transparency leads to a lower expected rate of inflation and less stabilization of supply shocks. Accountability through shifting final responsibility in the direction of the government leads to higher inflationary expectations and more stabilization of supply shocks. [source] The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-talesJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2000Jakob De Haan The European Central Bank (ECB) is widely considered to be (legally) independent. Buiter (1999) critizes the ECB for its lack of democratic accountability, which he does not define in a very precise way. Issing (1999) replies to some of the points raised by Buiter and argues that the ECB is both accountable and transparent. We first outline the concept of democratic accountability of central banks, before we comment on some of the disagreements between Buiter and Issing. Furthermore, we compare the legal accountability of the ECB with those of some other central banks (Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System). [source] THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY AND THE RHETORIC OF EXCESSJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 1 2007Jeffrey Stout ABSTRACT If militarism violates the ideals of liberty and justice in one way, and rapidly increasing social stratification violates them in another, then American democracy is in crisis. A culture of democratic accountability will survive only if citizens revive the concerns that animated the great reform movements of the past, from abolitionism to civil rights. It is crucial, when reasoning about practical matters, not only to admit how grave one's situation is, but also to resist despair. Therefore, the fate of democracy depends, to some significant degree, on how we choose to describe the crisis. Saying that we have already entered the new dark ages or a post-democratic era may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, because anyone who accepts this message is apt to give up on the hard work of organizing and contestation that is needed to hold political representatives accountable to the people. This paper asks how one might strike the right balance between accuracy and hope in describing the democracy's current troubles. After saying what I mean by democracy and what I think the current threats to it are, I respond to Romand Coles's criticisms of reservations I have expressed before about rhetorical excess in the works of Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty. This leads to a discussion of several points raised against me by Hauerwas. A digression offers some of my reasons for doubting that John Howard Yoder's biblical scholarship vindicates Hauerwas's version of pacifism. The paper concludes by arguing that Sheldon Wolin's work on the evisceration of democracy, though admirably accurate in its treatment of the dangers posed by empire and capital, abandons the project of democratic accountability too quickly in favor of the romance of the fugitive. [source] ,Order Out of Chaos': The Politics of Transitional JusticePOLITICS, Issue 3 2009Cillian McGrattan This article critically assesses the application of the ,transitional justice' model of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. The model addresses a number of important issues for societies emerging from violent conflict, including victims' rights and dealing with the past. This article claims that the model is founded upon highly contentious political assumptions that give rise to a problematic framing of the issues involved. The underlying implication is that by eschewing basic political analysis in favour of unexamined ideals concerning conflict transformation, the TJ approach belies its commitment to truth recovery, victims' rights and democratic accountability. [source] Secret Law and the Value of Publicity*RATIO JURIS, Issue 2 2009CHRISTOPHER KUTZ The dangers of secret law from the perspective of democratic accountability are clear, and need no elaboration. But distaste for secret law goes beyond questions of democracy. Since Plato, and continuing through such non-democratic thinkers as Bodin and Hobbes, secret law has been seen as a mark of tyranny, inconsistent with the notion of law itself. This raises both theoretical and practical questions. The theoretical questions involve the consistency of secret law with positivist legal theory. In principle, while a legal system as a whole could not be secret, publicity need not be part of the validity criteria for particular laws. The practical questions arise from the fact that secret laws, and secret governmental operations, are a common and often well-accepted aspect of governmental power. This paper argues that the flaw of secret law goes beyond accountability and beyond efficiency to the role that law plays, and can only play, in situating subjects' understanding of themselves in relation to the state. Secret law, as such, is inconsistent with this fundamental claim of the law to orient us in moral and political space, and undermines the claim to legitimacy of the state's rulers. [source] More than Writing on a Wall: Evaluating the Role that Codes of Ethics Play in Securing Accountability of Public Sector Decision-MakersAUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Issue 1 2007Niamh Kinchin This article argues that the essential factors of a public service code of ethics can be divided into five categories. These categories or principles are fairness, transparency, responsibility, efficiency and conflict of interest. These principles are identified in this article as being the basic elements of democratic accountability in relation to public sector decision-making. The issues explored are not only the obstacles that the public service decision-maker faces in internalising these principles but, also, the challenges for a pro-active management in fostering such internalisation. [source] The Problematic Relation between Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America: Evidence from the Bolivian CaseBULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH, Issue 1 2008ANITA BREUER During the wave of constitutional reforms, which started in the late 1980s, Institutions of Direct Democracy (IDD) have been incorporated into most Latin American constitutions, and over the past fifteen years, an increased use of these instruments by Latin American governments has been observed. This article deals with two questions related to this phenomenon: (1) what motivated the adoption and use of these institutions; and (2) what consequences can be expected with regard to democratic accountability in the region? To answer these questions, first, a classification of IDD is developed. In this, special attention is paid to the ability of the various types of IDD to introduce accountability into the representative structures of presidential systems. This classification is subsequently applied to analyse constitutional frameworks and direct democratic experience in the region. The findings suggest that the rise of IDD in Latin America was mainly induced by executive-legislative conflict and has done little to foster accountability. Finally, therefore, a detailed account of the specific constellation that led to the adoption of IDD in Bolivia is analysed in order to illustrate under which circumstances political actors choose to adopt and employ these tools. [source] The Andersen-Comsoc affair: Partnerships and the public interestCANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 3 2001David Whorley Thc business transformation project was intended to support the Ontario Works program and Ontario Disability Support program. The provincial auditor subsequently reviewed the project and identified a number of problems. This particular case illustrates some of the key issues associated with public-private partnerships in Ontario, and perhaps more generally. The article examines the government's managerialist agenda and the twin goals of downsizing the Ontario Public Service while increasing the involvement of business in program delivery. Analysis focuses on how the Ontario government conceives of partnership arrangements; the issue of differences in organizational power between public and private actors; the question of whether shared interests need necessarily exist between the parties; and the problem of securing accountability in partnership arrangements. It finds that collaborative partncrships and democratic accountability are in tension; public-sector organizations risk entering public-private partnerships in subordinate roles; and that divergent public and private purposes hampered the project. Moreover, the article suggests that the ministry's eventual corrective actions embraced traditional public administrative concerns. This development indicates that while recent managerialist reforms havc posed some challenge to public administration, it shows continued relevance in protecting the public interest. Sommaire: En janvier 1997, le ministère des Services sociaux et communautaires de l'Ontario a conch avec Andersen Consulting un partenariat entre secteurs public et privé. Le projet visait à appuyer le programme Ontario au travail et le Programme ontarien de soutien aux personnes handicapées. Le vérificateur provincial a, par la suite, passé en revue le projet et a identifié un certain nombre de problèmes. Ce cas particulier illustre certaines des questions clés associées aux partenariats entre le secteur public et le secteur privé en Ontario, et peut-être dans un champ plus vaste. L'artio cle examine le programme de nouveau management public du gouvernement let les deux objectifs jumeaux consistant à réduire la taille de la Fonction publique de l'Ontario tout en augmentant le rôe du secteur privé dans la prestation des programmes. L'analyse se centre sur la manière dont le gouvernement de l'Ontario conçoit les contrats de partenariat; la question des différences en matière de pouvoir organisationnel entre les intervenants des secteurs public et privé; la question de savoir si les parties doivent nécessairement partager des intérêts communs; et le problème de la garantie de l'imputabilité dans les contrats de partenariat. L'article montre qu'il existe des tensions dans les partenariats de collaboration par rapport à la responsabilité démocratique, que les organismes du secteur public risquent de conclure avec le secteur privé des partenariats où ils joueront des rôles subordonnés et que les objectifs divergents des secteurs public et privé ont été une entrave au projet. Par ailleurs, l'article laisse entendre que les mesures correctives prises finalement par le ministère ont tenu compte des préoccupations traditionnelles de l'administration publique. Cela indique que même si les récentes réformes de gestion ont posé certains défis à l'administration publique, elles visent toujours la protection de l'intérêt public. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||