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Delegation
Kinds of Delegation Selected AbstractsCOOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION, R&D AND COLLUSIONBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 2 2010Rupayan Pal L10; L13 ABSTRACT Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full-collusive outcomes,cannot,be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi-collusion,always,yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct. [source] Private Predecision Information, Performance Measure Congruity, and the Value of Delegation,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2000ROBERT M. BUSHMAN Abstract We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs. [source] Discussion of "Private Predecision Information, Performance Measure Congruity, and the Value of Delegation",CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2000SRIKANT M. DATAR First page of article [source] Oversight and Delegation in Corporate Governance: deciding what the board should decideCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2006Michael Useem American boards of directors increasingly treat their delegation of authority to management as a careful and self-conscious decision. Numerically dominated by non-executives, boards recognize that they cannot run the company, and many are now seeking to provide stronger oversight of the company without crossing the line into management. Based on interviews with informants at 31 major companies, we find that annual calendars and written protocols are often used to allocate decision rights between the board and management. Written protocols vary widely, ranging from detailed and comprehensive to skeletal and limited in scope. While useful, such calendars and protocols do not negate the need for executives to make frequent judgement calls on what issues should go to the board and what should remain within management. Executives still set much of the board's decision-making agenda, and despite increasingly asserting their sovereignty in recent years, directors remain substantially dependent upon the executives' judgement on what should come to the board. At the same time, a norm is emerging among directors and executives that the latter must be mindful of what directors want to hear and believe they should decide. [source] Oro-facial injuries in Central American and Caribbean sports games: a 20-year experienceDENTAL TRAUMATOLOGY, Issue 3 2005Enrique Amy Abstract,,, Dental services in sports competitions in the Games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee are mandatory. In every Central American, Pan American and Olympic Summer Games, as well as Winter Games, the Organizing Committee has to take all the necessary measures to assure dental services to all competitors. In all Olympic villages, as part of the medical services, a dental clinic is set up to treat any dental emergency that may arise during the Games. Almost every participating country in the Games has its own medical team and some may include a dentist. The major responsibilities of the team dentist as a member of the national sports delegation include: (i) education of the sports delegation about different oral and dental diseases and the illustration of possible problems that athletes or other personnel may encounter during the Games, (ii) adequate training and management of orofacial trauma during the competition, (iii) knowledge about the rules and regulations of the specific sport that the dentist is working, (iv) understanding of the anti-doping control regulations and procedures, (v) necessary skills to fabricate a custom-made and properly fitted mouthguard to all participants in contact or collision sports of the delegation. This study illustrates the dental services and occurrence of orofacial injury at the Central American and Caribbean Sports Games of the Puerto Rican Delegation for the past 20 years. A total of 2107 participants made up the six different delegations at these Games. Of these 279 or 13.2% were seen for different dental conditions. The incidence of acute or emergency orofacial conditions was 18 cases or 6% of the total participants. The most frequent injury was lip contusion with four cases and the sport that experienced more injuries was basketball with three cases. [source] Legislation, Delegation and Implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets RealityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 4 2009Herwig Hofmann This reform, the first since the Treaty of Rome, will have an impact on some of the most contested topics of EU law, touching several central questions of a constitutional nature. This article critically analyses which potential effects and consequences the reform will have. It looks, inter alia, at the aspects of the shifting relation between EU institutions, the distribution of powers between the EU and its Member States, as well as the future of rule-making and implementation structures such as comitology and agencies. [source] Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed PolityEUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 3 2002Giandomenico Majone It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation-of-powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ,mixed government',a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ,estates' representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation-of-powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule-making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ,regulatory estate'. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need. [source] The Myth of International Delegation: Limits to and Suggestions for Democratic Theory in the Context of the European Union1GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 1 2007Hans Agné This paper presents an argument as to why democratic states are unable to delegate authority to international organizations. Influential attempts to justify democratically such international bodies as the European Union by means of delegation are found to be untenable. At a more general level of theorization, it argues that the theory of delegation as involving the recoverability of delegated authority leaves us unable to identify democratic reforms for international organizations. As a remedy to the latter problem, the article proposes an alternative theory of democratic ,delegation', one that applies equally well to national and to international politics. [source] Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation,INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2005Francesca Castellani This paper proposes a simple model illustrating the potential benefits of approaching the design of a macroeconomic framework conducive to low inflation in both its monetary and fiscal dimensions rather than relying exclusively on the merits of central bank independence and other monetary commitment devices such as currency boards or dollarization. The reason is that monetary delegation alone merely ,relocates' the time-inconsistency problem stemming from the government's incentive to address structural output shortfall with a macroeconomic stimulus. This paper also provides a new argument explaining why fiscal deficit rules may be less effective than instrument-specific rules. [source] Delegation to Encourage Communication of ProblemsJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2009D. PAUL NEWMAN ABSTRACT We study a principal's choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems. We find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent's actions or to provide stronger incentives. Delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high. We find that increases in the principal's penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal's expected payoff, owing to optimal organizational responses. In addition, catastrophic risk, the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit (or product), may be greater under centralization than under delegation. Furthermore, catastrophic risk can be increased by well-intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by, for example, increasing the agent's penalties for failing to take a corrective action, because the organizational structure may change. [source] Delegation, Committees, and ManagersJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2007Birger Wernerfelt Attempts to economize on decision-making time imply that groups of peers may delegate authority to a small committee of managers even though this means that the information and preferences of the uninvolved players are neglected. Decisions are more likely to be delegated to players with better information and more representative preferences. The possibility of ex post protests may force managers to take the preferences of others into account but may also give them incentives to ignore their private information. The argument may explain employees' willingness to let bosses decide, and thus throw some light on the theory of the firm. [source] Delegation versus Veto in Organizational Games of Strategic CommunicationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 6 2007ANTHONY M. MARINO In organizations, principals use decision rules to govern a more informed agent's behavior. We compare two such rules: delegation and veto. Recent work suggests that delegation dominates veto unless the divergence in preferences between the principal and the agent is so large that informative communication cannot take place. We show that this result does not hold in a reasonable model of veto versus delegation. In this model, veto dominates delegation for any feasible divergence in preferences, if it induces the agent to shut down low quality proposals that he would otherwise implement and if such projects have sufficient likelihood. [source] Delegation and Wage Determination in Trade UnionsLABOUR, Issue 3 2000Laszlo Goerke Delegation of wage determination is modelled as the transferral of decision-making rights to better-informed agents. The rank and file of trade unions has less information and can, therefore, benefit from delegation. However, delegation might be disadvantageous for union members, since delegates pursue their own objectives. Also, delegates might incur a utility reduction, since becoming a delegate implies forfeiting a better-paid outside option. We investigate under what conditions delegation of wage bargaining power is beneficial for union members and their potential leaders. The wage and employment effects of delegation are derived. [source] Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contestsMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 8 2002Matthias Kräkel Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This paper shows that if the competition between the managers can be characterized as a contest, owners may induce their managers to maximize sales. Moreover, there is a first-mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive schemes. If delegation is endogenous the type of contest will determine whether all owners delegate their decisions to managers or not. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Reflections on School Nursing and DelegationPUBLIC HEALTH NURSING, Issue 2 2009Derryl Block No abstract is available for this article. [source] Delegation as a Source of LawRATIO JURIS, Issue 1 2003Dale Dewhurst The status of delegation as a strictly institutionalized source of law is controversial. In this article, we examine some instances of delegation, in order to explore their claim to be independent and strictly institutionalized sources of law. We consider primarily the instances of labour arbitration and of mediation. Our conclusion is that there is no straightforward answer in either instance to the question whether they constitute sources of law, although the claim of arbitration is strong and that of mediation is weak. We argue that the controversial character of delegation as a source of law is therefore to be expected, given its ambivalent character, and that in exploring the reasons for this ambivalence much can be learnt about the concept of a strictly institutionalized source of law. [source] Delegation of Authority In Business Organizations: An Empirical TestTHE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2004Massimo G. Colombo This paper tests the predictions of economic theory on the determinants of the allocation of decision-making power through the estimates of ordered probit models with random effects. Our findings show that the complexity of plants' operations and organization, the characteristics of the communication technologies in use, the ownership status of plants and the product mix of their parent companies figure prominently in explaining whether authority is delegated to the plant manager or not. In addition, the nature of the decision under consideration turns out to affect the allocation of authority. [source] Strategic Delegation in Monetary UnionsTHE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2004V. V. Chari In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation,that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union, are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem. [source] Organization, Management and Delegation in the French Water IndustryANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2001Jihad C. Elnaboulsi The water industry is largely a natural monopoly. Water distribution and sewerage services are characterized by networks and its natural monopoly derives from the established local networks of drinking water and sewers: they are capital intensive with sunk costs and increasing returns to scale. In France, local communities have a local requirement of providing public services under optimum conditions in terms of techniques and cost-effectiveness, and subject to respect different kind of standards in terms of water quality and level of services. They are responsible for producing and distributing drinking water, and collecting and treating wastewater. Furthermore, the French water utilities are required to be financially self-sufficient. Rate-setting varies across regions and local territories due to a variety of organizational features of services and availability of water resources. The management of these local public services can be public or private: local governments have the right, by the constitution, to delegate water service management to private companies which operate under the oversight of local municipal authorities. Today, nearly 80 per cent of the French population receive private distributed water. Different reasons are responsible for the poor performance and low productivity of most French public water utilities: technical and operational, commercial and financial, human and institutional, and environmental. Thus, many water public utilities have looked for alternative ways to provide water and sanitation services more efficiently, to improve both operational and investment efficiency, and to attract private finance. The purpose of this paper is to present the French organizational system of providing drinking water services, and collecting and treating wastewater services: legal aspects, contracts of delegation, and competition. [source] Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency CrisisBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 4 2003Virginie Boinet E52; F41 Abstract This paper shows that, in a fixed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, delegating the decision on the magnitude of realignment to an inflation-averse central banker reduces the range of realignment costs for which the policy-maker necessarily devalues. Stressing the influence of devaluation expectations on currency crises, it is also shown that this strategy of delegation reduces the width of the multiple equilibria zone within which self-fulfilling crises occur, thus promoting further the exchange-rate system's stability. The higher the central banker's degree of inflation aversion, the greater is this reduction. [source] Diplomats Without a Flag: The Institutionalization of the Delegations of the Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries,JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2006VÉRONIQUE DIMIER This article deals with the evolution of the status and role of the delegations of the European Commission in Africa from the 1960s onwards. Starting from an institutionalist approach, it tries to show to what extent this evolution reflects the bureaucratization of the external service (in the Weberian sense of a rational and professional civil service) in parallel with that of the administration of the Commission as a whole. It envisages the current reform of the external service as a new step in the construction of a mature European bureaucracy. [source] Cyclotron: a secure, isolated, virtual cycle-scavenging grid in the enterpriseCONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION: PRACTICE & EXPERIENCE, Issue 3 2010Kevin Kane Abstract Cycle-scavenging grids appeal to organizations with large numbers of workstations that remain idle outside of normal working hours. This represents a potential source of grid computing cycles, but the security and isolation issues that come with the use of non-dedicated resources have slowed their adoption in the enterprise. In this paper we present Cyclotron, a prototype cycle-scavenging grid solution that leverages virtualization and a declarative security policy-based access control infrastructure, supporting flexible authorization rules and the constrained delegation of access rights, to address these requirements. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Simulating multiple inheritance in JavaCONCURRENCY AND COMPUTATION: PRACTICE & EXPERIENCE, Issue 12 2002Douglas Lyon Abstract The CentiJ system automatically generates code that simulates multiple inheritance in Java. The generated code inputs a series of instances and outputs specifications that can be combined using multiple inheritance. The multiple inheritance of implementation is obtained by simple message forwarding. The reflection API of Java is used to reverse engineer the instances, and so the program can generate source code, but does not require source code on its input. Advantages of CentiJ include compile-time type checking, speed of execution, automatic disambiguation (name space collision resolution) and ease of maintenance. Simulation of multiple inheritance was previously available only to Java programmers who performed manual delegation or who made use of dynamic proxies. The technique has been applied at a major aerospace corporation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Private Predecision Information, Performance Measure Congruity, and the Value of Delegation,CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2000ROBERT M. BUSHMAN Abstract We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs. [source] Oversight and Delegation in Corporate Governance: deciding what the board should decideCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2006Michael Useem American boards of directors increasingly treat their delegation of authority to management as a careful and self-conscious decision. Numerically dominated by non-executives, boards recognize that they cannot run the company, and many are now seeking to provide stronger oversight of the company without crossing the line into management. Based on interviews with informants at 31 major companies, we find that annual calendars and written protocols are often used to allocate decision rights between the board and management. Written protocols vary widely, ranging from detailed and comprehensive to skeletal and limited in scope. While useful, such calendars and protocols do not negate the need for executives to make frequent judgement calls on what issues should go to the board and what should remain within management. Executives still set much of the board's decision-making agenda, and despite increasingly asserting their sovereignty in recent years, directors remain substantially dependent upon the executives' judgement on what should come to the board. At the same time, a norm is emerging among directors and executives that the latter must be mindful of what directors want to hear and believe they should decide. [source] Oro-facial injuries in Central American and Caribbean sports games: a 20-year experienceDENTAL TRAUMATOLOGY, Issue 3 2005Enrique Amy Abstract,,, Dental services in sports competitions in the Games sponsored by the International Olympic Committee are mandatory. In every Central American, Pan American and Olympic Summer Games, as well as Winter Games, the Organizing Committee has to take all the necessary measures to assure dental services to all competitors. In all Olympic villages, as part of the medical services, a dental clinic is set up to treat any dental emergency that may arise during the Games. Almost every participating country in the Games has its own medical team and some may include a dentist. The major responsibilities of the team dentist as a member of the national sports delegation include: (i) education of the sports delegation about different oral and dental diseases and the illustration of possible problems that athletes or other personnel may encounter during the Games, (ii) adequate training and management of orofacial trauma during the competition, (iii) knowledge about the rules and regulations of the specific sport that the dentist is working, (iv) understanding of the anti-doping control regulations and procedures, (v) necessary skills to fabricate a custom-made and properly fitted mouthguard to all participants in contact or collision sports of the delegation. This study illustrates the dental services and occurrence of orofacial injury at the Central American and Caribbean Sports Games of the Puerto Rican Delegation for the past 20 years. A total of 2107 participants made up the six different delegations at these Games. Of these 279 or 13.2% were seen for different dental conditions. The incidence of acute or emergency orofacial conditions was 18 cases or 6% of the total participants. The most frequent injury was lip contusion with four cases and the sport that experienced more injuries was basketball with three cases. [source] Diabetes Care Protocol: effects on patient-important outcomes.DIABETIC MEDICINE, Issue 4 2010A cluster randomized, non-inferiority trial in primary care Diabet. Med. 27, 442,450 (2010) Abstract Aims, The Diabetes Care Protocol (DCP) combines task delegation, intensification of diabetes treatment and feedback. It reduces cardiovascular risk in Type 2 diabetes (T2DM) patients. This study determines the effects of DCP on patient-important outcomes. Methods, A cluster randomized, non-inferiority trial, by self-administered questionnaires in 55 Dutch primary care practices: 26 practices DCP (1699 patients), 26 usual care (1692 patients). T2DM patients treated by their general practitioner were included. Main outcome was the 1-year between-group difference in Diabetes Health Profile (DHP-18) total score. Secondary outcomes: DHP-18 subscales, general perceived health [Medical Outcomes Study 36-Items Short Form Health Survey (SF-36), Euroqol 5 Dimensions (EQ-5D) and Euroqol visual analogue scale (EQ-VAS)], treatment satisfaction (Diabetes Treatment Satisfaction Questionnaire; DTSQ status) and psychosocial self-efficacy (Diabetes Empowerment Scale Short Form; DES-SF). Per protocol (PP) and intention-to-treat (ITT) analyses were performed: non-inferiority margin , = ,2%. At baseline 2333 questionnaires were returned and 1437 1 year thereafter. Results, Comparing DCP with usual care, DHP-18 total score was non-inferior: PP ,0.88 (95% CI ,1.94 to 0.12), ITT ,0.439 (95% CI ,1.01 to 0.08), SF-36 ,health change' improved: PP 3.51 (95% CI 1.23 to 5.82), ITT 1.91 (95% CI 0.62 to 3.23), SF-36 ,social functioning' was inconclusive: PP ,1.57 (95% CI ,4.3 to 0.72), ITT ,1.031 (95% CI ,2.52 to ,0.25). Other DHP and SF-36 scores were inconsistent or non-inferior. DHP-18 ,disinhibited eating' was significantly worse in PP analyses. For EQ-5D/EQ-VAS, DTSQ and DES-SF, no significant between-group differences were found. Conclusion, DCP does not seem to influence health status negatively, therefore diabetes care providers should not shrink from intensified treatment. However, they should take possible detrimental effects on ,social functioning' and ,disinhibited eating' into account. [source] STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON LAWYERS' COMPENSATION IN CIVIL DISPUTESECONOMIC INQUIRY, Issue 4 2007KYUNG HWAN BAIK We study a model of civil dispute with delegation in which a plaintiff's lawyer works on a contingent-fee basis but a defendant's lawyer on an hourly fee basis. We first derive the condition under which delegation to the lawyers brings both litigants more payoffs compared with the case of no delegation. We then show that under this profitable delegation condition, the contingent-fee fraction for the plaintiff's lawyer is about one-third. Next, allowing the plaintiff to choose between the two fees, we show that under the profitable delegation condition, the plaintiff chooses the contingent fee, given that the defendant adopts the hourly fee. (JEL K41, K13, D74, D72) [source] EMS improvement through effective delegation of environmental responsibilitiesENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2004Franklin Giles First page of article [source] Cannabis condemned: the proscription of Indian hempADDICTION, Issue 2 2003Robert Kendell ABSTRACT Aims To find out how cannabis came to be subject to international narcotics legislation. Method Examination of the records of the 1925 League of Nations' Second Opium Conference, of the 1894 Report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission and other contemporary documents. Findings Although cannabis (Indian hemp) was not on the agenda of the Second Opium Conference, a claim by the Egyptian delegation that it was as dangerous as opium, and should therefore be subject to the same international controls, was supported by several other countries. No formal evidence was produced and conference delegates had not been briefed about cannabis. The only objections came from Britain and other colonial powers. They did not dispute the claim that cannabis was comparable to opium, but they did want to avoid a commitment to eliminating its use in their Asian and African territories. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||