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Definite Descriptions (definite + description)
Selected AbstractsDirect Reference and Definite DescriptionsDIALECTICA, Issue 1 2008Genoveva Marti According to Donnellan the characteristic mark of a referential use of a definite description is the fact that it can be used to pick out an individual that does not satisfy the attributes in the description. Friends and foes of the referential/attributive distinction have equally dismissed that point as obviously wrong or as a sign that Donnellan's distinction lacks semantic import. I will argue that, on a strict semantic conception of what it is for an expression to be a genuine referential device, Donnellan is right: if a use of a definite description is referential, it must be possible for it to refer to an object independently of any attributes associated with the description, including those that constitute its conventional meaning. [source] The But Not All: A Partitive Account of Plural Definite DescriptionsMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2007BERIT BROGAARD In this paper I take a closer look at this suggestion. I argue that while the unitary account is clearly onto something right, it is in the end empirically inadequate. At the end of the paper I offer a new partitive account of plural definite descriptions that avoids the problems with both the unitary account and standard Russellian analyses. [source] Direct Reference and Definite DescriptionsDIALECTICA, Issue 1 2008Genoveva Marti According to Donnellan the characteristic mark of a referential use of a definite description is the fact that it can be used to pick out an individual that does not satisfy the attributes in the description. Friends and foes of the referential/attributive distinction have equally dismissed that point as obviously wrong or as a sign that Donnellan's distinction lacks semantic import. I will argue that, on a strict semantic conception of what it is for an expression to be a genuine referential device, Donnellan is right: if a use of a definite description is referential, it must be possible for it to refer to an object independently of any attributes associated with the description, including those that constitute its conventional meaning. [source] The Epistemological Argument Against Descriptivism,PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2002ROBIN JESHION The epistemological argument against descriptivism about proper names is extremely simple. Fora proper name ,N' and definite description ,F', the proposition expressed by "If N exists, then N is F is not normally known a priori. But descriptivism about proper names entails otherwise. So descriptivism is false. The argument is widely regarded as sound. This paper aims to establish that the epistemological argument is highly unstable. The problem with the argument is that there seems to be no convincing rationale for the first premise that is independent of a view about the nature of the proposition expressed by the sentence "If N exists, then N is F". [source] The Relationship Between Speaker's Reference and Semantic ReferenceLINGUISTICS & LANGUAGE COMPASS (ELECTRONIC), Issue 5 2010David Lumsden The distinction between speaker's and semantic reference arose in connection with Donnellan's distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of definite descriptions. The central issue concerning the referential/attributive distinction is whether it is semantic or pragmatic. Kripke favours the pragmatic interpretation and developed the terminology of speaker's and semantic reference in his explanation. The notion of speaker's reference can apply also to uses of proper names, demonstratives, indefinite descriptions and quantifier expressions. The main danger for the speaker's reference/semantic reference distinction lies in controversy over the semantics/pragmatics interface. Both Relevance Theory and neo-Gricean theory acknowledge the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion into semantics. If the pragmatic intrusion involves objective context rather than speaker's intentions this may permit a distinction between speaker's and semantic reference. [source] The But Not All: A Partitive Account of Plural Definite DescriptionsMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2007BERIT BROGAARD In this paper I take a closer look at this suggestion. I argue that while the unitary account is clearly onto something right, it is in the end empirically inadequate. At the end of the paper I offer a new partitive account of plural definite descriptions that avoids the problems with both the unitary account and standard Russellian analyses. [source] Ontological Symmetry in Language: A Brief ManifestoMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2006PHILIPPE SCHLENKER Various results from recent research in formal semantics suggest that this is not so, and that there is in fact a pervasive symmetry between the linguistic means with which we refer to these three domains. Reference to individuals, times and worlds is uniformly effected through generalized quantifiers, definite descriptions, and pronouns, and in each domain grammatical features situate the reference of terms as near, far or ,further' from the actual or from a reported speech act. We outline various directions in which a program of ontological symmetry could be developed, and we offer in the Appendix a symmetric fragment developed in a logic that can be seen as a compromise between an extensional and an intensional system. [source] Logical Form andthe VernacularMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 4 2001Reinaldo Elugardo Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, be doing this by using a sentence of their shared language, the proposition-meant has its logical form non-derivatively, which falsifies Vernacularism. We conclude the paper with a brief review of the debate on incomplete definite descriptions in which Vernacularism is assumed as a suppressed premise. [source] The Teetotaler and His MartiniMIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 5 2000Stefano Predelli I present a Russellian analysis of Donnellan's classic examples involving empty definite descriptions, such as a use of ,the man with the Martini' in a scenario in which the intended target is a teetotaler with water in his glass. Unlike the traditional Kripke-style responses to Donnellan, my analysis grants semantic significance to the intuition that, in appropriate circumstances, such a use picks out the teetotaler. I then argue that the apparatus developed in my discussion of Donnellan's examples may be successfully applied to the semantic treatment of improper definite descriptions, such as ,the table' in Strawson's ,the table is covered with books.' [source] UNIFIED SEMANTICS OF SINGULAR TERMSTHE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 228 2007John Justice Singular-term semantics has been intractable. Frege took the referents of singular terms to be their semantic values. On his account, vacuous terms lacked values. Russell separated the semantics of definite descriptions from the semantics of proper names, which caused truth-values to be composed in two different ways and still left vacuous names without values. Montague gave all noun phrases sets of verb-phrase extensions for values, which created type mismatches when noun phrases were objects and still left vacuous names without values. There is a single type of value for all noun phrases that dissolves the difficulties which have beset singular-term semantics. [source] | ||||||||||