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Decision-making Authority (decision-making + authority)
Selected AbstractsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTUREJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2003James A. Brickley Effective corporate leadership involves more than developing a good strategic plan and setting high ethical standards. It also means coming up with an organizational design that encourages the company's managers and employees to carry out its business plan and maintain its ethical standards. In this article, the authors use the term organizational architecture to refer to three key elements of a company's design: ,the assignment of decision-making authority,who gets to make what decisions; ,performance evaluation,the key measures of performance for evaluating business units and individual employees; and ,compensation structure,how employees are rewarded for meeting performance goals. In well-designed companies, each of these elements is mutually reinforcing and supportive of the company's overall business strategy. Decision-making authority is assigned to managers and employees who have the knowledge and experience needed to make the best investment and operating decisions. And to ensure that those decision makers have the incentive as well as the knowledge to make the best decisions, the corporate systems used to evaluate and reward their performance are based on measures that are linked as directly as possible to the corporate goal of creating value. Some of the most popular management techniques of the past two decades, such as reengineering, TQM, and the Balanced Scorecard, have often had disappointing results because they address only one or two elements of organizational architecture, leaving the overall structure out of balance. What's more, a flawed organizational design can lead to far worse than missed opportunities to create value. As the authors note, the recent corporate scandals involved not just improper behavior by senior executives, but corporate structures that, far from safeguarding against such behavior, in some ways encouraged it. In the case of Enron, for example, top management's near-total focus on boosting reported earnings (a questionable corporate goal to begin with) combined with decentralized decision making and loose oversight at all levels of the company to produce an enormously risky high-leverage strategy that ended up bringing down the firm. [source] Examining the Antecedents and Consequences of CIO Strategic Decision-Making Authority: An Empirical Study,DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 4 2008David S. Preston ABSTRACT Despite the strategic importance of information technology (IT) to contemporary firms, chief information officers (CIO) often still have varying degrees of strategic decision-making authority. In this study, we apply the theory of managerial discretion to define CIO strategic decision-making authority and argue that the CIO's level of strategic decision-making authority directly influences IT's contribution to organization performance. We also draw on the power and politics perspective in the strategic decision-making literature to identify the direct antecedents to the CIO's strategic decision-making authority. A theoretical model is presented and empirically tested using survey data collected from a cross-industry sample of 174 matched pairs of CIOs and top business executives through structural equation modeling. The results suggest that organizational climate, organizational support for IT, the CIO's structural power, the CIO's level of strategic effectiveness, and a strong partnership between the CIO and top management team directly influence the CIO's level of strategic decision-making authority within the organization. The results also suggest that the CIO's strategic decision-making authority in the organization directly influences the contribution of IT to firm performance and that effective CIOs have a greater influence on IT's contribution when provided with strategic decision-making authority. [source] Issue Representation in Neighborhood Organizations: Questing for Democracy at the GrassrootsJOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2000David Swindell In this era of government reinvention and devolution, some have expressed interest in applying that logic to the local level by including neighborhood associations among the mechanisms for delivering urban services. However, if decision-making authority were to be decentralized to a greater extent, there is the possibility that the decisions of these organizational participants might not be reflective of the group they are supposed to represent. This article seeks to examine the issue representation ability of neighborhood associations. Using a unique neighborhood-level dataset from Indianapolis, this analysis reveals how representative the organization's activities are in terms of the issues that are of most importance to residents (other participants and non-participants). In addition, the article presents and tests a model to explain differences in the levels of representation. The findings raise concerns with the wisdom of such devolution as well as highlight the environmental and organizational characteristics that influence issue representation. [source] The Little State Department: McGeorge Bundy and the National Security Council Staff, 1961-65PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001ANDREW PRESTON This article examines the alteration of the role, prerogatives, and power of the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, a position more commonly known as the national security adviser. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower conceived of and shaped the National Security Council(NSC) and its staff to be administrative in their responsibilities and character. Under President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy utterly changed this, concentrating power and decision-making authority in the hands of the special assistant and his NSC staff at the White House. From 1961, the special assistant and NSC staff ceased to be administrators and became policy formulators actively engaged in the policy-making process. This transformation occurred largely at the expense of the State Department and had profound consequences for American foreign policy, particularly toward the conflict in Vietnam. [source] State Wildlife Policy and Management: The Scope and Bias of Political ConflictPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Martin Nie State wildlife policy and management are often characterized by divisive political conflict among competing stakeholders. This conflict is increasingly being resolved through the ballot-initiative process. One important reason the process is being used so often is the way state wildlife policy and management decisions are often made by state wildlife commissions, boards, or councils (the dominant way these decisions are made in the United States). These bodies are often perceived by important stakeholders as biased, exclusive, or unrepresentative of nonconsumptive stakeholder values. As a result, unsatisfied interest groups often try to take decision-making authority away from these institutions and give it to the public through the ballot initiative. Cases and examples from Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho are examined in this context. The article finishes by outlining four broad alternatives that may be debated in the future: the no change alternative, the authoritative expert alternative, the structural change alternative, and the stakeholder-based collaborative conservation alternative(s). [source] The sequencing of reform policies in China's agricultural transition,THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 3 2004Alan De Brauw Abstract This paper provides evidence regarding gains due to agricultural market liberalization in China. We empirically identify the different effects that incentive and farm restructuring reforms and gradual market liberalization have on China's agricultural economy during its transition period. We find that average gains within the agricultural sector due to reforms that improved incentives and increased decision-making authority of producers exceed gains due to market liberalization by a large margin. Our method of analyzing the effects of transition policies on economic performance can be generalized to other reform paths in other transition economies. [source] Property rights and western United States water markets,AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2009Zachary Donohew This paper addresses water scarcity issues in the American West and examines the allocation of water through the appropriative rights system and the extent markets are used to reallocate water from low- to high-valued uses. The unique physical properties of water make it difficult to bound and measure, which makes defining property rights difficult. Markets are also impeded by disputes over third-party effects due to the interdependencies of water users and complex institutional arrangements that dilute decision-making authority. Analysis of water trading in the western United States indicates that the rate of permanent transfers is increasing over time and urban users are paying higher prices relative to agricultural users. [source] | |||||||||||||